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This thesis describes and analyzes four markers of Indus Kohistani, a language spoken in Northern 
Pakistan that has received little attention so far. The markers discussed are lee, a “hearsay” evidential 
that does however not mark every reported speech, karee, a grammaticalized quotative and 
complementizer that is also found in purpose and reason clauses, in naming and in similarity 
constructions, če, a complementizer borrowed from Pashto, and loo, a marker that indicates utterances a 
speaker wishes her audience to convey to a third party.  
Relevance Theory, an inferential theory of communication, distinguishes between utterances that 
are descriptions or representations of a state of affairs and utterances that are the representations of 
another representation like speech or thought, i.e. metarepresentations. This distinction allows for an 
analysis within this framework that shows one underlying meaning common to all four markers: all are 
used as indicators of metarepresentation. What distinguishes them is the kind of metarepresentation they 
point out. The evidential lee indicates metarepresentation of attributed utterances; karee marks attributed 
and self-attributed thoughts and utterances; the complementizer če indicates the same 
metarepresentations while gradually replacing karee; and the marker loo is used to indicate 
metarepresentations of desirable utterances, a non-attributive type of metarepresentation. Furthermore, I 
suggest that the evidential lee also activates the cognitive assessment mechanism of an addressee, 
providing input for the evaluation of the communicated information, namely its source. A speaker will 
use lee when what she communicates is the report of rather unusual events, to show herself as 
trustworthy and to hand over some of the responsibility of assessment to the addressee.  
This study uses data from collected narrative and non-narrative recorded texts as well as from 




Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
One purpose of this thesis is to describe four discourse markers of Indus Kohistani1, a language 
that so far has not received much attention. Each of these particles marks utterances that are not 
descriptions of states of affairs but representations of someone’s speech or thoughts: The evidential 
particle lee indicates reported speech but is not used as a default ‘reported’ marker. The marker karee, 
the converb of kar- ‘do’ is similar to SAY complementizers in its functions as a quotative, as a 
complementizer and as a marker of purpose and reason clauses. The complementizer če, a more recent 
acquisition into the Indus Kohistani lexicon, seems to be replacing the marker karee in all the uses 
mentioned above but is even more multifunctional. Finally, the marker loo indicates utterances that a 
speaker wants her hearer to say to a third person. 
The second purpose of this study is to propose an analysis that offers an underlying unifying 
meaning but can also account for the differences between the four markers. Using the theoretical 
framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995), an inferential theory of communication,  I 
will show that lee, karee, če, and loo are procedural indicators of metarepresentation, the feature that is 
common to all four. What distinguishes them is the kind of metarepresentation they mark: lee indicates 
attributed metarepresentations of speech, karee and če mark (self-) attributed metarepresentations of 
speech and thought, and loo indicates metarepresentations of non-attributive desirable utterances. 
Furthermore, the fact that lee does not mark every instance of reported speech can be explained within 
relevance theory by analyzing lee as an indicator that triggers the hearer’s argumentative module, a 
                                              
1 “ISO 639-3 code [mvy]”. 
2 
 
cognitive epistemic vigilance mechanism aimed at protecting a hearer from being misinformed (Sperber 
et al. 2010). It follows that a speaker will use lee when she wants to present herself as a reliable and 
trustworthy informant by laying open the sources of her information, so that the addressee believes her. 
In the remaining part of this chapter I introduce the speakers of Indus Kohistani and the language 
itself in sections 1.2 and 1.3.  An overview of previous research of Indus Kohistani is presented in 
section 1.4. Section 1.5 contains a brief description of the data used in this study and their transcription. 
In section 1.6 I list the main typological features of Indus Kohistani (a more detailed description is 
provided in the Appendix); and this chapter concludes in section 1.7 with an overview of the thesis. 
1.2 Indus Kohistani: the people  
Kohistan, a Persian word meaning “land of mountains”, is the name of an area and district in the 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (formerly North-West Frontier Province) in Northern Pakistan. And 
indeed, this mountainous region in the Western Himalayas has been one of the most remote and difficult 
to access. Only since the construction of the Karakoram Highway, which connects Pakistan with China 
and was completed in 1979, can it be reached more easily.  
The Indus river divides the district Kohistan into an Eastern and a Western part; at the same time it 
also functions as a natural border between two language areas: on the Eastern side, Shina Kohistani is 
spoken, on the West bank and its side valleys Indus Kohistani. On both sides of the river the inhabitants 
refer to themselves as Kohistani. In the 1981 census (as cited in Hallberg 1992:89) the number of 
people living in the district Kohistan was given as approximately 470,000, about half of these living on 
the Western side of the Indus. In 1998 the reported population number was 472,579 (District Profile 
Kohistan 2007:23); assuming that about half of them still live on the Western bank the estimated 
number of Indus Kohistani speakers at that time was approximately 235,000. There has been no more 
recent census.  
Traditionally, most of the Indus Kohistani speakers were herders and farmers who used to move up 
and down the mountains in a yearly cycle (transhumance; for a detailed description see Zarin and 
Schmidt 1984). The winter months were spent near the river; in Spring people with their families and 
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cattle moved up the side valleys. On their way up they would plant maize on different altitude levels 
and spend the hottest months on alpine pastures high up the mountains. At the end of the summer 
season they would gradually move back towards the river, harvesting the fields on each level on their 
way down. At that time, the only way to get to more settled areas of Pakistan was on precarious 
footpaths (Jettmar 1975:22; Zoller 2005:6).  
The construction of the Karakoram Highway has opened up the area and thereby triggered many 
changes. Nowadays, many have abandoned this way of life for economic reasons and have left the 
district in search for a living elsewhere. In all major cities of Pakistan, from Peshawar to Karachi, there 
are Kohistani settlements. Some of these are in the Mansehra - Abbottabad area in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
Province where an increasing number of Indus Kohistani speakers is living, among them the extended 
family of my main language consultant. 
1.3 Indus Kohistani: the language 
Indus Kohistani is classified as belonging to the Central (Kohistani) group of Dardic languages 
within the Northwestern zone of Indo-Aryan. On a higher level, it is part of the Indo-Iranian, and Indo-
European language family (Hallberg 1999:1; Zoller 2005:1; Mock 1997:6).  
The term “Dardic languages” is somewhat of a misnomer; it refers back to the Dards or “Darada”, 
a people who, according to Sanskrit, Greek and Roman sources, were assumed to live in the area of the 
upper Indus which includes today’s Northern Pakistan (Jettmar 1975:19). The term was again used in 
the 19th century to describe “an independent mountain tribe, three or four marches north from Dras, who 
speak the Pashtu as well as the Daradi language” (Izzet Ullah 1843:286 as cited in in Mock 1997:4). As 
Mock remarks, the area mentioned here most likely refers to the Astor valley where until today Shina is 
spoken. Subsequently other authors continued to use “Dardic” and “Dards”, among them Leitner  
(1893:1) who coined the geographical term Dardistan ‘land of the Dards’ which included the Shina-
speaking area as well as Hunza and Nagar in the North, and the area to the West up to Chitral and parts 
of Eastern Afghanistan. It has to be noted that none of the inhabitants of what Leitner called Dardistan 
ever referred to themselves as Dards.  
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Following Leitner, Grierson (1919:1) then adopted the term “Dardic” to refer to the languages 
spoken in this area and to classify them as an independent branch of Indo-Iranian (Masica 1991:461), 
assuming that a genetic relationship distinguishes this group of languages from others. This assumption 
(and likewise the use of the term) has since been a point of dispute; most authors (the author of this 
study included) use the expression as a convenient term for a group of languages in the mountainous 
area of Northern Pakistan but note that it is a geographical rather than a linguistic term; that is, the term 
“Dardic” does not indicate that the languages in question are a separate branch of Indo-Aryan 
(Morgenstierne 1965:138-9; Fussman 1972:11; Mock 1997; Strand 1997/2013; Liljegren 2008:29-32). 
As long as there is no evidence of shared innovations that would distinguish the languages classified as 
Dardic from other languages, the term “Dardic” will remain controversial; a reason for some 
researchers to reject the use of the term (Strand 1997/2013) and to replace it with a less contentious one 
(Liljegren 2008:31). 
When asked by an outsider, Indus Kohistani speakers refer to their language as koostãĩ̀  
‘Kohistani’. As this term is also used for other languages of Northern Pakistan, Hallberg (1992:91) 
introduced the term Indus Kohistani to avoid confusion. Other names mentioned in the literature about 
Indus Kohistani include Shuthun (Leitner (1893 Appendix IV:1), Mayon and Maiyã  
(Biddulph 1880:12), but there is no evidence that these names are known or used currently.  
There are two main dialects of Indus Kohistani: one spoken in the settlements near the Indus River, 
such as Jijal, Pattan and Seo, and a second variety spoken in the Kandia and the Duber valley (Hallberg 
1992:92-102)2. The sociolinguistic survey by Hallberg shows that the two dialects share around 90% 
lexical similarity; he notes that mother-tongue speakers from both areas perceive both varieties as one 
and the same language. There are some phonological differences as well as differences in verb inflection 
which is a topic of current research (Hallberg, p.c.). However, as Zoller (2005:4) remarks, although 
                                              
2 Leitner (1893, appendix IV: 10) mentions two dialects “Shéná” and “Shúthun” which however turned out to 
be two different languages, namely Shina Kohistani and Indus Kohistani. Jettmar (1983), Fussman (1989), and 
Cooper and Fitch (1985) remark on the existence of  two distinct dialects on the Western side of the Indus, but the 
first comprehensive dialect survey was done by Hallberg (1992). 
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dialectal variations within the two varieties are few, mother-tongue speakers can easily identify another 
speaker’s home village by his speech.  
The Indus Kohistani language area is surrounded by several other languages, among them Shina 
Kohistani on the Eastern bank of the Indus; another dialect of Shina is spoken in the North-East, and to 
the South and South-West of District Kohistan, Pashto is the main language. In the next valley to the 
West, in Swat, we find Torwali and Gawri (Kalam Kohistani), two other languages belonging to the 
Dardic group. Three smaller languages, Bateri, Chilisso and Gowro, are found within the Shina-
Kohistani language area on the East bank of the Indus (Hallberg 1992; Zoller 2005). Furthermore, small 
language enclaves of Indus Kohistani as well as of other languages can be found outside their own 
language areas; for a more detailed picture I refer the reader to Zoller (2005:8-10). 
The languages of wider communication are Pashto, and increasingly Urdu, which is the language of 
instruction in schools and the official language of Pakistan. As the literacy rate in district Kohistan, 
especially for females, is low (District Profile Kohistan 2007:17) it is mainly younger men who are 
proficient in Urdu, although most men speak some Urdu or Pashto. The majority of the women are 
more or less monolingual, or speak some Shina Kohistani or Pashto when women from those language 
areas come into the family through marriage. 
In the growing language community outside the district Kohistan the picture is different: often both 
boys and girls are sent to school; also the women of such families learn the local languages of their 
neighbors (Hindko, Pashto, Punjabi etc.) as well as some Urdu due to the Urdu television programs. 
And as can be observed elsewhere in Pakistan, English vocabulary makes its steady entry into the Indus 
Kohistani lexicon. 
To conclude this section, Hallberg (1992:112) characterizes Indus Kohistani as a very vital 
language that is widely used in homes as well as in most other domains. 
1.4  Previous research 
When looking at the entries for the language Indus Kohistani in Baart and Baart’s “Bibliography of 
languages of Northern Pakistan” (2001:66), there exists relatively little literature compared with other 
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languages of the region. In this section I look at publications about the language Indus Kohistani, 
leaving aside literature that is concerned with Indus Kohistan from an ethnological viewpoint. 
The book “Dardistan” by Leitner, published in 1893, contains the first written evidence of the 
language in the form of word lists, dialogs, proverbs, riddles and a ballad, presumably all from an 
informant of the Kandia valley. Leitner himself had never been in Kohistan. Biddulph (1880:158) 
mentions the “Maiyon tribe of Kandia, Doobeyr and Seo” but the only language data of the area of 
today’s Kohistan described by him are of Chilisso. In 1958 Barth and Morgenstierne published some 
wordlists of Indus Kohistani; this was followed by a study of the language of Kanyawali3 by Buddruss 
(1959). In 1985 Fitch and Cooper published their “Report on a Language and Dialect survey in 
Kohistan District”; the first extensive survey of languages in Kohistan was carried out by Hallberg and 
published in 1992 (Rensch, Decker and Hallberg 1992:83-115). This was followed by the monograph 
“Indus Kohistani: A Preliminary Phonological and Morphological Analysis” by Hallberg and Hallberg 
in 1999; their data are from the Seo and Jijal villages. A dictionary of Indus Kohistan, based on the Jijal 
variety, was published by Zoller in 2005, including notes on phonology and Indus Kohistani tone, and a 
diachronic sketch of the Dardic languages. 
A primer of the Indus Kohistani variety of Kandia together with some notes on the grammar has 
been published in 2007 by M. Sh. Rashid, himself an Indus Kohistani mother tongue speaker. 
1.5 Data and transcription 
My first contacts with Indus Kohistani speakers were within a hospital context, where I worked as 
a midwife and nurse. Caring for patients whose only language was Indus Kohistani made it necessary to 
learn their mother tongue. Subsequently, the language learning developed into language documentation 
and research. The data used in this thesis4 consist of a large corpus of oral texts that include folk stories, 
                                              
3 Kanyawali is a village within a Shina-speaking area whose inhabitants are Indus Kohistani speakers, see also 
Zoller 2005: 5. 
4 Data collected under IRB proposal  # IRB 200908-041 with the author as principal investigator.  Permission to 
include data collected between 2001 and 2009 has been given by protocol change approved on July 8, 2011. 
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narratives of personal experiences, expository and procedural texts5; these have been recorded between 
2001 and 2009 and have been transcribed and translated by me6. A second corpus of recorded 
conversations has been collected within the extended family of my main language consultant in the 
years 2011 to 2014. The passages relevant for this study have again been transcribed and translated by 
me. The data represent the Pattan variety of Indus Kohistani as spoken by the people settled in Pattan, 
the dialect found in settlements near the Indus river. Due to cultural constraints the speakers are, with 
very few exceptions, female; and my medical background is to be blamed for the relative dominance of 
health-related topics in the collected data. Names of speakers and persons mentioned in the data have 
been replaced by capital letters so as not to reveal their identity. 
The transcription of Kohistani language data in this study is mostly based on what Masica calls the 
“Standard Orientalist” transcription (Masica 1991:XV), with the addition of symbols borrowed from the 
International Phonetic Alphabet (IPA). Retroflex consonants are represented by letters with subscript 
dots: ṭ, ḍ, ṛ, ṇ. Aspirated consonants are represented with a regular h following the consonant as in th, 
dh, ph, etc. The characters ṣ, ẓ, and c ̣represent the voiceless and the voiced retroflex grooved fricative, 
and the voiceless retroflex affricate. Alveopalatal fricatives and affricates are written as follows: š 
represents the voiceless grooved fricative, and ž its voiced counterpart; č denotes the voiceless affricate, 
and ts the voiceless dental affricate. The voiceless velar fricative is represented by x, its voiced 
counterpart as ɣ. The character y represents the palatal semivowel, as y in English yard. I do not follow 
Masica in his annotation of vowel length. In this study a long vowel is represented as for example aa, a 
short vowel as a (Masica uses ā for a long vowel). Likewise, nasalization is indicated by the tilde over 
the vowel symbol as in ãã, representing a long nasalized vowel (In Masica’s transcription the tilde 
follows the vowel).  
                                              
5 The corpus includes one hundred and five texts of varying length: the shortest ones consist of  twenty 
sentences, the longest ones of five hundred and thirty sentences. Average length is between one and two hundred 
sentences.  
6 My own estimate of my proficiency in Indus Kohistani would be level three on a 1 to 5 scale or, in the terms 
of the ACTFL proficiency guidelines, ‘advanced’ level. 
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Indus Kohistani has pitch accent which is perceived as either rising or falling. In this study I follow 
Zoller (2005) in that a rising tone is represented with an acute accent as in á and aá, and a falling tone 
with a grave accent as in à and àa.  
1.6 Main typological features of Indus Kohistani grammar 
In this section I briefly mention the main typological features of Indus Kohistani. A more detailed 
overview with examples will be presented in the Appendix (for a phonological and morphological 
analysis see Hallberg 1999; Zoller 2005; Buddruss 1959). 
The basic constituent order of pragmatically unmarked Indus Kohistani clauses is S-O-V. Speech 
and other sentential complements may follow the clause-final verb of the matrix clause. The word order 
may be different because of pragmatic factors.  
In an Indus Kohistani noun phrase, the head noun is usually the right-most element; adjectives, 
demonstratives, numerals, possessors, and the indefinite marker ek ‘one’ precede the noun. Relative 
clauses may be prenominal or postnominal. 
In Indus Kohistani verb phrases with complex verb constructions, the first verb usually carries the 
meaning and has a non-finite form (root or participle) whereas the second verb is marked for 
tense/aspect and agreement but is more or less semantically empty. 
Grammatical relations within noun and postpositional phrases are marked on the dependent 
element. That is, adjectives of the variable kind show agreement with the head noun for gender (and for 
number as well in some cases); possessors are marked with genitive case and show gender/number 
agreement with the head of the phrase, the possessee; and in postpositional phrases the noun as the 
dependent element is case-marked. 
At the clausal level, Indus Kohistani shows case marking, again a marking of grammatical relations 
on the dependent constituent, and agreement of the verb with its subject, this being a case of head 
marking. 
Indus Kohistani displays ergative alignment in clauses with transitive verbs that are marked for 
perfective aspect. For a more detailed description and examples see the Appendix, section  3. 
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The Indus Kohistani verb shows one of two agreement patterns: Finite verbs are marked for aspect, 
tense and gender/number agreement, verb forms expressing mood are marked for person and number 
only. Again, more details and verb paradigm examples are found in the Appendix section  4. 
1.7 Overview of the thesis 
In Chapter 2 I introduce Relevance Theory, the theoretical framework used for the analysis of the 
four Indus Kohistani markers that are the topic of this study.  
Chapter 3 discusses the Indus Kohistani “reported” marker lee. After introducing this marker and 
giving a brief overview of similar evidential markers in the wider geographical context I describe the 
different uses of lee and then analyze it as a marker that indicates metarepresentation of attributed 
utterances. Moreover, I show that lee also plays a role in activating a hearer’s cognitive assessment 
mechanism, the argumentative module; this analysis can account for the fact that lee is not the default 
“reported” marker in Indus Kohistani. 
In Chapter 4 I introduce the marker karee, the grammaticalized converb of the verb kar- ‘do’ that 
has a wide range of functions from marking reported speech to indicating reported thought, and purpose 
and reason clauses. This chapter gives an overview of sentential complementation in Indus Kohistani 
and then describes the different uses of the marker. As karee shows many similarities to so-called SAY 
complementizers (complementizers that have developed from a verb of speech) found on the Indian 
subcontinent, Turkic and Tibetan languages as well as in other parts of the world, section 4.4 presents 
an overview of relevant literature concerning grammaticalization of such complementizers. In section 
4.5 I analyze karee as a metarepresentation marker that indicates (self-) attributed utterances and 
thoughts.  
Chapter 5 discusses the Indus Kohistani complementizer če, a borrowed marker that is on the way 
to partly replace the older marker karee. After describing this multifunctional marker and its uses I 
analyse če as a metarepresentation marker similar to karee in many aspects but also different in that its 
uses extend those of karee. The chapter concludes with a brief synchronic and diachronic analysis of 
these two markers. 
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In Chapter 6 I present the Indus Kohistani marker loo, a discourse particle that marks utterances 
that a speaker wants her addressee to say to a third person. The marker loo is also used as an indicator 
of third-person imperative. In section 6.3 I describe and illustrate its two main uses; in section 6.4. I 
analyze loo as a metarepresentation marker of desirable utterances and show that this analysis accounts 
for both uses stated above. 
Chapter 7 contains a summary of this thesis and discusses topics for further research.  
 
11 
Chapter 2  
Relevance Theory 
In this chapter, I introduce Relevance Theory, the theoretical framework used for the analysis of 
the four Indus Kohistani markers treated in this study. This brief introduction to Relevance Theory is 
based on Sperber and Wilson (1995), Blass (1990), and Unger (2006). 
2.1 Communication is inferential: the basics of Relevance Theory 
Relevance Theory has been described as an “inferential theory of communication which aims to 
explain how the audience infers the communicator’s intended meaning” (Unger 2006:10). This theory 
stands in contrast to the “code model” approach (as outlined in Blass 1990:34) where communication is 
basically seen as a matter of encoding and decoding messages. Grice (1989) went beyond the code 
model by pointing out the huge role that inference plays in the process of interpreting a speaker’s 
meaning. Grice noted that a communicator provides evidence (not necessarily linguistically encoded) for 
her intentions7; the hearer on his part has to infer the intentions from the evidence offered. Grice 
formulated four basic maxims of conversation, namely the maxims of quality, of quantity, of relevance, 
and of manner which together underlie the co-operative principle of communication (Grice 1989).  
Building on Grice’s insight into the inferential nature of communication, Sperber and Wilson 
(1995) postulate that inference in communication is not just filling the gap between “what is said” and 
“what is meant” but is fundamental in all aspects of utterance interpretation. Furthermore they claim 
that in fact relevance is the single factor guiding an audience in recovering an intended meaning, 
making Grice’s maxims and co-operative principle of communication redundant. 
                                              
7 Throughout this study, unnamed speakers or communicators will be referred to with a female pronoun and 
addressees with a male pronoun. 
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Sperber and Wilson formulated two principles, the cognitive principle of relevance and the 
communicative principle of relevance: 
Cognitive principle of relevance: Human cognition tends to be geared to 
the maximization of relevance. 
and 
Communicative principle of relevance: Every act of ostensive 
communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal 
relevance (Sperber and Wilson 1995:260). 
In other words, human cognition in general attends only to those phenomena (utterances and otherwise) 
that promise to be relevant in some way. In the case of communication, the single factor guiding the 
hearer’s comprehension process is the search for relevance; the speaker, on the other hand, by the mere 
act of communicating verbally signals that the content of her utterance will be relevant to the hearer. 
The comprehension process then goes as follows: (i) recovery of the linguistic utterance content by 
decoding; its result is an incomplete logical form, (ii) reference assignment, disambiguation, recovery of 
elided material, resolution of semantic indeterminacies such as big, here, or now, all by way of 
inference, the result of which is a fully developed propositional form or explicature, (iii) search for 
implicit contents, or implicatures, within a specific context, again a purely inferential process, until the 
search for relevance has been satisfied and thereby the speaker’s intended meaning has been recovered 
(1995:185-202). It has to be noted that although this brief description might be seen as a serial order of 
steps (i) to (iii), this is not the case: massive parallel processing takes place in the search for relevance. 
Information that is relevant increases or improves an individual’s overall knowledge of the world. 
We say in this case that the hearer achieves cognitive effects. These occur in three different ways: (i) 
the new information, processed together with already existing assumptions, leads to new conclusions or 
contextual implications, thus increasing the knowledge about the world, (ii) the new information 
confirms and strengthens already existing assumptions, and (iii) the new information contradicts already 
existing assumptions and, being stronger than these, will eliminate them and so improve the existing 
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assumptions about the world. Information which does not lead to one of these three effects is not 
relevant to a hearer. 
Search for relevance, or cognitive effects, involves costs such as processing effort and time. The 
human mind is geared to process only such information which promises cognitive effects with the least 
expenditure of time and effort. High processing costs will decrease the relevance of any input. It follows 
that relevance is defined in terms of cognitive effects as well as processing costs. A hearer will 
therefore, when interpreting an utterance, always follow a path of least effort, access the context most 
accessible, and stop the interpretation process when his expectations of relevance is satisfied (Wilson 
2012:238). 
2.2 Representation and metarepresentation 
One basic concept in Relevance Theory, and indeed in cognition and Theory of Mind in general, is 
that of representation and metarepresentation. A representation is used to represent something else. The 
photo of a house represents a real house; likewise, the word house  represents a real house and the 
concept “house”. Our knowledge about the world is stored in the mind in the form of representations of 
the world. The utterance “Yesterday was my sister’s birthday” represents a state of affairs in the world 
if it is true that the speaker’s sister had birthday one day prior to the utterance. Such an instance Sperber 
and Wilson call the descriptive use of a representation (Sperber and Wilson 1995:228). To clarify, on 
the most basic level every utterance is the representation of a thought of the speaker and resembles this 
thought. In what follows I am not concerned with this basic level, the descriptive use of representation 
and resemblance. What concerns us here are instances where the speaker’s utterance does not represent 
a state of affairs in the sense described above but represents another utterance or thought. Such an 
utterance is the metarepresentation of another utterance or thought: a lower-order representation 
embedded within a higher-order representation. Example (1) is such an instance. 
(1) A: “What did Mary say to you?” 
 B: “She said, ‘I have to go to a meeting to Islamabad tomorrow’”  
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A direct quotation such as the example above is a typical instance of such a metarepresentation. 
Speaker B’s utterance does not only contain a descriptively used representation (“she said”) but also the 
representation of another representation, namely Mary’s utterance. B is quoting Mary verbatim, that is, 
Mary’s original utterance, the lower-order representation, and B’s quote of her, the higher-order 
representation, are identical. But does such a metarepresentation have to be identical with the lower-
order representation, or in other words, are only direct quotes instances of metarepresentation? Sperber 
and Wilson show that this is not the case. It is not identity but rather resemblance of some kind that 
characterizes the relation between representation and metarepresentation. To use example (1), if speaker 
B had answered A’s question by saying “Tomorrow she has to go to a meeting to Islamabad”, B’s 
utterance would still be a metarepresentation of Mary’s, albeit not a verbatim one. What is important 
here is that the two representations resemble each other; in our example it is resemblance of content or, 
as Wilson says, in sharing of logical and contextual implications. Imagine that B’s answer is something 
like “She won’t be here tomorrow”. Although there is even less similarity between original utterance 
and quote, there is still resemblance in the shared implication that Mary will not be here tomorrow. To 
quote Wilson, 
According to Relevance Theory, in interpreting a quotation, or more 
generally a linguistic metarepresentation, the hearer is not entitled to 
assume a strict identity between representation and original. Rather, 
following the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure, he should 
start deriving implications that might plausibly be shared with the 
original, and stop when he has enough to satisfy his expectation of 
relevance. Thus, resemblance rather than identity, is the normal or 
typical case (Wilson 2012:244).  
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Such a resemblance in content is also called interpretive resemblance; a metarepresentation that 
resembles the lower-order representation is used interpretively. It follows that not only direct but also 
indirect and free indirect quotations are instances of metarepresentation.  
However, this is not the whole range of  linguistic metarepresentations. Sperber and Wilson 
distinguish between attributed and non-attributed metarepresentations, and in the case of attributed ones, 
between interpretive and metalinguistic metarepresentations. As to the latter contrasting pair, B’s 
utterance “She won’t be here tomorrow” above is an instance of an interpretive metarepresentation that 
shares implications with the original but not verbatim identity. If on the other hand speaker B is quoting 
Mary verbatim, may be even imitating her accent, then this is an instance of a metalinguistic 
metarepresentation where the resemblance that the speaker points out is linguistic and stylistic rather 
than in content.  
Attributive metarepresentations also include self-attributed metarepresentations: quotes of a 
speaker’s previous utterances or thoughts, such as utterances introduced by “As I said, …” or “I think 
that …”.  
A special case of attributive metarepresentation is one that echoes an attributed utterance or thought 
and at the same time expresses the speaker’s attitude towards it. Consider example (2), taken from 
Wilson ((21) and (22) in 2012:249). Suppose Peter and Mary have been to see a film. As they come out, 
one of the following exchanges occurs:  
(2) PETER: That was a fantastic film. 
        
 MARY: a. [happily]  Fantastic. 
  b. [puzzled]  Fantastic? 
  c. [scornfully]  Fantastic!  
Mary’s answers in (2a), (2b), and (2c) metarepresent Peter’s remark but they do not achieve relevance 
merely by resembling Peter’s utterance in content: it is Mary’s attitude to this content that she wants to 
convey with this kind of metarepresentation. In the case of (2c), her attitude is one of strong 
disagreement with Peter’s view of the film. Irony is an instance of echoic metarepresentation where a 
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speaker quotes or echoes an attributed utterance or thought and at the same time dissociates herself from 
this quote.  
Other cases of echoic utterances include denials such as the following example (3). 
(3) A: “Oh, next week you are on holiday” 
 B: “I won’t be on holiday; I will be working on my thesis”  
Speaker B echoes speaker A’s utterance, at the same time negating it. The effect is that of rejecting A’s 
assumption that B will be on holiday next week. In a similar way, echo questions are analyzed: The 
speaker echoes an attributed utterance or thought and at the same time questions either its content or 
form. 
All instances of metarepresentation treated so far metarepresent an attributed representation. 
Following are instances of metarepresentations where the lower-order representation is non-attributive. 
Cases of mention of sentence types, utterance types or proposition types, that is, abstract 
representations, belong into this category. Furthermore, within Relevance Theory regular (that is, non-
attributive) questions and exclamatives are analyzed as metarepresenting desirable thoughts, and regular 
(non-attributive) negations and disjunctions as metarepresenting possible thoughts (2012:254). Likewise 
there are representations of desirable utterances and possible utterances. In  Chapter 6 I will discuss the 
Indus Kohistani marker loo that marks desirable utterances: utterances that a speaker wants her 
addressee to say to a third person. And, as Wilson notes, drafts, essay plans and rehearsals of future 
conversations might be examples of representations of non-attributive possible utterances (2012:257). 
How does a hearer recognize that the speaker’s utterance is not describing a state of affairs but is 
representing another representation? A quotation may be introduced by “he said” or “I have heard” and 
thereby be identified as a metarepresentation (conceptual encoding). Hearsay markers, question and 
negation markers are grammatical indicators of metarepresentations (procedural encoding). But other 
metarepresentations may not be explicitly marked as such, for example instances of free indirect 
quotation. In such cases of tacit quotation it is the task of the hearer to infer the speaker’s meaning by 
following the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure. As Wilson says, “… [T]he recognition and 
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interpretation of linguistic metarepresentations involves a substantial amount of pragmatic inference” 
(2012:244). Also languages differ in what kind of metarepresentations they encode and what is left to 
the hearer to infer, as well as how an explicit metarepresentation is coded: conceptually or procedural. 
In the next section we will look at conceptual and procedural meaning within relevance theory. 
2.3 The conceptual - procedural distinction 
Words encode meanings, but not every word encodes the same kind of meaning. Many, such as 
child, house, tree, and go, buy, say, encode concepts - someone who is familiar with these concepts has 
no problem in describing what they represent. There are, however, other words whose meaning is more 
difficult to pin down, for instance words such as but, so, and also. Within Relevance Theory, words that 
encode concepts or are “content” words, are said to have conceptual meaning whereas the second type 
of words encode procedural meaning - meaning that is computational rather than conceptional, and 
therefore difficult to describe.  
It was Blakemore who introduced this particular distinction into Relevance Theory and who 
analyzed discourse connectives such as and, so, and but as containing not concepts but procedural 
information whose function is to constrain the inferential comprehension procedure, thereby reducing 
processing costs (Blakemore 1987). This analysis has since been successfully applied to discourse 
connectors and other grammatical words of a wide range of languages and has allowed for one unifying 
meaning of markers with a seemingly wide range of uses, see for example the interpretive use marker rɛ ́
and the marker ma in Sissala (Blass 1990). 
Early on in the study of such procedural markers, it seemed that all words encoding procedural 
information are also non-truth-conditional, whereas all words encoding concepts also contribute to the 
truth conditions of a proposition. Later it became obvious that these two distinctions cross-cut each 
other: content words encode concepts and are truth-conditional, discourse connectives encode 
procedural instructions and are non-truth-conditional, personal pronouns on the other hand encode 
procedural meaning and contribute to the truth conditions of a proposition, whereas illocutionary 
adverbials encode concepts but are not truth-conditional (Sperber and Wilson 1993; Blakemore 2002).  
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Words encoding procedural meaning, or procedural indicators, as they are termed now, may 
function as constraints on explicatures (for instance personal pronouns), on implicatures (discourse 
connectors such as so, but, after all), and on the construction of higher-level explicatures (for example 
illocutionary force indicators such as mood), that is, procedural indicators act on all levels of utterance 
interpretation. In fact, “many or possibly all types of grammatical marking” can be seen as encoding 
procedural instructions for the interpreter of an utterance (LaPolla 1997:13). For instance, tense marking 
constrains and simplifies the search for relevance by indicating the time frame for a particular event, 
something that otherwise would have to be either expressed as a concept or inferred from the context, 
both of which would increase processing costs (1997:10).  
More recently, the understanding of how lexical items encoding procedural instructions work has 
been expanded. Previously, as noted above, procedural markers were seen as constraints on relevance, 
in other words, they activate procedures that guide a hearer towards the intended interpretation of an 
utterance, thereby saving effort and time. In the light of research about what Sperber calls “epistemic 
vigilance” (Sperber, Clément, Heintz, Mascaro, Mercier and Origgi 2010) it seems that procedural 
indicators have more functions. These I will relate in the following section. 
2.4 Argumentation and persuasion 
Relevance Theory assumes that the mind is modular, and that apart from general mind-reading 
capacities there is an array of other modules that are closely interacting, for instance emotion reading, 
social cognition, and, as one of them, a comprehension module specialized for comprehension of overt 
communication. More recently, Sperber et al. (2010) and Wilson (2011, 2012c) have argued that other 
cognitive procedures located in distinct modules are involved in comprehension and in the search for 
relevance, specifically the hearer’s ability to assess the trustworthiness of the source as well as of the 
content of communicated information. This specialized cognitive mechanism, “epistemic vigilance”, is 
assumed to be located in a distinct, the argumentative or argumentation module. 
But what is epistemic vigilance, and why do we need an argumentative module? Wilson (2011:20) 
notes that a speaker, when communicating, has two goals: (i) that her addressee understand, and (ii) that 
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he believe what the speaker is communicating. The hearer, on the other hand, has two tasks when 
something is communicated to him, namely (i) to infer the speaker’s meaning, to understand, and (ii) to 
decide whether to believe it, in other words, to protect himself from being misinformed, either 
accidentally or intentionally. This latter task is called epistemic vigilance. According to Sperber et al. 
(2010), two categories of assessment procedures subsumed under epistemic vigilance can be 
distinguished: mechanisms that evaluate the reliability of the content of communicated information, and 
such ones that assess the reliability of the information source, namely the speaker. These two categories 
of cognitive assessment procedures constitute the argumentative module. It is activated if for instance 
communicated information is inconsistent in itself or contradicts already existing knowledge. 
A speaker will therefore, in order to achieve her goals of being understood and believed, word her 
utterances in such a way that they pass the hearer’s epistemic vigilance mechanisms. This involves 
using procedural indicators aimed at showing logical relations within the communicated as well as with 
background information to convince the hearer to accept the content; and evidential markers in order to 
persuade the hearer to trust the source of information, namely the speaker. 
Wilson (2011:22-5) remarks that indeed the main function of procedural indicators such as the 
discourse connectives so, but, and therefore may not be that of constraining the hearer’s comprehension 
procedure in order to arrive at the right inferences without undue effort, but rather to activate the 
argumentative module in order to get past the hearer’s epistemic vigilance. Likewise, evidential markers 
not only indicate attributive use and source of information as such, thereby constraining the 
comprehension process, but may also activate the described assessment procedures. In this case, by 
marking grammatically second- and thirdhand information and thus disclosing the source of 
information, the speaker aims at persuading the hearer of her reliability and trustworthiness. 
Aikhenvald’s observations about languages that have evidential systems confirm this claim: “Ignoring 
evidentiality in a language with evidentials gets you marked as unreliable or a liar” (Aikhenvald 
2004:344), and “Accuracy in getting one’s information source right is crucial for successful 
communication and for the speaker’s reputation” (2004:335). In more general terms, procedural 
indicators in a language “put the user of the language into a state in which some of these domain-
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specific cognitive procedures [e.g. assessment of trustworthiness and reliability, the author] are highly 
activated” (Wilson 2011:11).  
Unger notes that the respective inputs to the comprehension module on the one hand and to the 
argumentative module on the other hand are distinct. Whereas the comprehension module works with 
decoded utterances (or writing) as input, 
the input to the argumentative module are claims, that is, assumptions 
(mental representations) that the audience is not prepared to accept at 
face value, and information relevant to its evaluation (Unger 2012:49). 
The triggers activating this module can be logical connectors such as so, therefore, and but, or evidential 
markers such as the Indus Kohistani lee, as I will argue in section 3.6.4. The output of the 
argumentative module will then be reasons to accept or reject the claims made by the speaker (Unger 
2012). Here again, the activation of different cognitive modules does not happen as a serial process but 
rather simultaneous.  
What insights can we gain from Relevance Theory in respect to the four Indus Kohistani markers 
that are the topic of this study? All four of these are markers of reported speech, or speech and thought 
in the widest sense, but distinct from each other. In traditional grammar, it would be difficult to find one 
unifying meaning and at the same time account for the differences between the four markers. Within the 
relevance-theoretic framework, on the other hand, all utterances marked by any of the four markers 
have to be seen as metarepresentations; consequently all four expressions can be analyzed as 
metarepresentation markers. The variety of metarepresentations then accounts for the differences: The 
marker lee indicates representations of attributed utterances, the markers karee and če indicate 
representations of attributed and self-attributed utterances and thoughts, loo is a marker of non-
attributive representations of desirable utterances, and the concepts of epistemic vigilance and 
argumentative cognitive module can explain why the use of lee is not obligatory for all reported speech.  
As Wilson writes, “Linguistic metarepresentations range from the fully explicit and conceptually 
encoded […] to the fully tacit” (2012:247). The four markers to be discussed in this study are evidence 
that Indus Kohistani is a language that makes the presence of metarepresentations explicit by the use of 
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procedural indicators, thereby reducing decoding as well as inferential processing effort, namely the 






Chapter 3  
The Indus Kohistani “reported” marker lee 
The Indus Kohistani marker lee, the topic of this chapter, indicates second- and thirdhand report, 
that is, it is an evidential marker. Within Relevance Theory, evidentials proper such as lee are seen as 
procedural markers or indicators (Blass 1990); my analysis of lee goes along this line. In the following 
sections I first introduce lee and give a brief overview of evidential markers in the wider geographic 
area. In  3.3 I describe the semantic and syntactic properties of lee and define it as a “reported” marker. 
I describe and illustrate its uses in section  3.4, and then compare the use of lee in narratives of personal 
experiences with those of folk stories. In section  3.6  I analyze lee as a procedural indicator, more 
specifically, as a metarepresentation marker of attributed utterances. Furthermore I argue that lee, 
besides indicating interpretive use, triggers the activation of the audience’s epistemic vigilance 
mechanisms, the so-called argumentative module. Such an argumentative function of lee would also 
explain why not every reported utterance in Indus Kohistani has to be marked by lee. 
3.1 Definition of the marker lee 
The particle lee is used when a speaker is quoting someone else or when she wants to indicate that 
the information she is sharing is not firsthand knowledge. In other words, lee is an evidential marker.  
Aikhenvald defines evidentiality as “a linguistic category whose primary meaning is source of 
information” (2004:3). She points out that it is not part of the primary meaning how reliable such 
information is, just how this information was obtained. Only such languages have evidential systems 
proper where source of information is expressed grammatically. That rules out expressions such as “I 
heard that …” or adverbs such as reportedly  or apparently as being counted as evidentials in this sense. 




In this study I follow Aikhenvald’s classification of evidentials (Aikhenvald 2004:393) and define 
the Indus Kohistani marker lee as a “reported” or “hearsay” marker. Both these terms are 
interchangeable and are used to mark information “that has been learned from someone else’s report” 
(2004:394). Other terms in use are “secondhand” or “quotative”; however, “quotative” should only be 
used for such “reported” evidentials that are employed when the exact source of the quoted information 
is known.  A “reported” evidential does not have this condition; the original provider of the quoted 
information may or may not be mentioned or even known. As this is the case with the marker lee I use 
the term “reported” throughout this study.  
3.2 “Reported” markers in the wider geographical context 
Indus Kohistani is not part of a linguistic area where evidential systems with several distinctions 
abound. Nevertheless, evidentiality is grammatically marked in neighboring languages of the Dardic 
group, in Tibeto-Burman languages to the East, in Indo-Iranian languages to the West, and in Turkic 
languages to the North of the Dardic languages area (Bashir 1996, 2006). Here, I want to mention just a 
few languages that employ “reported” markers. Other evidentials that are used to mark information 
obtained by inference, or the notion of mirativity, I ignore here as this would be beyond the scope of 
this study. 
Bashir (2006) gives an overview of evidentiality in South Asian languages. Whereas her main 
focus is on inferentiality and mirativity, she also mentions “reported” evidentials. Starting in the East, 
Nepali, an Indo-Aryan language, has, among other evidential strategies, a hearsay particle re (2006:6). 
 Balti, the only Tibeto-Burman language in Pakistan, has a morpheme –lo, a “reportative” marker 
(Jones 2009:58). This marker follows the sentence-final verb, and is used to mark reported information 
whose source is not indicated. 
To the West, some of the Nuristani languages, a subgroup of the Indo-Iranian family, have a 
“reported” evidential. Buddruss (1987:33,37) describes a “Reportativpartikel” -le for the language 
Waigali (see also Degener 1998:173-182; Bashir 2010:10). The marker, an enclitic, always follows the 
clause-final verb. Buddruss compares this marker with the Nepali reported evidential re and notes that it 
24 
 
is used to mark information that one knows by hearsay. In the text his analysis is based on, -le is present 
in every sentence that states hearsay information; the exact source of the reported information is not 
mentioned. There seems to be a remarkable similarity to the Indus Kohistani marker lee.  
Strand (2012) mentions two other Nuristani languages that employ reported markers: “Kati”, or 
“Bashgali”, has a reportative particle mem; “Kamdeshi” has a similar particle mma. Both “indicate that 
what the speaker is relating is hearsay” (2012:6; see also Bashir 2010:8).  
Nearer home, Torwali, another language of the Dardic language group spoken in the Swat Valley, 
is reported to have a sentence-final particle a, that is “employed in all tenses for sentences representing 
information acquired indirectly” (Bashir 2006:12). This marker is also mentioned by Lunsford 
(2001:142) without any further discussion.  
Bashir also notes a sentence-final particle –yer in Kalam Kohistani of the same language group, 
which, according to her, indicates hearsay, mirative meanings and indirect knowledge. Baart (1999:147-
9) describes the two Kalam Kohistani morphemes äro and är as “reported-speech” markers. These 
evidentials are used to mark reported information; the source of the reported speech may or may not be 
expressed. äro occurs reported-speech clause-initial, är clause-final. If a speaker wants to quote her own 
previous utterance then the morpheme märo is used, again speech clause-initial. I suspect that Bashir’s 
yer and the morpheme är mentioned by Baart represent one and the same marker.  
I have no knowledge of “reported” evidentials in Kohistani Shina and Gilgiti Shina, the two Shina 
dialects immediately to the East and North-East of the Indus Kohistani area. They do have a “quotative” 
for marking quotations of speech and thought, similar to the Indus Kohistani marker karee (Radloff 
1998, Schmidt and Kohistani 2008).  However, this will be the topic of  Chapter 4. 
In this section I have shown that “reported” evidentials are not uncommon in the surrounding 
language area. It is a well-known fact that evidential features easily spread from one language to 
another (Aikhenvald 2004:271, 288-299). The source or “epicenter” of diffusion of evidentiality 
(2004:289) that led to the emergence of evidential markers in Indus Kohistani remains a topic for 
further research. Several sources are possible: Turkic languages which, according to Aikhenvald, are 
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considered such an epicenter in Central Asia, Iranian languages, and third, the Tibeto-Burman language 
area.  
Furthermore, Degener (1998:181) in her description of the Waigali “Reportativ” particle –le 
considers the Sanskrit particle kila as a possible source, referring to van Daalen’s description of kila as a 
particle being used in reported speech to mark hearsay information (van Daalen 1988). For the time 
being I have to leave open if such a relationship might be possible between Indus Kohistani lee and 
Sanskrit kila. 
3.3 Syntactic and phonological properties of the marker lee 
The marker lee is a particle that may attach itself to the following syntactic categories: a sentence- 
or clause-final verb, the speech verb of a matrix clause, a vocative, and a personal pronoun that fills in 
the subject (speaker’s) slot of a main clause that is followed by a speech complement8 . The marker has 
a distinct meaning “reported” but syntactically it cannot stand as an independent word; it always needs 
a host. Phonologically, too, it is dependent – it does not have an accent of its own as an independent 
word would have. On the other hand, it is not a suffix, as it may attach to a variety of syntactic 
categories as mentioned above. Consequently, it should be classified as a clitic; and as it always follows 
its host, as an enclitic (Haspelmath 2002:150-4).  
If the preceding word, the host of lee, ends in a short vowel then this vowel may be lengthened. 
For instance, the third-person singular distant personal pronoun is só. If it is followed by the marker lee, 
the short vowel -ó may become a long one as in sóo=lee ‘he said’. The accent on só does not shift to 
the right when the vowel is lengthened so that phonetically the accent is now perceived as falling. This 
is a morphophonemic change that can also be observed when the marker loo ( Chapter 6) follows a host 
ending with a short vowel, and when the pronouns bé  ‘we (EXCL)’ and tú ‘you (SG)’ or tús ‘you (PL)’ 
build the inclusive pronoun béetu(s) ‘we and you, the addressee (INCL)’. 
                                              
8 These are the syntactic categories followed by lee that occur in my data. There might be other constituents that 
may precede lee of which I have no knowledge. 
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3.4 Uses of the evidential marker lee 
In this section I describe the different uses of lee: the marking of reported information that the 
speaker herself has heard, marking of reported information that came to the knowledge of the speaker 
via a third person, instances where the marker lee replaces the speech verb of a complement-taking 
predicate, and the marking of reported information where the exact source is not known.  
In Indus Kohistani all reported speech is direct speech. The speech complements always take the 
perspective of the quoted speaker; this is reflected in deixis, pronominal and time reference.  
The data that illustrate the uses of lee are mostly taken from natural discourse and narratives. When 
listening to Indus Kohistani discourse it becomes soon obvious that the use of lee is not obligatory; this 
becomes even more evident when looking at narratives. I further refer to this fact in sections  3.5 
and  3.6.4. 
3.4.1 Marking of secondhand information 
Indus Kohistani distinguishes between secondhand and thirdhand information when the marker lee 
is used: if a speaker quotes something she has heard herself from the original source then lee follows 
the quoted speech complement. If on the other hand the speaker quotes thirdhand information then lee 
follows the speech verb of the matrix clause (see section 3.4.2). In this section I illustrate the use of lee 
as a “secondhand report” marker. The following examples (4a) to (4d) are taken from a narrative about 
the earthquake in 2005. The speaker was quoting one of her sons speakinɡ to her when he came home 
after the earthquake.   
(4a) khẽ ẽẽ̀ màayn ãã oó kuú=lee  
 DEVM 3SG.PROX.ERG say.PFV1 yes VOC older.sister=REP  
   ‘Then he said, “Yes, oh Older Sister’  
(4b) má ḍi-íthu=lee      
 1SG flee-PRS.PFV.M.SG=REP      
   ‘I have fled’ 
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(4c) iskul-ãĩ̀ kùṛ-muṛ bazíthe=lee  
 school-GEN.F wall.F.PL-things.like.that.ECHO go.PRS.PFV.M.PL.=REP  
      ‘The walls of the school went (down)’ 
(4d) hãã maasmá búṭ báč hu-úthe=lee  
 and child.PL all saved become-PRS.PFV.M.PL=REP  
      ‘But the children all escaped’” (The earthquake #188, 190-1) 
The first occurrence of the evidential marker is in (4a) following the vocative ‘oh Older Sister’. I 
assume that a name plus vocative here count as a constituent, therefore lee follows the vocative. In 
utterances (4b) to (4d) the marker follows the utterance-final verb, marking the utterance content as 
secondhand report, something that the speaker had heard from the original source with her own ears and 
now quoted to me. 
In example (5), the speaker told me how high her blood pressure had been when she had gone to 
the doctor.  
(5) khẽ màayn če biíš kám dùu šól ṣṹ tsìiz 
 DEVM say.PFV1 COMP twenty less two hundred 3SG.DEM thing 
 
 
thú=lee baḍplešár    
 be.PRS.M.SG=REP blood pressure    
   ‘(The doctor) said that it is one hundred and eighty, this thing, the blood pressure’ (conversation 
19.7.2013) 
Again, lee is following the quotation to indicate that this is second-hand information. The word “blood 
pressure” is a kind of afterthought, added to help me understand the meaning of “this thing”.  
 
3.4.2 Marking of thirdhand information 
In the previous section we have seen that lee follows the speech complement when it contains 
secondhand information. In this section I illustrate the use of lee as marker of thirdhand report. 
Thirdhand information is “based on verbal report from someone else who in their turn acquired the 
information through another verbal report” (Aikhenvald 2004:395). If a speaker quotes someone she has 
heard about through a third person then the evidential marker lee follows the speech verb of the matrix 
clause. The following example is taken from a conversation about dreams. The speaker narrates a dream 
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that her son had told her. In (6), she is quoting from an encounter with a strange man that her son had 
had in his dream. 
(6) màaṣ=uk ii-ɡaleé miiɡeé man-ãã̀s=lee če má 
 man=INDEF come-put.CVB 1SG.DAT say-PST.IPFV.M=REP COMP 1SG  
 
 tií qábur-a man de-ént   
 2SG.DO grave-OBL in give-PRS.M.SG   
   ‘A man came and said to me, “I’ll put you into a grave”’ (Graves, graveyards #87) 
The man’s utterance in the dream is marked with lee as this is reported information; the marker follows 
the speech verb and not the complement clause because this is a thirdhand report.  
In addition to marking the speech verb, lee may also follow the quotation as shown in example (7). 
It is the beginning of an incident related to the earthquake that my language consultant told me. 
(7) AB mùuṭ dìs qasá kar-ãã̀s če ṣṹ baazaár.ø 
 name.M former day story do-PST.IPFV.M COMP 3SG.DEM market.OBL  
 
 man man-ãã̀s-e=lee če taalíb=uk ãã̀s=lee 
 in say-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M=REP COMP student=INDEF be.PST.M=REP 
   ‘The other day AB was saying that in the market people were saying that there was a 
student’(The earthquake #327) 
The first lee follows the speech verb of the matrix clause “(people) in the bazaar said”. This marks the 
following utterance as a quotation of a quotation, in other words, as thirdhand information. 
Subsequently, when AB (who is being quoted by the speaker) goes on telling the story of the student, 
lee occurs at the end of nearly every sentence. I assume that this was AB’s way of indicating to his 
mother that what he was telling her was secondhand information. So in this quotation we have both: 
AB’s use of lee (following the speech complement) as a marker of secondhand report, and my language 
consultant’s use of lee (following the speech verb) as a marker of thirdhand information. 
3.4.3 The marker lee in utterances that are not speech complements 
The examples presented so far are all utterances said by specific persons and quoted as 
complements of speech predicates. Quite often, however, the quotation is not obvious as such; i.e. there 
may be neither a matrix clause with speech verb nor a speech complement. The reported information is 
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quoted as a statement; only the presence of lee indicates that the actual utterance is a quotation of 
someone else. The speaker of the original utterance may be inferred from the context/the preceding 
discourse. But there is also reported information where the exact source is not known or mentioned or 
which consists of what “people say”; here, too, lee is the sole indicator that the utterance in question is 
a quotation. With the following examples I want to illustrate this use of lee.  
The context of example (8) is as follows: My language consultant’s family had found a wife for 
one of their sons, and father and son went to the bride’s family to finalize the arrangements and to 
perform nikah, the actual marriage contract. As my language consultant was not present at the occasion 
her husband told her later about it, and subsequently she reported it to me. The actual utterance was 
remarkable and therefore reported because it is unusual that a young man would raise his voice in the 
presence of his elders. 
(8) ɡhõ̀õ awàaz kar-ãã̀s=lee   
 big.M.SG voice.M do-PST.IPFV.M=REP   
   ‘He made (gave his consent with) a loud voice’ (conversation 4.5.2012) 
Although the speaker does not mention the source of the quotation, it is obvious from the context that 
she is quoting her husband. 
In (9), the speaker is talking about a house that she herself had not yet seen but her husband and 
her sons had told her about.  
(9) cạ̀a kamrií ɡhẽẽ̀ ɡhẽẽ̀ baá-ø thé=lee 
 three room.PL big.M.PL big.M.PL house/room-PL be.PRS.M.PL=REP 
   ‘There are three rooms, big, big rooms’ (conversation 10.9.2012) 
The marker lee at the end of the utterance indicates that this is a quotation, not a statement. The original 
speaker of this quotation can be inferred from the preceding discourse where I was told that the 
speaker’s husband and sons had gone to look at the house. 
In example (10), the speaker talks about what she had heard concerning a young man who had 
committed suicide. The following utterance from this conversation is marked by lee. 
(10) yàa aspatàal-ø man  ãĩ̀s=lee nií=aa sáx bimàar ãĩ̀s 
 mother hospital-OBL in be.PST.F=REP neg=Q very ill be.PST.F 
   ‘(His) mother was in the hospital, they say, wasn’t she, she was very ill’ (conversation 8.6.2012) 
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Here, the speaker did not specify the source of her information. It may be that she herself did no longer 
remember who exactly had told her about this incident. lee in this example indicates what “people” 
said. 
This is even more obvious in example (11) where what the speaker is quoting may be knowledge 
acquired from a number of different people over a longer period of time. The topic of her talk is how 
eating habits and availability of food items have changed since her childhood9. 
(11) h  ̃ĩ̀ hár xoraak-á tsèe thé, ḍaalḍá kha-ánt=lee 
 now every food.M-PL much.M.PL be.PRS.M.PL vegetable.ghee eat-PRS.M=REP  
 
 ɡhiíl kha-ánt=lee masùu ho-óɡaa=lee mheeṣ-ãã̀ masùu 
 ghee eat-PRS.M=REP meat become-PFV2.M.SG=REP buffalo-GEN.M meat.M  
 
 ho-óɡaa=lee ɡuur-õ̀õ masùu ho-óɡaa=lee 
 become-PFV2.M.SG=REP cow-OBL.PL meat.M become-PFV2.M.SG=REP  
 
 bakar-èel masùu ho-óɡaa=lee 
 goat-ADS.M meat.M become-PFV2.M.SG=REP 
   ‘Now, every kind of food is available in abundance: people eat vegetable ghee, they eat ghee 
made from butter; there is/would be chicken meat, there is/would be buffalo meat, there 
is/would be beef, there is/would be goat’s meat’ (Family planning #32) 
Each of the six statements is followed by lee. It indicates that what is marked by it is information that 
the speaker has heard and gathered from other people, in other words, is hearsay. So another way to 
translate this utterance would be “… people eat vegetable ghee, I have heard, they eat ghee, I have 
heard, there is meat, I have heard …” and so on. 
3.4.4 The marker lee in questions 
In interrogative clauses, evidentials may be indicators of either the speaker’s or the addressee’s 
information source or even of that of a third party (Aikhenvald 2004:244, 248). From the Indus 
                                              
9 One might wonder why this particular information is not firsthand knowledge. Due to strict observance of 
purdah ‘female seclusion’, Kohistani women rarely leave their homes. Firsthand knowledge may be acquired from 
relatives and immediate neighbors; knowledge about the wider Kohistani community is usually passed on by a 
household’s menfolk and visitors, i.e. is secondhand knowledge. 
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Kohistani data available to me it seems that when lee is used in a question it reflects the addressee’s 
source of information; the speaker expects the addressee to provide information that has not been 
acquired firsthand but was itself reported to the addressee. Such questions are of the kind “did you hear 
that/if …?” as illustrated in (12) below. The background to this example is such that the speaker had 
heard about a relative’s car accident; this relative had been hit by another car whose driver had been in 
the wrong. The speaker now asked another family member who had knowledge about the accident if the 
other driver had paid compensation, knowing that her addressee had previously called the relative’s 
family.  
(12) sẽẽ̀ màaṣ-e rupày dít=lee=aa   
 3SG.DIST.ERG man-ERG rupees give.PFV1=REP=Q   
   ‘Did you hear if that man gave money (paid compensation)?’ (conversation 7.10.11) 
The speaker knew that her addressee had no firsthand knowledge about whether compensation had been 
given or not but assumed that the addressee had been told on the phone by a third person, so she used 
lee in her question. This use is further illustrated in (13), taken from a conversation about a device for 
children with cleft palate. I had been asked to find out if such a device is available in Pakistan. After 
some enquiry I went back to tell them that “this thing is not available in Pakistan; I have asked the 
doctors”. My language consultant then replied with a rising/questioning pitch: 
(13) nií thú=lee      
 NEG be.PRS.M.SG=REP      
   ‘It is not, they say?’ 
Later another member of the family asked my language consultant about the same device, aɡain with a 
rising pitch towards the end of the utterance (14). 
(14) ɡi-  ̃ ́ nií thú=lee     
 what-also NEG be.PRS.M.SG=REP     
   ‘There is nothing at all available, they say?’ 
Whereupon my language consultant confirmed (15): 
(15) nií thú=lee      
 NEG be.PRS.M.SG=REP      
   ‘It is not, they say’ (conversation 7.5.2012) 
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Both, question and answer, are marked by lee and reflect that the information asked for and given is 
reported.  
In examples (13) and (14), the speakers indicated that their utterance is a question by raising their 
voice at the end of the utterance. In the next example (16) below (as well as above in example (12)) we 
see that the question particle, itself a clitic, follows lee. The context of this utterance is as follows: Some 
men of the extended family were supposed to go up to Pattan. They had left my language consultant’s 
house earlier on but were still in town, meeting with other relatives. After some time my language 
consultant asked one of her daughters-in-law if she had heard about the men. 
(16) bazíthe=lee=aa      
 go.PRS.PFV.M.PL=REP=Q      
   ‘Did you hear that the men have left (for Pattan)?’ (conversation 10.5.2013) 
The marker lee in this question indicates that the speaker does not expect her addressee to have first-
hand knowledge about whether the men have left. The meaning of lee in such a case is “did you hear” 
or “did they say”. Note that the question marker aa follows the “reported” marker, having both the 
statement and the marker lee in its scope. 
This use differs from the quoting of a question as shown in example (17). It is taken from a 
conversation about my language consultant’s oldest daughter who, after several pregnancies, was not 
well. My language consultant told me that she had advised her to stop getting pregnant. She then quoted 
her daughter’s answer. 
(17) khẽ màayn éqaa má  ɡí zar-í hu-úthi=aa=lee 
 DEVM say.PFV1 oh! 1SG what old-INCH become-PRS.PFV.F=Q=REP 
   ‘Then she said, “Oh! Have I become that old?”’ (conversation 7.5.2012) 
In this example, the quoted utterance is indicated by the speech verb “(she) said”, and the “reported” 
marker follows the question marker, that is, the question as such is in the scope of lee. It is an instance 
of a simple quotation where the quoted utterance happens to be a rhetorical question. In examples (12) 
to (14) and (16) on the other hand, it is not a question that is being quoted but a statement that the 
speaker expects the addressee to confirm or deny, depending on the addressee’s knowledge acquired 
through a third person. 
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3.4.5 The marker lee and person 
The marker lee being a “reported” evidential, it seems obvious that it is used for quoting persons 
other than the speaker herself. The examples seen so far are all quotations of persons other than the 
speaker and her addressee. However, hearsay evidentials may also mark utterances with a first-person 
speaker subject. Aikhenvald (2004:225-7) describes that the use of a “reported” evidential with first 
person, that is, the speaker, may produce special effects such as expressing lack of control, surprise (= 
notions of mirativity), disagreement, denial, or irony. My data of Indus Kohistani do not include 
instances of the use of lee with a speaker subject. The following example (18) is elicited; but although 
there is a first-person subject it is still the report of what “people say”. 
(18) má ɡàaḍii mùl di-ínt=lee    
 1SG car price give-PRS.F=REP    
   ‘People say that I am selling my car’ (elicited 19.8.2013) 
This could be uttered in a context where the speaker is astonished to hear what other people are saying 
about her as she has no intention at all of selling her car. As for using lee to mark self-quotation: 
according to my language consultant, it is ungrammatical for a speaker to use lee to mark quotes of her 
own previous utterances. In such a case, the Indus Kohistani marker karee would be employed 
(see  Chapter 4). 
In my Indus Kohistani corpus there are few instances of lee marking quotes of an addressee’s 
previous utterances. In these examples, lee often replaces the speech verb, as illustrated by example 
(19). This utterance is taken from a conversation with my language consultant, in the course of which 
we had been talking about one of her daughters-in-law, D, who had a health issue. Having been asked 
for advice I had recommended to do nothing for the time being. Then we had talked about something 
else. Later on, my language consultant resumed the former topic by saying the following utterance. 
(19) tèe D-ãã̀ intezàar kar-iž=aa=lee   
 then name.F.GEN.M waiting.M do-SBJV.1PL=Q=REP   
   ‘So did you say that we should wait with D?’ (conversation 27.4.2012) 
Although there is no mention of the original speaker of this quoted utterance, it is obvious from the 
context that the speaker is quoting (in question form) what I, her addressee, had suggested earlier in the 
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conversation, in other words, she is echoing what I had said earlier. This is an instance of an echo 
question. 
Example (20) is elicited; it is the quotation of an addressee’s previous utterance. Here the marker 
lee follows the quoted speech. 
(20) mùuṭ wàar tẽẽ̀ man-áthe če zõṍ kira 
 previous time/turn 2SG.ERG say-PRS.PFV COMP 1PL.OBL for  
 
 ṣas baá-an be-ṍ thú=lee    
 3SG.DEM.DOM house-ABL go-INF be.PRS.M.SG=REP    
   ‘Last time you said, “We will have to leave this house”’ (elicited 11.3.2013) 
Example (21), another second-person quote, was uttered when my language consultant explained to 
me that her sister-in-law had called to ask if I would come that day, because she wanted to meet me. My 
language consultant told her that she was not sure about my coming, but … 
(21) tèe telfún kìir khẽ tú=lee má  uka-ínt 
 then telefone do.PFV1 SUB 2SG=REP 1SG come.up-PRS.F 
   ‘Then you called and said, “I will come”’ (conversation 10.5.2013) 
Here again, the speech verb of the quotation is replaced by lee. In section  3.4.7 I will present and 
discuss more such examples.  
3.4.6 The marker lee and tense 
The notion “reported” implies that what is being reported has been uttered at some time previous 
to the quotation, that is, in the past. So we can expect that speech verbs introducing a quotation 
containing lee are marked for past tense. That this is indeed the case can be seen in all those examples 
shown so far that have a speech verb preceding the reported utterance. The following example (22) 
deviates from all the others in that the speech verb of the quotation has a present tense suffix. Previous 
to this utterance, my language consultant’s daughter, having a health problem, had been persuaded by 
doctors and family to have an operation in our hospital. As the date for it was approaching I asked my 
language consultant if her daughter was prepared to be admitted. She responded that she herself had not 
heard anything from her daughter; however, this is what she had heard from other people: 
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(22) O man-àynt=lee če má apareešán neer-di-ínt  
 name.F say-PRS.F=REP COMP 1SG operation not.do-give-PRS.F  
   ‘People say that O is saying that she will not let (the doctor) operate on her’ (conversation 
14.8.2013) 
Present tense marking in this example does not contradict the assumption that what is being quoted has 
been uttered at some time in the past. In this case, present tense indicates that the quoted speaker’s 
saying started at some time in the past and is still going on at the time of the quotation. So we can 
assume that lee is used to mark only such quotations that were uttered in the past.  
But what about possible/hypothetical utterances that someone might utter in the future and that are 
quoted? An example of such a hypothetical quotation is the following example (23) taken from a story 
about a king’s minister who has been sent to find six stupid people. On his search the minister meets a 
man lying on the road and stretching both his hands upwards. When the minister asks him what he is 
doing there and why he does not take down his hands he answers, “My wife has sent me to the market 
to buy a cooking pot this size (indicated by his hands). If I take down my hands to get up I no longer 
know the size of the pot and will buy the wrong one”. Then follows (23). 
(23) khẽ tèe m  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariũṹ man-áṣit če m  ̃ĩ̀ kira lák 
 DEVM then 1SG.POSS wife say-FUT.F COMP 1SG.POSS for small.M  
 
 pateelá a-áthe karaɡal   
 cooking.pot.M bring-PRS.PFV MRM   
   ‘Then my wife will say to me, “You have brought a small cooking pot!” (although I was 
supposed to bring a big one)’ (Akbar Badshah #50) 
In this example of a possible/hypothetical quotation it is not the “reported” marker lee that is used but 
the allomorph karagal of the marker karee which will be discussed in  Chapter 4. For now let me state 
that lee cannot be employed to indicate hypothetical quotations that might have been uttered or might be 
uttered in the future. 
3.4.7 The marker lee replacing the speech verb of a matrix clause 
In every-day conversation and also in folk stories, the speech verb introducing quotations may be 
replaced by the marker lee . Although the use of lee in the latter kind of narratives differs from that 
discussed so far, the following example (24) is a fairly typical instance of lee replacing the speech verb 
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(the use of lee in folk stories will be addressed in section  3.5.2). In this story, several crows are talking 
about a girl and wondering who she is. 
(24a) qàa-ø i-íthe šár~šar huú man-áthe  
 crow-PL come-PRS.PFV.M.PL gathering~REDUPL become.CVB say-PRS.PFV  
   ‘The crows came, gathered and (one) said,’ 
(24b) ṹ m  ̃ĩ̀ bheenṭuú thi    
 3SG.PROX 1SG.POSS sister.DIM be.PRS.F    
   ‘“She is my sister”’ 
(24c) mút=lee m  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariṹ thi    
 other=REP 1SG.POSS wife be.PRS.F    
   ‘Another said, “She is my wife”’ 
(24d) mút=lee m  ̃ĩ̀ bheenṭuú thi    
 other=REP 1SG.POSS sister.DIM be.PRS.F    
   ‘Another said, “She is my sister”’ 
(24e) mút=lee m  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariṹ thi    
 other=REP 1SG.POSS wife be.PRS.F    
   ‘Another said, “She is my wife”’ (Princess and crows #77-80) 
Note that the speech verb in the first sentence is in Present Perfective Tense which would have induced 
ergative case marking on the subject had it not been omitted. In the following clauses the subject noun 
phrase mút ‘another’, however, has no case marking, that is, it is in nominative case. This is typical for 
this use of lee where it replaces the speech verb: the speaker-subject noun phrase preceding lee is never 
marked for ergative case. In other words, one cannot say *ẽẽ̀=lee  (3SG.PROX.ERG=REP) ‘he said’; this 
is ungrammatical. 
The next example is from The Earthquake text, a narrative about a personal experience. The 
speaker recounts what happened before the earthquake. In the morning, she and one of her daughters-in-
law were about to go up the mountain to cut grass. B, another daughter-in-law had been told to stay at 
home. The speaker then quotes B as saying to her (25): 
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(25) ṹ=lee ma-  ̃ ́ uk-àm     
 3SG.PROX=REP 1SG-also go.up-SBJV.1SG     
   ‘She said, “May I too go up (with you)?”’ (The earthquake #9) 
Although there is neither speech verb nor tense marking it is clear that the saying was done in the past. 
It could never be understood as “she is saying”. So, lee, where it replaces a speech verb, always 
indicates past tense. This is also illustrated by the next example (26), taken from a conversation between 
my language consultant and me. I had told her about a new bio gas project that one of my colleagues 
was interested in starting. Later on, while I was still sitting with her, another woman joined us and my 
language consultant quoted me as having said: 
(26) ṹ=lee H-ãã̀ xawàand koošìiš  man thú waleé 
 3SG.PROX=REP name.F-.GEN.M husband.M attempt in be.PRS.M.SG but  
 
 aázdis haár ás neer-áthe    
 nowadays until 3SG.PROX.DOM not.do-PRS.PFV    
   ‘She has said, “H’s husband is trying (to start such a project) but so far he has not done (started) 
it”’ (conversation 30.4.2012) 
As in the previous example, lee indicates that the quotation has happened in the (albeit immediate) past, 
and consequently the translation has to be “she has said”.  
In (24), the speaker quoted thirdhand reported information (a conversation in a folk story); in both 
(25) and (26) she quoted secondhand information. In sections  3.4.1. and  3.4.2 we had seen that in the 
case of secondhand information lee follows the quote whereas in an instance of reporting thirdhand 
information lee follows the matrix clause speech verb. When the marker lee replaces the speech verb 
then the distinction in the marking of secondhand and thirdhand information is not maintained. The 
addressee will have to infer from the context if the information conveyed is second- or thirdhand.  
 Example (27) is another instance of quoting an addressee’s earlier utterance. It is taken from a 
conversation about a sick baby I had been asked to see. I had advised the parents to show the baby to a 
pediatrician, saying, “I am not a proper doctor” although in Pakistan, everyone who is working within 




(27) tu-  ̃=́lee má  unɡí ḍaakṭár thí   
 2SG-also=REP 1SG exactly.this doctor be.PRS.F   
   ‘You too said, “I am this, I am a doctor”’  
When I did not immediately grasp what she had said, she repeated her utterance, this time without using 
lee (28). 
(28) tẽẽ̀ màayn ma-  ̃ ́ ḍaakṭár thí pakistàa-ø man 
 2SG.ERG say.PFV1 1SG-also doctor be.PRS.F Pakistan-OBL in 
   ‘You said, “I too am a doctor, in Pakistan”’ (conversation 22.6.2012) 
This example as well as (19) to (21) in section 3.4.5 clearly show that lee, when replacing the speech 
verb, is not restricted to marking second- and thirdhand reports but can, just like lee in other 
placements, be used to quote an addressee’s previous utterances. Likewise, lee cannot replace the speech 
verb when a speaker is quoting herself, another point that I have noted in section 3.4.5. 
There is another restriction in this use of lee as a speech verb replacer. The person that is being 
quoted has to be already introduced and activated in the mind of the hearer if lee is to stand in place of 
the speech verb. In examples (24) to (27) the quoted-speaker’s subject slot is filled by a pronoun 
because the quoted speaker has already been activated in the discourse. In my data, I have not found any 
instance where lee replaces the speech verb and the quoted speaker is referred to by something other 
than a pronoun, i.e. is not already introduced and activated in the minds of the audience. 
3.5 The marker lee in narratives 
Above I have already given a few examples of lee in narratives; but most of the examples were 
taken from every-day conversation. In this section, I want to take a closer look at how the marker is 
employed in narratives as opposed to its use in conversations. I show that, as observed in conversations, 
in narratives of someone’s experiences, too, lee does not mark every reported utterance. Further on, I 
will describe the role of lee in folk stories. 
3.5.1 The marker lee in narratives about someone’s experiences 
In my corpus of Indus Kohistani texts there are many instances where a narrator tells about a 
previous personal experience or about what happened to someone else, using the “reported” marker lee. 
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One such instance is given in (29), taken from the recount of the happenings after the earthquake in 
2005. The madrassah student in this example had been dug out from under a collapsed building several 
days after the earthquake. Example (29a) has already been presented as (7) in section  3.4.2. 
(29a) AB mùuṭ dìs qasá kar-ãã̀s če ṣṹ baazaar-á 
 name.M former day story do-PST.IPFV.M COMP 3SG.DEM market-OBL  
 
 man man-ãã̀s-e=lee če taalíb=uk ãã̀s=lee 
 in say-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M=REP COMP student=INDEF be.PST.M=REP 
   ‘The other day, AB was telling us that in the bazaar people were saying that there was a certain 
madrassah student’ 
(29b) só taalíb amã  ̃ ́ zànd nika-ílaas=lee  
 3SG.DIST student REFL alive.M come.out-PST.PFV.M=REP  
   ‘That madrassah student had survived (the earthquake)’ 
(29c) zànd nika-í sayõṍ man-áthe=lee če  tú ɡí 
 alive.M come.out-CVB 3PL.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV=REP COMP 2SG what  
 
 khãã̀s če tú zànd thú   
 eat.PST.IPFV.M COMP 2SG alive.M be.PRS.M.SG   
   ‘Having emerged alive they (=people) asked him, “What did you eat that you are still alive?”’ 
(29d) sẽẽ̀ màayn má ṣá zìib-ø hin màats 
 3SG.DIST.ERG say.PFV1 1SG 3SG.DEM.OBL tongue.OBL with mud  
 
 tsaṭ-ãã̀s      
 lick-PST.IPFV.M      
   ‘He said, “With my tongue I licked mud’ 
(29e) mút mẽẽ̀ ɡi-  ̃ ́ nií kha-áthe  
 other 1SG.ERG what-also NEG eat-PRS.PFV    
   ‘Other than that I have not eaten anything’ 
(29f) mút  miiɡeé ɡí pát nií i-íthi tamãĩ̀ ãĩ̀s 
 other 1SG.DAT what knowledge.F not come-PRS.PFV.F darkness.F be.PST.F 
   ‘Other than that I did not know anything; it was dark’ 
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(29g) hãã ṣás zìib-ø hin ṣás màats tsáṭ-ãã  
 and 3SG.DEM.OBL tongue-OBL with 3SG.DEM.DOM mud lick-CONT   
 
 bẽẽ̀s=lee    
 go.PST.IPFV.M=REP    
   ‘And with my tongue I went on licking the mud’ 
(29h) ṣás mẽẽ̀ kha-áthe      
 3SG.DEM.DOM 1SG.ERG eat-PRS.PFV      
   ‘This is what I have eaten”’ 
(29i) ṣã  ̃ ́ baal-i-á man-áthe=lee hãã sẽẽ̀ taalib-eé ṣṹ 
 3PL.DEM word-F-PL say-PRS.PFV=REP and 3SG.DIST.ERG student-ERG 3SG.DEM  
 
 duni-ãã̀ cọól paš-eé žú só  tas  ̃ĩ̀ dimàaɣ naš-íthu 
 world-GEN.M light see-CVB DM 3SG.DIST 3SG.DIST.POSS brain decay-PRS.PFV.M.SG 
   ‘These words he said; but when this madrassah student again saw the day light he became 
mentally ill’ (The earthquake #327-336) 
The “reported” marker is found in both the quotation of the people and those of the madrassah student. 
However, not every sentence of the student’s answer is marked with lee. This may be so because once 
the source of the utterance, namely the student, has been established it is no longer necessary to mark 
every single clause of it with lee.  
However, if we look at The Earthquake narrative as a whole there are many instances of reported 
utterances that are not marked by lee. In Table 1 I want to give a brief overview of the recorded text’s 
content and the sections where lee is marking reported information. 
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Table 1. Occurrences of lee in The Earthquake narrative 
1 happenings before the earthquake, conversations with husband and daughter-in-law; lee  used 
once as speech verb replacement 
2 the earthquake, conversation with daughter-in-law 
3 immediately after the earthquake: conversations with daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, husband, 
visitors 
4 arrival of and quotation of first son: lee 
arrival of and quotation of second son: lee 
arrival of and quotation of third son: lee 
5 the first day and night after the earthquake, conversations with family members, relatives, other 
people about household goods, cattle, where to sleep etc. 
6 talk about what caused the earthquake, what people think 
7 recount of a visit to the town B. which had been destroyed 
8 report of the story of the madrassah student: lee 
 
 
It is obvious that by no means is the “reported” evidential lee used to mark every quotation of second- 
or thirdhand information. The same pattern emerges in other narrative texts that I recorded. Here a 
question arises: why did the speaker not use lee to mark every instance of a reported speech? Is it 
because its use is not obligatory or because the speaker had pity with me, the addressee of these texts 
and non-native speaker, and left the “reported” marker out to make things easier for me? At some point, 
I noticed that my language consultant used lee less frequently when talking to me than when talking to 
other mother tongue speakers (because I was struggling with the concept of using evidentials when 
talking). So the recorded narratives, especially the early ones that she told me, might not reflect a 
mother-tongue speaker’s use of lee when talking to other mother-tongue speakers.  
Subsequently I paid special attention to the use of lee in other people’s (family members, visitors) 
conversations among themselves. Their pattern of use of the “reported” marker coincides with and 
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confirms that of my language consultant in that many quotations of third persons are not marked by lee, 
in conversations as well as in longer narratives.  
 For now let me state that not every report of second- or third-hand information is marked by lee, 
and that its use is conditioned by pragmatic factors. These I will set out and discuss in section  3.6.4. 
3.5.2 The marker lee in folk tales and other narratives that are not someone’s personal 
experiences 
Folk stories are reported narratives per se, and one might expect that every single sentence is 
marked by lee or, in other words, that “reported” evidentials function as narrative genre markers. This 
is true for many languages that have evidentials, where the “reported” evidential marker is used in 
traditional and folk stories (Aikhenvald 2004:310). However, as Aikhenvald remarks, such a use is not 
obligatory (Aikhenvald 2004:314-5). “Reported” markers may or may not be used in traditional or folk 
stories. Every language seems to have its own conventions in this respect. Evidentials can be used in 
such narratives to create specific stylistic effects. In what follows I briefly describe the occurrences of 
lee in these kinds of Indus Kohistani narratives although I do not yet have a precise understanding of 
this particular use. 
There seems to be a basic distinction in Indus Kohistani between narratives about someone’s 
experiences that really happened, and folk stories. The latter have a fixed “frame” or formula for 
beginning and ending the narrative which automatically informs the addressee that what will be told is a 
folk story, not something that happened in the real world. Examples (30) and (31) show the typical 
opening and closing sentence of such a narrative; the formulaic part of the clause is in bold script. 
(30) qasá ɡày ɡày ɡày ek baačàa=uk ãã̀s 
 story.F go.PFV2.F go.PFV2.F go.PFV2.F one king=INDEF be.PST.M 
   ‘Once upon a time there was a certain king‘ [lit.: ‘The story went and went and went, there was 
a certain king’] (King’s son and fairy #1) 
(31) qasá aaluú má  unduú     
 story thither 1SG hither     
   ‘This is the end of the story’ [lit.: ‘The story (went) thither and I hither’] (Prince and fairy #225) 
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As Aikhenvald (2004:314) notes, “such ‘fixed frames’ may make the ‘reported’ evidential redundant”. 
And this seems to be true for Indus Kohistani folk tales. Furthermore, inside this frame, in the body of 
the narrative, the use of lee is distinct from that mentioned so far. In all the folk tales in my corpus of 
data, lee is mostly used to replace the speech verb when conversations are narrated. Once the identity of 
speaker and addressee has been established the matrix clause of a speech complement simply consists of 
a personal pronoun (indexing the speaker) and the marker lee. Examples of this use I have shown in 
section  3.4.7. 
In addition, lee occurs in sentences that comment on the inner state of a character, or that describe 
circumstances such as time of day or of aspects of the local area, or that convey information that is of 
secondary importance. By definition such comments and observations count as background information. 
Following are all instances where lee is used in two folk stories, shown in (32) and (33). 
(32) #89 After that, the king’s son became very distressed=lee 
 
#96 Dawn broke=lee and they set off 
 
#97 When they arrived=lee at his father-in-law’s house he put one foot to the inside of 
the door’s threshold 
 
#120 Over there, there was a mountain=lee 
 
#164 When she (the fairy) arrived=lee, she (the king’s daughter) again saw her taking 
her husband and bringing him to the mountain 
   (Prince and fairy) 
(33) #12 One day they went to get rid of the daughters =lee 
 #67 They asked, “Why?” and she said, “That’s it; now I go” =lee 
 #78 another =lee, “She is my wife” 
 #79 another =lee, “She is my sister” 
 #80 another =lee, “She is my wife” 
 #151 Then the king became very glad =lee because the crows had done such a great job 
for him. 
   (Princess and crows) 
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The sparing use of lee in such narratives is conspicuous. Other stories of this genre in my data 
collection contain even less occurrences of lee.  
Aikhenvald remarks that in narratives, evidentials may be used to mark either a climax or 
background material. She points out that “the non-firsthand evidential often has a distancing effect … in 
its ‘distancing’ function the non-firsthand evidential may serve to differentiate backgrounded and 
foregrounded information” (Aikhenvald 2004:313-6). Degener suggests such an interpretation for the 
“reported” marker –le in Waigali (Degener 1998:173-84; see also section  3.2). This analysis might also 
work for Indus Kohistani lee. However, I do not have enough data to prove such a claim. Further 
research will be needed to determine the function of lee in such narratives. 
There is one particular text in my collection of narratives, a story told about Adam and Eve. 
Although such a text might not be considered as a narrative of someone’s personal experience, the 
difference between a folk tale and this story is conspicuous in that lee is being used like in narratives of 
someone’s personal experiences, as seen in (34). 
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(34) #1 In the beginning of our world, in the beginning, our God created two people, a 
man and a wife. 
 #2 God gave them permission (saying), “There are many fruit trees; you are allowed 
to eat all the fruit”. 
 #3 He showed them two trees (saying), “Do not eat the fruit of these two trees”. 
 #4 In this way they ate fruit and for a long time lived as husband and wife. 
 #5 One day a man came. 
 #6 That man said =lee, “What do you eat?” 
 #7 They replied =lee, “We eat fruit. 
 #8 But God has not given permission to eat the fruit of these two trees. 
 #9 He said, ‘Do not eat the fruit of these two trees 
 #10 They are very bad.’” 
 #11 Then the man said =lee, “Leave God! 
 #12 He will not say anything. 
 #13 Eat the fruit of those two trees!” 
 #14 They tore off that fruit and hid it ... 
   (More about sin #1-14) 
Like in stories about someone’s personal experiences, and in day-to-day discourse, quotations in this 
narrative are marked by lee. Interestingly, it is only the reported speeches of human beings that are 
marked, not the quotations of what God was saying. My impression is that this narrative has to be 
grouped with other narratives of people’s experiences, not with myths or folk stories. 
This section discussed the use of lee in narratives of different kinds. In narratives of someone’s 
personal experiences, lee marks some but by no means all reported utterances or reported information. 
In the story about Adam and Eve, belonging to the category “creation of the world, origin of 
humankind”, lee is used similarly (although God’s utterances are not marked). Folk tales are distinct 
from these narratives in that they have a fixed frame or formula for beginning and ending the story; this 
frame might be the reason that lee is used mainly to mark parts of the narrative that are background 
information. More data will be needed to confirm or disprove this first impression.  
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3.6 The “reported” marker lee: an interpretive use marker 
In this section, I show that within the framework of relevance theory, the reported evidential lee is 
best analyzed as a procedural marker indicating metarepresentations of attributed utterances. 
Furthermore, I look at an additional function of lee, namely that of activating the addressee’s 
argumentative module. This function might explain why lee is not obligatory when reporting second- 
and thirdhand information.  
3.6.1 Evidentials in the literature  
Palmer (2001) classifies both evidential and epistemic systems as part of modality. The difference 
between the two he describes as follows.  
The essential difference between these two types is […] that with 
epistemic modality speakers express their judgment about the factual 
status of the proposition, whereas with evidential modality they indicate 
the evidence they have for its factual status (2001:8) 
Within evidential systems, Palmer distinguishes the categories “sensory” and “reported”. Others such as 
“inference” or “assumed”, he notes, are not purely evidential categories; they may belong to either 
evidential or epistemic modality; it follows that these two may overlap. 
Aikhenvald (2004) sees evidentiality as a grammatical system distinct from modality, its core 
meaning being “source of information”. She distinguishes the following categories of information 
marked by evidentials: (i) information acquired directly through seeing, (ii) information acquired 
through hearing or other senses such as smelling and tasting (auditory/sensory), (iii) inferred 
information based on visible or tangible evidence, or result, (iv) information acquired through logical 
reasoning, assumption or general knowledge, (v) hearsay, that is, reported information with no reference 
to the one it was reported by, and (vi) reported information with an overt reference to the quoted source 
(quotative) (2004:63-4). Epistemic overtones, that is, indications about the reliability of information 
such marked, are secondary and not part of the core meaning. Nevertheless, evidentials, especially 
hearsay markers, may acquire additional readings such as epistemic and mirative extensions (2004); and 
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Aikhenvald notes that such evidentials may function as tokens of narrative genre (2004:310), may be 
used to mark ironic or sarcastic utterances (2004:166, 183-4), or to mark complement clauses of verbs 
such as wonder or think (2004:51). However, she does not offer an explanation for these secondary 
meanings such as indicating irony, that seem to have nothing to do with reported information. 
One other analysis that I want to mention here is that of markers of evidentiality and mirativity in 
Turkic languages by Johanson (2000). The notion of mirativity covers “speaker’s ‘unprepared mind’, 
unexpected new information (for the speaker) and concomitant surprise” (Aikhenvald 2004:195). It is 
related to evidentiality but is seen as a separate semantic and grammatical category (2004; DeLancey 
2001). 
 For Turkic languages, where both “reported” or “inferred” (evidentiality) and “unexpected new 
information” (mirativity) may be marked, Johanson does not see the need to set up a distinct category 
“mirativity” to account for instances of the latter kind of information, nor does he assume that 
evidentiality covers both notions. Instead he subsumes both kinds of markings under the notion of 
indirectivity. This indicates that “a narrated event En is not stated directly, but in an indirect way by 
reference to its reception by a conscious subject P” (Johanson 2000:62). So, for him, neither “source of 
information” nor notions of unpreparedness of mind, surprise or unexpected new information define this 
category of grammatical marking, but the fact, that such a marked utterance, in addition to the 
information about some state of affairs it contains, has a second layer referring to the speaker’s 
reception of the obtained information. In Johanson’s words, this second layer “expresses the speaker’s 
attitude towards the proposition expressed in the sentence” (2000:70). The notion of indirectivity covers 
all three uses mentioned by him: reportive, inferential and perceptive.  
Some Turkic languages such as Turkmen and Chuvash (2000:77) have more than one indirective 
marker, thus distinguishing between reception realized by hearsay, through inference, and by perception. 
Modern Turkish, on the other hand, has one marker mɪš that covers all three notions subsumed under 
indirectivity.  
This analysis of Turkic indirective markers is of interest because it would well fit in with an 
analysis of evidential markers as markers of interpretive use. I will come back to it in the next section. 
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3.6.2 Evidentials and Relevance Theory 
As already outlined in  Chapter 2, within Relevance Theory it is assumed that every utterance 
represents a thought of its speaker. This thought itself may be a representation of a description of a state 
of affairs in the actual world, as in “today the sun is shining”; or the thought may be the representation 
or in other words, the interpretation of, another thought or utterance, as in “he thought that she had 
already left” or “Renate has said that she will come tonight”. The former use is called descriptive use, 
the latter interpretive use (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson 2012). Such interpretively used 
representations are really metarepresentations because they metarepresent another public (speech) or 
mental (thought) representation.  
In this section I am concerned with the interpretive use of representations. Reported speech is one 
but by no means the only instance of this use. There is a further distinction between attributive and non-
attributive interpretive use (Wilson 2012). Attributive interpretive use, besides representations of 
attributed utterances and thoughts, also includes cases of irony, where the speaker metarepresents an 
attributed utterance or thought and at the same time expresses a dissociative attitude to it. Echoic 
utterances, echoic questions and echoic denials are other such instances where the speaker 
metarepresents an attributed utterance or thought with an attitude (see section  2.2).  
Blass (1990) was the first to point out that for markers used to indicate hearsay, an analysis as 
evidential marker may be less than satisfactory. In her analysis of the Sissala particle rɛ ́she states that 
its interpretation as a “hearsay” or evidential marker does not account for all its uses, for example when 
marking ironic utterances, when occurring in echoic questions or in constructions involving verbs of 
propositional attitude. She shows that an analysis within the framework of Relevance Theory is much 
more satisfying, where rɛ ́is seen as a marker of interpretive use, that is, as an indicator of 
metarepresentations of attributed utterances or thoughts. Within this analysis, not only the “hearsay” use 
but also the other above mentioned uses can be accommodated. For instance, constructions involving 
verbs of propositional attitude are analyzed as representations that the hearer has to embed under a 
higher-level metarepresentation or higher-level explicature representing the speaker’s attitude to the 
lower-level representation. In the same way, echo questions and echo denials are metarepresentations of 
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attributed utterances which may have an additional layer of metarepresentation expressing the speaker’s 
attitude towards the attributed utterance. With irony, this additional layer is obligatory (see 
section  3.6.2.5 ).  
Let me summarize: an analysis of evidential markers such as Sissala rɛ ́ within the framework of 
Relevance Theory does not just explain its use of marking verbal reports. It can also account for other 
uses such as marking reported thoughts, echo questions and denials, ironic utterances, and utterances 
that express a propositional attitude towards its content in that all these cases are seen as 
metarepresentations of attributed utterances or thoughts. So the scope of an evidential marker may be 
way beyond marking reported speech. 
The categories of metarepresentations, attributed and non-attributed, are understood to be universal, 
but languages differ in the way they choose to mark them grammatically or otherwise. In Sissala, 
interpretive use of metarepresentations of utterances as well as of thoughts is grammatically indicated 
by rɛ.́ For Japanese, Itani (1994) re-analyzed the utterance-final “hearsay” particle tte within Relevance 
Theory as a marker of attributed utterances but not thoughts.  
Here I want to come back to Johanson’s analysis of Turkic markers of hearsay, inference and 
mirativity mentioned in section  3.6.1. Striking similarities can be observed in so far as Johanson states 
that propositions marked by the “indirectivity” marker have a second layer referring to the speaker’s 
reception of the obtained information. Translated into relevance-theoretical terms, this means that a 
speaker’s utterance that is marked by an indirectivity marker contains two levels of representation: a 
lower-level representation of a state of affairs embedded under a higher-level metarepresentation 
expressing – in Johanson’s words - the speaker’s reception of this state of affairs. This higher-level 
metarepresentation may be of the kind “someone said that …”, in other words, hearsay (evidential), or 
such as “I inferred from fact X that …” (inference), or it may express the speaker’s surprise etc. 
(attitude) about the said state of affairs. In each case, a metarepresentation is involved. If this analysis is 
correct then, like Sissala rɛ,́ the scope of Modern Turkic mɪš as a marker of metarepresentations 
includes several other kinds of metarepresentations besides those of attributed utterances. Mirativity, 
within this approach, seems then to include just another bundle of speaker’s attitudes such as surprise, 
50 
 
unprepared mind etc. that involve metarepresentation and results in the construction of a higher-level 
explicature. Some languages do not mark it grammatically at all, others have a marker used exclusively 
to mark this notion (lo in Hare, DeLancey 2001), whereas languages such as Modern Turkic group it 
together with other kinds of metarepresentations expressing the notions of “reported” and “inferred”. 
This is just a first impression; it would be interesting to take a closer look at mirativity as seen within 
Relevance Theory. 
In the next section, I will argue that a similar analysis works well for Indus Kohistani lee. 
3.6.2.1 Indus Kohistani lee: a marker of attributed utterances 
In Indus Kohistani, the “reported” marker lee is best analyzed as a marker of interpretive use, 
restricted to indicating attributed utterances, or in other words, marking attributed public 
metarepresentations. When comparing the Sissala and the Indus Kohistani marker it is obvious that 
Sissala rɛ ́covers a much wider range of metarepresentations, for instance it includes 
metarepresentations of attributed thoughts. Indus Kohistani lee, on the other hand, marks only a subset 
of metarepresentations, namely that of metarepresentations of attributed utterances that were actually 
uttered by someone. We will see in the following chapters that Indus Kohistani has several other 
markers for indicating different kinds of metarepresentations, for instance example (35) illustrates the 
use of two different markers for indicating attributive speech and thought respectively. This utterance is 
part of a conversation about a woman who thought she was pregnant and about whom my language 
consultant had heard via other people. The “think” clause at the beginning of the utterance and the 
complement clause are in square brackets. 
(35) [oolàat  thí karee=lee] tilaá~tilaa paátyõ màayn=lee 
 offspring be.PRS.F MRM=REP cause.to.move.CVB~REDUPL later say.PFV1=REP  
 
 [če rasuulìi thí]     
 COMP tumor be.PRS.F     
   ‘Assuming that (she) is pregnant (they) went with her (to different places), later (they) said that 
it is a tumor’ (conversation 14.1.2013) 
The first clause of this utterance “it is offspring” is marked by karee, another metarepresentation marker 
indicating that this is not the description of a state of affairs in the real world nor an actually uttered 
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speech but an assumption, a thought. This assumption was then reported by someone else to my 
language consultant who in turn reported it to me; therefore it is marked with lee as a reported or 
attributed speech. The last clause, the speech complement clause “it is a tumor”, is again marked by lee 
because it is an attributed utterance which, this time, does not contain an assumption/thought but a 
description of a state of affairs (verified by ultrasound).  
In section  3.4 I described different uses of lee: marking explicit reported utterances that are 
complements of a speech verb; marking propositions that would otherwise not be identifiable as 
reported utterances; and replacing the speech verb in reported utterances. In all these instances, lee 
marks the propositions as attributed utterances, that is, utterances that were originally uttered by 
someone other than the speaker. In the following sections I will apply my analysis to the data described 
above and also show how the analysis of lee fits in with that of the other two attributive use markers. 
3.6.2.2 lee  marking clauses other than speech complements 
Recall that lee is not only found in complements of speech predicates but also in other clauses that 
are otherwise not explicitly marked as reported speech. Consider again example (8), repeated here. The 
speaker was telling me about the nikah (marriage contract) of one of her sons at which she herself had 
not been present but had been told about by her husband. The utterance consists of a simple proposition; 
nothing apart from the marker lee indicates that this is a reported utterance. Such instances demonstrate 
the most typical use of a “reported” marker.  
(8) ɡhõ̀õ awàaz kar-ãã̀s=lee   
 big.M.SG voice.M do-PST.IPFV.M=REP   
   ‘He made (gave his consent with) a loud voice’ (conversation 4.5.2012) 
The first explicature of this utterance is something like “the speaker said, ‘He (my son) gave his consent 
to the marriage with a loud voice’”. However, the presence of lee indicates that the proposition uttered 
by the speaker is an attributed one, originally uttered by someone else. In relevance-theoretical terms, 
lee constrains the addressee of this utterance to construct another, a higher-level explicature, of the kind 
“the speaker said, ‘Someone said/it has been reported to me that he (my son) gave his consent to the 
marriage with a loud voice’”. For me, the addressee of this utterance, it was easy to recover the original 
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source of this utterance from the context, so the final higher-level explicature was “the speaker said, 
‘My husband told me that my son gave his consent to the marriage with a loud voice’”. (There is still 
another higher-level explicature as I realized later on because the speaker told this utterance with a 
mocking attitude. Young men are supposed to be quiet and not raise their voice in the presence of their 
elders. So the speaker’s mocking attitude (although not expressed linguistically) causes the hearer to 
construct another higher-level explicature such as “The speaker said with a mocking attitude, ‘My 
husband told me that my son gave his consent to the marriage with a loud voice, indeed!’”).  
In utterances such as the one above lee functions as a procedural indicator that guides the addressee 
towards the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “someone has told that … (proposition of 
utterance)”. The original speaker of the reported utterance may or may not be mentioned or even 
known. In example (8) above, the context helped in recovering the source.  
In example (36), the final clause is marked by lee. The speaker had related that she had had a sugar 
test because she suspected having diabetes. 
(36) ṭésṭ kar-i-aaíl khẽ nií thú=lee   
 test do-CAUS-PFV1 SUB NEG be.PRS.M.SG=REP   
   ‘When (I) had the (blood sugar) test done (the doctor) said that it is not (diabetes)’ (conversation 
24.12.2012) 
Leaving aside lee, the explicature would be “the speaker said, ‘When I had the test done it was not 
(diabetes)’”. Here again, the addressee is constrained by the presence of the marker lee to construct a 
higher-level explicature such as “the speaker said, ‘When I had the test done, X said that it is not 
diabetes’”. Considerations of relevance guide the search for X, the original speaker of the quoted 
utterance: the one who had ordered or done the test must be the one who commented on it. 
In other instances, considering the context, the addressee arrives at the conclusion that what has 
been marked by lee is what people in general say, as illustrated in example (11), repeated here. 
(11) h  ̃ĩ̀ hár xoraak-á tsèe thé, ḍaalḍá kha-ánt=lee 
 now every food.M-PL much.M.PL be.PRS.M.PL vegetable.ghee eat-PRS.M=REP  
 
 ɡhiíl kha-ánt=lee masùu ho-óɡaa=lee mheeṣ-ãã̀ masùu 




 ho-óɡaa=lee ɡuur-õ̀õ masùu ho-óɡaa=lee 
 become-PFV2.M.SG=REP cow-OBL.PL meat.M become-PFV2.M.SG=REP  
 
 bakar-èel masùu ho-óɡaa=lee 
 goat-ADS.M meat.M become-PFV2.M.SG=REP 
   ‘Now, every kind of food is available in abundance: people eat vegetable ghee, they eat ghee 
made from butter; there is/would be chicken meat, there is/would be buffalo meat, there 
is/would be beef, there is/would be goat’s meat’ (Family planning #32) 
In summary, the marker lee, when following a proposition, indicates that relevance is to be found 
by constructing a higher-level explicature such as, “the speaker has been told/the speaker has heard that 
… (proposition)”.  
3.6.2.3 lee replacing complement-taking speech predicates  
In section  3.4.7 I showed how lee can be used to replace complement-taking speech predicates. 
Example (37) illustrates this use.  
(37) paátyõ mẽẽ̀  P-an tapús kar-áthe só=lee só 
 later 1SG.ERG name.M-ABL question do-PRS.PFV 3SG.DIST=REP 3SG.DIST  
 
 pií nií thú     
 over.there NEG be.PRS.M.SG     
   ‘Later, I asked P; he (said that) he is not there’ (conversation 5.10.12) 
Looking at all the instances of this use I noticed that the complementizer če ‘that’, although not 
obligatory with speech complements, is never used in such constructions. The syntactic pattern of such 
utterances is as follows (38):  
(38) PRONOUN - lee - PROPOSITION (= speech complement)  
Furthermore, the pronoun is never marked for ergative case although if preceding a speech verb marked 
for perfective aspect, the speaker subject has ergative case marking. The only difference between 
propositions such as (8) and (36) and this one is the explicit mention of the original speaker (its slot 
usually filled by a pronoun), and the marker lee preceding the proposition instead of following it. It 
might well be that in such cases, lee has the same function as mentioned above, namely constraining the 
addressee towards constructing a higher-level explicature of the kind described in the previous section. 
To take example (37), the explicature of the second part of the utterance would be “he=lee  he is not 
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there”. The presence of lee indicates that relevance will be achieved by the further construction of the 
higher-level explicature “he said that he is not here”. Within the conventional analysis of reported 
speech in terms of complement clause and matrix clause it is difficult to place this verb-less 
construction. A pronoun plus a “reported” marker do not make a matrix clause. Here Güldemann’s 
analysis of matrix clauses as quotative indexes and “tags” on the speech clause (see section  4.2) works 
better. He shows for African languages that a minority of them has verb-less quotative indexes (QI); in 
some cases such a QI consists of just a pronoun (Güldemann 2008), or a pronoun and what he calls 
quote orienter10. It seems that in Indus Kohistani, this particular verb-less construction is such an 
instance of a “non-predicative quotative index” (2008:54). 
3.6.2.4 lee marking speech complements and complement-taking speech predicates 
In my data, in the majority of instances of lee being used, the marker either follows a speech 
complement or a complement-taking speech verb, in which case it is then followed by the speech 
complement. Of these speech complements, most of them are introduced by the complementizer če 
‘that‘, another interpretive use indicator (see  Chapter 5). Examples (39) and (40) illustrate this use. 
(39) sẽẽ̀ màaṣ-e màayn=lee če tús ɡi kha-ánt-ø 
 3SG.DIST.ERG man-ERG say.PVF1=REP COMP 2PL what eat-PRS.M-PL.M 
   ‘The man said, “What are you eating?”’ (More about sin #6) 
Here, too, the basic function of lee is to indicate attributive use, that is: marking an utterance as 
originally uttered by someone other than the speaker. But at the same time, the fact that this is a 
reported utterance is already part of the explicature, namely “the speaker said, ‘The man said, “…”’”. Is 
this a case of double or redundant marking? In the example above, taken from the narrative about Adam 
and Eve, where we find a speech verb followed by lee and the complementizer če, one could argue that 
the presence of lee is necessary to indicate that what is attributed is thirdhand information  (see 
section  3.4.2). However, this explanation does not hold for example (40) where the speaker is quoting 
her son whom she had herself heard saying “I do not eat curry”. 
                                              




(40) khẽ màayn má  zùuli nií kha-ánt=lee  
 DEVM say.PVF1=REP 1SG curry NEG eat-PRS.M=REP  
   ‘He said, “I do not eat curry”’ (conversation 25.6.2012) 
From the conversation immediately preceding it was clear that the speaker herself had witnessed her son 
making this utterance. She introduces the quotation with, “he said”. So the marking of this utterance as 
a reported speech heard by the speaker (= lee following the speech complement) would seem not to be 
necessary. Here the question arises why there is double (example (40)) or even triple (example (39)) 
marking, namely an explicit speech verb plus complementizer če plus the marker lee.  
Another question would be why not every attributed utterance is marked by lee (see section  3.5.1, 
Table 1 where I give a list of occurrences of lee in a personal-experience narrative). Two answers seem 
possible: (i) seen from a diachronic point of view, lee may be in the process of being replaced by other 
interpretive use markers i.e. by the complementizer če;  therefore its use is no longer obligatory and it 
will eventually fall out of use at some time in the future; (ii) whereas the complementizer če is the 
default interpretive use marker (see  Chapter 5), lee marks something else in addition to interpretive use 
(= is the marked one of the two interpretive use markers). In what follows I will consider both 
possibilities.   
Concerning the first-mentioned possibility I am not able to confirm or refute such a claim. As there 
are no earlier language records available with which to compare my data, one can only speculate about 
a possible reduction and final loss of lee. Aikhenvald notes that evidentials easily spread, but also can 
be lost due to language contact (2004:294-6). If lee is in the process of being replaced by če, this would 
explain why the use of this marker is no longer obligatory, but would offer no explanation as to why 
utterances may have both markers. As to the second answer, namely that lee is the marked member of 
the two markers of attributed use če and lee, I want to make a suggestion which I will outline in 
section  3.6.3. 
3.6.2.5 Does lee mark echoic utterances? 
In section  3.6.2 I noted that the analysis of the Sissala marker rɛ ́ as an interpretive use marker 
explains why it is also used in echoic utterances including ironic ones. Both are metarepresentations of 
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attributed utterances or thoughts. And both achieve relevance not so much by reporting or repeating an 
attributed utterance or thought as by conveying the speaker’s attitude towards it. 
In the case of echoic use, the speaker is metarepresenting interpretively the speaker’s previous 
utterance, as shown in (2), taken from Wilson and repeated here. Suppose Peter and Mary have been to 
see a film. As they come out, one of the following exchanges occurs:  
(2) PETER: That was a fantastic film. 
        
 MARY: a. [happily]  Fantastic. 
  b. [puzzled]  Fantastic? 
  c. [scornfully]  Fantastic!  
As Wilson notes, the speaker who echoes the hearer’s previous utterance (or parts of it) may convey all 
kinds of attitudes of which (2) shows three instances. In (2a) the attitude conveyed is that of agreement, 
in (2b) it is questioning, and (2c) conveys disagreement and scorn. 
Ironic utterances are a special case of echoic use. The speaker is echoing an utterance or a thought 
of someone else and at the same time conveying a dissociative attitude, (2c) being an instance of this 
use. Mary is repeating part of Peter’s utterance but with such an attitude that the hearer (Peter) is being 
constrained to construct a higher-level explicature such as “The speaker (Mary) does not think at all that 
the film was fantastic”. In other words, by echoing part of Peter’s utterance with this attitude she is 
signaling that she rejects his judgment of the film. 
Both, simple echoic and echoic utterances spoken with a dissociative attitude, may be marked by a 
“reported” evidential, not because an evidential may have secondary meanings or overtones but because 
echoic utterances are, like reported speech, instances of attributed utterances or thoughts. 
Coming back to the Indus Kohistani marker lee, the question arises if it is also used to mark such 
echoic - including ironic - utterances. I will now present and discuss instances of what might be 
considered echoic utterances. Let us first turn to questions marked by lee. The next two examples are 
instances of questions being echoed. In (41) the speaker repeats as a question what the hearer has said in 
the previous utterance.  
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(41) A ṣúli-õõ man masùu i-íthu   
  nostril-PL.OBL in flesh come-PRS.PFV.M.SG   
   ‘A: “Tissue has grown in the nostrils, the doctor is saying”’ 
 B masùu i-íthu=lee=aa     
  flesh come-PRS.PFV.M.SG=REP=Q     
   ‘B: “Did he say that tissue is growing?”’ (conversation 30.4.12) 
The second instance of what seems to be an echoic question is presented in examples (13) to (15), 
repeated here and taken from a conversation about a device for children with cleft palate. I had been 
asked to find out if such a device is available in Pakistan. After some enquiry I went back to tell my 
language consultant that “this thing is not available in Pakistan; I have asked the doctors”. She then 
replied with a rising/questioning pitch: 
(13) nií thú=lee      
 NEG be.PRS.M.SG=REP      
   ‘Is it not, they say?’ 
Later another member of the family asked my language consultant about the same device, aɡain with a 
rising pitch towards the end of the utterance (14). 
(14) ɡi-  ̃ ́ nií thú=lee     
 what-also NEG be.PRS.M.SG=REP     
   ‘There is nothing at all available, they say?’ 
Whereupon my language consultant confirmed (15): 
(15) nií thú=lee      
 NEG be.PRS.M.SG=REP      
   ‘It is not, they say’ (conversation 7.5.2012) 
Both, examples (41) and (13) to (15) contain clear instances of questions echoing the content (or part of 
it) of the hearer’s previous utterance. However, in both cases the hearer’s previous utterance that is 
being echoed is already an attributed utterance. In (41) speaker B echoes an utterance attributed to 
speaker A who in turn attributed it to the doctor. In other words, the utterance that speaker B is echoing 
is itself an attributed “reported” utterance. 
The same is true for (13) to (15) and, in fact, for all other instances of echoing questions in my 
data: the utterance that is being echoed is itself reported. So, as long as I have no data that show a 
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marked echoic question referring to an utterance that itself is not reported, I cannot claim that lee marks 
echoic questions. 
In my data there are only a couple of utterances marked by lee that have ironic connotations; one 
of them is example (17) from section  3.4.4, repeated here. It is taken from a conversation about my 
language consultant’s oldest daughter who, after several pregnancies, was not well. My language 
consultant told me that she had advised her to stop getting pregnant. She then quoted her daughter’s 
answer. 
(17) khẽ màayn éqaa má  ɡí zar-í hu-úthi=aa=lee 
 then say.PFV1 oh! 1SG what old-F become-PRS.PFV.F=Q=REP 
   ‘Then she said, “Oh! Have I become that old?”’ (conversation 7.5.2012) 
Here the original speaker of the reported utterance echoes what Kohistani women in general believe: A 
woman is considered old once she is beyond the childbearing age. At the same time this is also an 
instance of echoing an implicature of my language consultant’s previous utterance “stop getting 
pregnant”, namely “if someone stops getting pregnant then she is considered old. It follows that if I stop 
getting pregnant I will be considered old”. The speaker’s (i.e. my language consultant’s daughter’s) 
attitude is dissociative, this being conveyed by the exclamation particle éqaa.  
But here, too, the ironic utterance is not just the echoing of an utterance attributed to the hearer and 
Kohistani women in general; it then was reported to my language consultant who in turn passed it on to 
me. In other words, it contains multiple levels of attribution, and we have the same problem as with 
echoic questions above. 
All the instances of echoic use that I have found so far involve multiple levels of attribution: (i) 
speaker echoing the hearer’s previous utterance (second-level attribution) that itself is attributed (first-
level attribution), or (ii) the hearer’s previous utterance is being echoed by the speaker (first-level 
attribution), then this echoic utterance in turn is reported to another addressee (second-level attribution). 
It follows that from the data available we cannot conclude that lee is being used to mark echoic 
utterances per se, without a second-level attribution involved. Further research of more diverse data may 
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approve or disprove this impression. To summarize: from the data available at this point it seems that 
Indus Kohistani lee is not used to mark echoic questions and ironic utterances per se. 
3.6.3 Procedural indicators: triggers of the argumentative  module 
In section  2.4 I introduced the relevance-theoretic concepts of argumentation and persuasion as 
goals of a speaker, and that of epistemic vigilance on the part of an addressee when communicating. I 
also mentioned the argumentative module that is assumed to be separate from the comprehension 
module and whose activation may be triggered by procedural indicators. Recall that an addressee’s 
epistemic vigilance is directed toward the contents of an utterance as well as the trustworthiness of the 
communicator. A speaker may therefore use procedural indicators such as so, but , and therefore  to 
activate the audience’s epistemic vigilance mechanism towards the content of her utterance, whereas 
evidentials are employed as an attempt to convince the addressee of the speaker’s trustworthiness. It 
follows that an evidential marker may have two functions: (i) indicating source of report/attributed 
representations and (ii) activating the addressee’s argumentative module in order to prove herself as a 
trustworthy and reliable communicator. 
 In the next section, I outline Unger’s analysis of the Estonian quotative as an example of such a 
twofold function of a procedural indicator. 
3.6.3.1   The Estonian quotative 
Unger (2012:45-73) suggests that the Estonian quotative, a verb form with the ending –vat, is one 
such evidential marker that has a twofold function: indicating interpretive use and activating the 
argumentative module. Comparing –vat  with the Sissala marker rɛ ́ he notes that both are used to mark 
quotations including indirect speech, hearsay and information acquired through inference; in other 
words, both are markers of interpretive use. But whereas Sissala rɛ ́does not have any connotations of 
diminished speaker’s commitment to the truth of her proposition, the Estonian quotative is used only in 
such contexts where the speaker is not fully committed to the truth of her proposition expressed. 
Unger argues that this difference between the two markers exists because the Estonian verb suffix  
-vat activates the argumentative module whereas Sissala rɛ ́does not. That is, the Estonian quotative has 
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two functions, (i) indicating interpretive use (like Sissala rɛ)́ and (ii) activating the epistemic vigilance 
mechanism located in the argumentation module, thereby making sure that the source of information 
description is used as input (2012:68). 
Such an analysis predicts that Estonian –vat will only be used when the speaker wants her audience 
to evaluate for themselves whether to accept or reject the claims contained in the reported information. 
This means that the Estonian quotative will be used to mark only a subset of attributed propositions, for 
instance reports of rather unusual events, or quotations where the speaker cannot guarantee for the 
precise contents of the original utterance (2012:69). 
In section  3.6.4 I will suggest that a similar analysis might work for Indus Kohistani lee and also 
might account for the fact that its use to mark attributed utterances is not obligatory. 
3.6.4 The Indus Kohistani marker lee: activator of the argumentative module 
In section  3.5.1 I had noted that the use of the marker lee is not obligatory when reporting someone 
else’s utterances. In my data there are also many instances of lee being used in utterances that are 
already recognizable as reported speech by a complement-taking predicate such as “X said …”, thus 
seemingly being double-marked . Here I want to suggest a possible explanation for this selective use of 
lee, building on Unger’s analysis of the Estonian quotative and on the more general claims of Wilson 
(2011) that procedural markers indicating logical or evidential relations may be analyzed as activators of 
the argumentative module. To say it in Wilson’s words, 
“… the function of the procedural expressions in a language is to put 
the user of the language in a state in which some of these domain-
specific cognitive procedures [i.e. cognitive procedures whose primary 
functions are not intrinsically linked to inferential comprehension, 
2011:12] are highly activated” (Wilson 2011:11). 
I claim that the marker lee is such a trigger that activates the addressee’s argumentative module. Here I 
want to repeat what Unger (2012) said about the input into this module (see section  2.4). “The input  
[…] are claims, that is, assumptions (mental representations) that the audience is not prepared to accept 
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at face value, and information relevant to its evaluation”. The evidential lee provides “the information 
relevant to its evaluation”, namely the source of information. It follows that an Indus Kohistani speaker 
will use lee in instances where she wants to get past her audience’s epistemic vigilance mechanism 
(Wilson 2011:23). By activating the argumentative module and by providing the input needed for 
evaluation, she (i) presents herself as trustworthy by openly declaring her information as second- or 
thirdhand, and she (ii) wants the hearer to judge for himself whether to accept or reject it, or in other 
words, she wants the hearer to take some of the responsibility for the proposition’s epistemic 
assessment. In the following paragraphs I will show with examples from my data how this may work 
out. 
Let us first consider instances where the syntactic placement of lee indicates third-hand information 
as illustrated in example (42). 
(42) ḍaakṭar-á  man-ãã̀s-e=lee as  ̃ĩ̀ ããcị̀-õõ nazár húm 
 doctor-PL say-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M=REP 3SG.PROX.POSS eye-PL.OBL sight.M also  
 
 nií thú     
 NEG be.PRS.M.SG     
   ‘The doctors were saying that he also cannot see’ (conversation 22.6.2013) 
The person talked about in this utterance was a small baby that had been born with several visible 
anomalies. After the baby boy had been seen by a doctor his mother reported the results to the speaker 
of the utterance, who in turn told me. So this is a case of thirdhand information. The speaker has already 
made this evident by using the complement-taking matrix clause “the doctors were saying”. I suggest 
that by adding the marker lee, the speaker is activating the addressee’s cognitive 
evaluation/argumentation module, indicating “this information I have from hearsay” and “judge for 
yourself if the information from such a source is reliable” and thereby not taking full responsibility 
herself for the truth of the proposition expressed. 
The next two examples (43) and (43) may be analyzed on a similar line. The background of (43) is 
as follows. My language consultant told me about the previous night when her family had been woken 
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up by loud voices. She had asked one of her sons what the shouting and commotion was all about and 
he answered her, 
(43) sã  ̃ ́ kaabulìi thé ɡí ɡúzur-a thé i-íthe 
 3PL.DIST Afghan be.PRS.M.PL what Gujjar-PL be.PRS.M.PL come-PRS.PFV.M.PL  
 
 man-àant-ø=lee če  zãĩ̀ bakàr puli-a-áthe   
 say-PRS.M-PL.M=REP COMP 1PL.POSS.F goat.F hide-CAUS-PRS.PFV   
   ‘It is those Afghans or Gujjars; they have come and said that someone has taken away their 
goats’ (conversation 3.9.2012) 
Note that the speaker of the reported utterance (the son) as well as my language consultant is reporting 
information for the truth of which they cannot vouch. By using the marker lee the hearer’s 
argumentative module is activated, he is informed about the source of information, i.e. hearsay, and he 
has to decide for himself whether he accepts the reported speakers’ claims.  
The utterance in example (43) is not explicitly marked as containing thirdhand information; the 
marker lee follows the quotation. The original source of the quotation is “people”.  
(44) khẽ h  ̃ĩ̀ xálak man-àant če  hindù-õõ qaanùun 
 DEVM now people say-PRS.M COMP Hindu-GEN.PL custom  
 
 ãã̀s=lee       
 be. PST.M=REP       
   ‘So now people say that (a woman’s complete covering of the face) is a Hindu custom’ (A 
mother’s advice #93) 
Here again, I argue, the marker lee is used to trigger the activation of the argumentative module. In 
this specific example it seems that the speaker makes no commitment to or judgment about the truth of 
the proposition expressed but leaves this task to the hearer. However, I think it is not part of the 
semantics of lee to express doubt about a proposition marked by it. If we follow the analysis outlined 
above then the notion of “reduced commitment/doubt” is a contextual effect, resulting from the handing 
over of responsibility of assessment to the addressee. What lee as an activator of the argumentative 




In example (45) below, there is no doubt about the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the 
proposition expressed, but here, too, lee is being used to activate the speaker’s argumentative module, 
such that the hearer should judge for herself. The utterance in (45) is part of a conversation between my 
language consultant and her mother-in-law. The former had gone to her youngest sister-in-law to ask 
her to help her to cut grass. Now she reported to her mother-in-law, what her youngest sister-in-law had 
replied. 
(45) ‘She said to me, “I have to clean the house lee, I have to do the dishes lee, I have to do 
...lee, I have to do ...lee”; so I said, “Then we are not able to go today”’ 
   (field notes conversation 23.9.2011) 
The expected answer of a younger woman to the request of her elder would be to comply. Here this is 
not the case, her answer is rather unusual. The use of lee following every clause is conspicuous. It is as 
if, by using lee, the speaker is telling her mother-in-law, “judge for yourself if what she said is right”, 
thereby activating the hearer’s argumentative module.  
The last example is from the earthquake narrative, an overview of which I presented in 
section  3.5.1 as Table 1, repeated here. 
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 Table 1 . Occurrences of lee in The Earthquake narrative 
1 happenings before the earthquake, conversations with husband and daughter-in-law; lee  used 
once as speech verb replacement 
2 the earthquake, conversation with daughter-in-law 
3 immediately after the earthquake: conversations with daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, husband, 
visitors 
4 arrival of and conversation with first son: lee 
arrival of and conversation with second son: lee 
arrival of and conversation with third son: lee 
5 the first day and night after the earthquake, conversations with family members, relatives, other 
people about household goods, cattle, where to sleep etc. 
6 talk about what caused the earthquake, what people think 
7 recount of a visit to the town B. which had been destroyed 
8 report of the story of the madrassah student: lee 
As I have already noted, lee is used sparingly in this narrative that contains plenty of reported 
utterances. Apart from two other instances, we find lee only in the three conversations between the 
speaker and her three sons after their safe arrival, and in the report about the madrassah student at the 
end of the narrative (see examples 29 a-i). I suggest that here, too, the use of lee is connected with the 
activation of the hearer’s argumentative module. It is a rather unusual event, the survival of someone 
buried under a building (29 a-i) and reported as thirdhand information, that is marked by lee; likewise 
the three encounters with the speaker’s sons when they come home alive and well. The function of lee 
in all these instances may be, as Wilson puts it, “to display the communicator’s competence, 
benevolence and trustworthiness to the hearer” by getting the information sources right (Wilson 
2011:24), whereas “[i]gnoring evidentiality in a language with evidentials gets you marked as unreliable 
or a liar”, to quote Aikhenvald (2004:344) again. In each of the above mentioned instances the presence 
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of lee indicates that the speaker is reliable and that the hearer should judge for himself whether to trust 
the indicated source(s) of information.  
Leaving the use of lee in folk tales aside, such an analysis could be applied to all instances of lee in 
my data. The fact that lee seems not to be used to mark echo questions per se or ironic utterances (see 
subsection  3.6.2.5) would support the interpretation of lee as an activator of the argumentative module. 
Also, this would explain why lee is not used when quoting sayings of God, as within Kohistani culture 
and religion, any epistemic vigilance regarding God’s words would be considered unnecessary, even 
sinful. Of course more data and research will be needed to confirm (or disprove) my hypothesis.  
3.7 Summary: The Indus Kohistani marker lee 
In this chapter I have introduced the Indus Kohistani marker lee as an evidential “reported” 
marker, using Aikhenvald’s classification of evidentials. After giving a brief overview of reported 
evidentials in the wider geographic context I have then described the uses of lee. It marks reported 
utterances that are speech complements, thereby distinguishing between secondhand and thirdhand 
information. lee is also used to mark reported information that is otherwise not recognizable as such i.e. 
that syntactically is not a speech complement. Furthermore, lee may replace the speech verb of a 
complement-taking matrix clause. In conversation as well as in narratives the use of lee is not 
obligatory. A distinction has to be made between lee marking reported information in conversation and 
narratives of someone’s experiences on the one hand and its use in folk tales on the other hand. In the 
latter category of narrative its main function is not indicating reported information. Rather, it seems to 
be used as a marker of background material. 
I have then briefly reviewed some aspects of current analyses of evidential markers by Palmer 
(2001), Aikhenvald (2004) and Johanson (2000). I have introduced the notion of interpretive use in 
Relevance Theory and the analysis of “reported” markers within this theoretical framework as first 
demonstrated by Blass (1990). I have argued that Indus Kohistani lee may likewise be analyzed as a 
procedural indicator of interpretive use albeit of a more restricted range than that shown by Blass for the 
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Sissala marker rɛ. The marker lee is one of several such interpretive use markers in Indus Kohistani, 
indicating attributed utterances only.  
Finally, I have proposed a possible answer to the question as to why the use of lee is not obligatory 
in marking attributed utterances. Building on Wilson’s claims that procedural indicators not only guide 
and constrain a hearer’s search for meaning but also may be activators of the addressee’s cognitive 
mechanisms relating to epistemic vigilance, I suggested that such an analysis may work well for lee. 
According to this interpretation, lee would be used in instances where a speaker wants her addressee to 
take over responsibility of evaluating the information himself by laying open its sources. This would 
also explain why lee does not mark every attributed utterance and why it is not used to mark echo-
questions proper and ironic utterances per se. 
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Chapter 4  
The Indus Kohistani marker karee 
The Indus Kohistani marker karee, a grammaticalized form of the verb kar- ‘do’, has a variety of 
uses: as a quotative11, as complementizer, as a marker of purpose and reason clauses, and as marker of 
naming and of similarity constructions. Considering this particular combination of functions the marker 
karee can be grouped together with other similarly grammaticalized markers many of which have 
developed from speech verbs (Lord 1993; Bashir 1996; Güldemann 2008 among others).  
In the first part of this chapter I introduce the source of karee, a converb, and the grammaticalized 
marker with its phonological and syntactic properties. As the marker karee has a lot to do with 
quotations, a short overview of sentential complementation in Indus Kohistani follows. In section  4.3 I 
describe the different uses of karee.  
Section  4.4 presents a brief overview of relevant literature concerning grammaticalization in 
general and of quotatives specifically. In section  4.5 I propose an analysis of karee within the 
framework of Relevance Theory as a procedural indicator, more specifically, as a metarepresentation 
marker of utterances and thoughts. By indicating an utterance as the metarepresentation of another 
utterance or thought, karee constrains the addressee’s interpretation process. In cases where the 
utterance marked by karee is not embedded within a speech or “think” matrix clause, karee guides the 
addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “the speaker says, ‘I/someone 
else said/thought that …’”. I argue that such an analysis can provide a satisfactory explanation for all 
the different uses. Section  4.5.3 provides some thoughts on how my analysis of the marker karee  might 
                                              
11 As defined by Aikhenvald (2004:394): “verbal form or a participle introducing a verbatim quotation of what 
someone else has said”. 
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be relevant for other similar grammaticalized quotatives; and section  4.6 presents a summary of this 
chapter. 
4.1 The converb kareé and the metarepresentation marker karee 
In the following sections I describe the Indus Kohistani converb kareé and the marker karee. Both, 
converb and marker, are used extensively and may occur together in one sentence. 
4.1.1 The converb kareé 
The Indus Kohistani marker karee is the grammaticalized form of the converb kareé ‘having done’, 
developed from the verb kar- ‘do’. This verb is a generic performance/action verb (Güldemann 
2008:306); it is mostly used as the verbal component of conjunct verbs, constructions that consist of a 
nonverbal word (often a noun) and a finite form of the verb ‘do’, for instance kàam karàant (work.N 
is.doing) ‘ is working’, or qasá karàant (story.N is.doing) ‘is telling’. Such conjunct verbs are a well-
known feature of Indo-Iranian languages. The converb kareé  ‘having done’, a perfective adverbial 
participle, and other such converbs in general, are often also referred to as conjunctive participles within 
the Indian subcontinent language area (Masica 1991:399).  
Indus Kohistani converbs of intransitive regular verbs are built by adding the suffix -ií to the verb 
root. The converb suffixes for regular transitive verbs are -eé or -aá. In the case of the verb kar- ‘do’, 
the -eé suffix is used: kar-eé, the accent of the word being on the last mora of the suffix.  
In Indus Kohistani, as in other Indo-Aryan languages, converbs are used frequently in the 
construction of adverbial clauses. A dependent clause containing a converb, or a string of such clauses, 
is followed by the main clause containing the finite verb form. Example (46) shows a typical use of 
such adverbial clauses. The speaker of (46) is talking about what people do when there is a funeral. The 
adverbial clauses of this and the following example are in square brackets. 
(46) tèe [hàa dhaý] [dawàa kar-eé] tèe riz-àant-ø 
 then hand hold.CVB prayer do-CVB then disperse-PRS.M-PL.M 
   ‘Then (the people) hold up hands, pray and then disperse’ (Death, burial #38) 
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Example (47) contains a string of adverbial clauses with converbs, followed by the main clause 
with the finite verb. 
(47) [kukõṍ maar-eé] [suɡàa bhaát lad-eé] [ɡhiíl ɡal-eé] búṭ 
 chicken.PL kill-CVB good.M.SG rice.M cook-CVB ghee pour-CVB all  
 
 só xálki ɡóli de-ént   
 3SG.DIST people.SG.DAT bread give-PRS.M   
   ‘(He) kills chicken, prepares tasty rice, pours ghee (on it) and serves the meal to all the people’ 
(About deqani # 29) 
In addition to the above described converb form, there is a second construction using the verb ɡal-  
‘put/pour’. Here the verb stem is followed by the converb gal-eé ‘having put/poured’, for instance kará-
ɡal-ee 12 ‘having done’, or ií-ɡal-ee ‘having come’. So far, I have not been able to determine the exact 
differences in use and meaning between the two forms. My main language consultant uses both forms 
but more frequently the V-eé form. In texts of another language consultant the V-á-gal-ee form is found 
nearly exclusively. It is mentioned here because both forms may be used as metarepresentation markers. 
4.1.2 The metarepresentation marker karee 
Both converb forms introduced in the previous section are also used as quotation marker, 
complementizer and in several other functions which will be described in the following sections. That 
these two forms have undergone grammaticalization can be observed as follows: (i) the markers have 
lost their accent. (ii) Perhaps as a consequence of losing the accent, the converb ending –ee is frequently 
being dropped, resulting in the forms kar and karagal. (iii) The semantic content of the converb which 
was rather generic in the first place has been lost. 
Syntactically, the marker karee and its second form karagalee  follow the clause-final finite verb, 
whereas the converb kareé/ karáɡalee takes the place of the clause-final verb in an adverbial clause. 
As this chapter will mainly be concerned with reported speech and thought, I first want to present a 
brief overview of sentential complementation in Indus Kohistani in the following section.  
                                              
12 Note that in this construction the pitch accent is on the stem, not on the last mora of the converb. 
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4.2 Sentential complementation in Indus Kohistani 
Noonan defines sentential complementation as “the syntactic situation that arises when a notional 
sentence or predication is an argument of a predicate” (Noonan 2007b:52), whereby the said argument 
may function as subject or object of the predicate. This definition includes the whole range of 
complementation, from sentence-like speech complements to nonfinite complements; here the 
complement is seen as dependent, a constituent of the matrix clause, that is the main or independent 
clause.  
There are other approaches to analyze complements of verbs of speech, perception and cognition in 
particular, see for example Güldemann who proposes to analyze these not as sentential subordinate 
complement clauses but as syntactically autonomous clauses, with the matrix clause functioning as a 
kind of tag on the quote (Güldemann 2008:231). One reason for him to adopt this analysis is the fact 
that quotation clauses can occur without a matrix clause but not matrix clauses without quotation 
clauses, or in other words, the quote can be without the tag, but not the tag without the quote. 
Furthermore, the matrix clause of such complements may in many languages in fact not be a clause at 
all but consist of just a quotation marker or be otherwise reduced13. Güldemann therefore uses the terms 
“Reported Discourse” (RD in short) in place of complement, and “Quotation Index” (QI) in place of 
matrix clause. Thompson’s analysis within the framework of Emergent Grammar goes into a similar 
direction in that she sees such matrix-clause-and-complement constructions as independent clauses 
(complement) within “epistemic/evidential/evaluative frames” (matrix clause) that consist of frequently 
used “phrasal fragments” (Thompson 2002:142). It seems to me that for the analysis of Indus Kohistani 
sentential complements of verbs of speech, cognition and perception, Güldemann’s analysis is more 
satisfying as quite often what is called the matrix clause simply consists of a quotation marker, a kind of 
tag on the quoted utterance or thought. However, to make things no more complicated than necessary I 
will continue to use the conventional terms “complement” and “matrix clause”.  
                                              
13 Two instances of such a reduced matrix clause have been described in chapter 3 section 3.4.3 where the 
matrix clause is just a “reported” marker (example (8)), and in chapter 3, section 3.4.7 where the matrix clause 
consists of a pronoun referring to the speaker plus a “reported” marker (example (24)). 
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4.2.1 Form of reported speech and thought in Indus Kohistani 
In Indus Kohistani, all quotations are reported as direct speech, that is: pronouns and indicators of 
temporal and spatial deixis all refer to the original speaker of the quote. Thoughts are quoted in the 
same way in that they are presented as “mental” or “inner” direct speech. So far I have not come across 
any instance of indirect speech that takes the reporter’s perspective concerning time, pronominal 
reference and deixis. Example (48) will illustrate this fact. 
(48) sẽẽ̀ màayn [má ṣás zìib-ø hin màats tsaṭ-ãã̀s] 
 3SG.ERG say.PFV1 1SG 3SG.DEM.OBL tongue-OBL with mud lick-PST.IPFV.M 
   ‘He said, “I was licking mud with my tongue”’ (The earthquake #330) 
Example (49) was uttered when my language consultant was asked where her son was. 
(49) uskẽẽ̀ ẓhũ  ̃ ́ bazíthu     
 just now outwards go.PRS.PFV.M.SG      
 
 [má qasày-ø ɡee be-ént karee]   
 1SG butcher-OBL to go-PRS.M MRM   
   ‘(He) has just left for the town (down-valley), saying that he will go to the butcher’ [lit.: ‘… 
saying “I go to the butcher”’] (conversation 27.4.2012) 
Both utterances are reported as direct speech; the original speaker of the quote is referred to as ‘I’. 
4.2.2 Sentence-like complementation strategies  
In Indus Kohistani we find both sentence-like complements and nonfinite complements. In this 
study I will be concerned only with the former type for the formation of which there exist several 
strategies illustrated in the following sections. The complements of all examples are in square brackets. 
4.2.2.1 Juxtaposition  
One complementation strategy in Indus Kohistani is juxtaposition. Here the matrix clause is 
followed by the complement without any complementizer or other clause linker. This strategy is used 
only when man- ‘say’ is the complement-taking predicate. Example (50) shows such an instance. 
(50) sayõṍ man-áthe [ɡí ho-óthu]    
 3PL.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV what become-PRS.PFV.M.SG    
   ‘They said, “What happened?”’ (Avalanche story #48) 
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Occasionally, the matrix clause may follow the quotation instead of preceding it, as seen in example 
(51). This is possible only when, in the course of the preceding conversation, the identity of the quoted 
speaker has already been established. The speaker of the utterance in (51) had told me about a visit to 
the doctor and finished by reporting the doctor’s last remarks. 
(51) [cạ̀a hapt-õ̀õ paátyõ ɡatá wá] man-áthe  
 three week-PL.OBL later again come.down.IMP.2SG say-PRS.PFV  
   ‘“Come back after three weeks”, he said’ (conversation 6.4.13) 
The hearer already knows from the conversation immediately preceding this utterance that the quoted 
speaker is the doctor. The default order is nevertheless matrix clause – complement. 
4.2.2.2 Use of the complementizer če  
By far the most frequently used strategy is that of inserting the complementizer če between main 
clause and quote. This complementizer will be the topic of  Chapter 5; here I just want to give an 
illustration of its use in reporting speech or thought, as shown in example (52).  
(52) abàa-e kòu kar-áthe [če hĩaál wa-íɡee kãã ́
 father-ERG shoutinɡ do-PRS.PFV COMP avalanche come.down-PFV2.F who  
 
 amãã̀ bač-aa-h-aánt khẽ bača-ái]    
 REFL escape-CAUS-POT-PRS.M SUB escape-CAUS-IMP.2PL    
   ‘The father shouted, “An avalanche is coming down, save yourselves if you can”’ (Avalanche 
story #62) 
The complementizer can also replace the complement-taking predicate as can be seen in the following 
example (53). 
(53) khẽ ḍoóm cẹ̃ẽ̀s [če  ṣás màaṣ xabár kar-á 
 then Dom send.PST.IPFV.M COMP 3SG.DEM.DOM man news do-IMP.2SG  
 
 ṣás màaṣ xabár kar-á]   
 3SG.DEM.DOM man news do-IMP.2SG   
   ‘Then (the family) used to send the Dom, (saying) “Inform this man, this man, … (about the 
wedding),”’ (About the Dom tribe #10 
 Chapter 5 will further illustrate the use of če as a complementizer occuring with complement-
taking predicates other than speech, cognition and perception verbs. 
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4.2.2.3 Uses of the marker karee  
Together with the complementizer če or on its own, the marker karee is used in complement 
constructions as the next examples will illustrate. Contrary to če, the marker karee follows the 
complement. In (54) both markers are present. 
(54) m  ̃ĩ̀ asií tal ḍàaḍ nií thí [če ṹ 
 1SG.GEN 3SG.PROX.OBL on belief NEG be.PRS.F COMP 3SG.PROX  
 
 duaalš  ̃ĩ̀ i-ṣaýt karee]    
 twelve.ORD come-FUT.F MRM    
   ‘I don’t believe her that she will come on the twelfth’ (conversation 29.10.2012) 
The following example is a self-quotation of an earlier utterance, without the complementizer če. 
(55) má man-ãĩ̀s  nií=aa [Q-ãã̀ ék puc-̣eé du-  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariũṹ 
 1SG say-PST.IPFV.F  NEG=Q name.F-GEN.M one son-ERG two-GEN.F wife  
 
 a-áthe karee]      
 bring-PRS.PFV MRM      
   ‘I was saying, wasn’t I, that one of Q’s sons has taken a second wife’ (conversation 27.8.12) 
Here, too, the complement clause follows the matrix clause but the marker of the complement clause 
karee is clause-final. 
4.2.2.4 Use of the “reported” marker lee  
The marker lee may be used in addition to the complementizer če to mark reported speech; 
however it may also be the only indicator of a speech complement.  Chapter 3 treats this marker in more 
detail; here I want to give just a few examples of its typical uses. Example (56) shows a quotation 
preceded by the matrix clause and followed by lee.  
(56) xawànd-e man-ìl [tú é naìi=lee]   
 husband-ERG say-PFV1 2SG come.IMP.2SG NEG=REP   
   ‘The husband said, “Don’t come”’ (conversation 31.12.2012) 
The marker lee following the quote indicates that the speaker herself heard the original utterance 
(secondhand report).  
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In example (57) the “reported” marker follows the speech verb of the matrix clause, marking the 
following quotation as a thirdhand report. Matrix clause and complement are juxtaposed, the strategy 
that may be used if the complement-taking predicate is the verb man- ‘say’. 
(57) khẽ sayõṍ man-áthe=lee [bé ṣã  ̃ ́ meewá khaánt-ø] 
 DEVM 3PL.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV=REP 1PL.EXCL 3PL.DEM fruit eat.PRS.M-PL.M 
   ‘Then they said, “We are eating this fruit”’ (more about sin #7) 
In example (36), repeated here, the second clause is a reported speech clause, recognizable as such 
only because it is followed by lee.  
(36) ṭésṭ kar-i-aáil khẽ [nií thú=lee]   
 test do-CAUS-PFV1 SUB NEG be.PRS.M.SG=REP   
   ‘When (I) had the (blood sugar) test done (the doctor) said that it is not (diabetes)’ (conversation 
24.12.2012) 
The addressee of this utterance has to infer the identity of the quoted speaker from the immediate 
context. 
In example (58), lee replaces the speech verb; here the matrix clause consists of a pronominal 
reference to the speaker and the marker lee. This use is limited to instances when the reported speaker 
has already been introduced and is activated in the minds of the audience. The following example is 
taken from the report of a conversation between the speaker and her son. 
(58) ṹ=lee [má  sút ãã̀s]    
 3S.PROX=REP 1SG asleep be.PST.M    
   ‘He said, “I was asleep”’ (Dreams and their interpretation #85) 
To summarize this section, Indus Kohistani uses a variety of complementation strategies for 
reporting speech and thought such as juxtaposition, the complementizer če, the marker karee, the 
“reported” marker lee, and a combination of these strategies (če plus karee, če plus lee). All 
complements – reported speech and thought likewise – have to be presented as direct speech. 
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4.3 Uses of the marker karee 
The development of SAY verbs14 or verba dicendi via a grammaticalization process to quotatives, 
complementizers and subordination markers is well known and has been described by Lord (1993), 
Güldemann (2008), Bashir (1996), Hopper and Traugott (1993) and many others. As we will see, the 
Indus Kohistani marker karee, although its source is not a SAY verb, obviously has taken a similar 
grammaticalization pathway. I therefore adopt this approach in describing the different uses of karee, 
starting with its function as a marker of reported speech or, as often termed, a quotative. 
4.3.1 Indus Kohistani  karee as marker of reported speech  
Indus Kohistani has two explicit markers of reported speech: the “reported” marker lee 
(see  Chapter 3) and the marker karee. As we have seen in  Chapter 3, lee is used only for reporting 
utterances of sources other than the speaker herself whereas karee has a number of other functions 
besides that as a quotative. Looking at the frequency of occurrences of both markers in my data it is 
quite obvious that karee as a quotation marker is used less that lee. Further differences are noticeable 
when comparing quotations marked by lee with such marked by karee. (i) Whereas lee marks quotations 
of an addressee and of third persons only, karee  is also used to mark quotations of a speaker’s own 
previous utterances (self-quotation). (ii) Most of the quotations marked by karee contain questions, 
imperatives, or express volition, intentions, or thoughts about something. That implies (iii) that instances 
of quotations containing descriptions of states of affairs are rather scarce; (iv) hypothetical/not realized 
quotations, for instance “why didn’t you tell him ‘Come tomorrow’?” may be marked by karee but not 
by lee. In the following sections I will illustrate each of these points. 
4.3.1.1 karee as marker of second- and thirdhand report 
As already mentioned in section  4.2.2.3, the marker karee always follows the quotation. In example 
(59) below, karee is not the only indicator of reported speech: the quoted utterance is preceded by the 
matrix clause verb “had called” and the complementizer če.  
                                              
14 SAY verb stands for the semantic field of verbs of saying. 
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(59) raál ẓhaaw-ií  telfún kar-álaas [če má boó ḍhipṭìi.ø 
 at.night brother-DAT phone do-PST.PFV COMP 1SG up duty.OBL  
 
 man thú kar]    
 in be.PRS.M.SG MRM    
   ‘(My son) had called his brother at night, saying, “I am up here on duty”’ (conversation 
5.10.2012) 
In the next example, the original speaker of the quoted utterance is not mentioned. 
(60) bé bilàal xabár ho-óthe [sã  ̃ ́ wa-íthe karee] 
 1PL yesterday news become-PRS.PFV.M.PL 3PL.DIST come.down-PRS.PFV.M.PL MRM 
   ‘Yesterday we got the news that they have come down’ (conversation 8.6.2012) 
Matrix clause and quote are juxtaposed, the quote is following the complement-taking predicate. 
Example (61) is an instance of a quotation that is identifiable as such only because of the presence 
of karee.  
(61) [ṹ tasií mil bhèeṭ thí karee]  
 3SG.PROX 3SG.DIST.OBL with sitting be.PRS.F MRM  
   ‘(X. said that) she is living with him’ (conversation 21.5.2012) 
This quotation is not preceded by a matrix clause with an utterance predicate. 
The quotation in example (62) is that of a question. Speaker A. had heard B. talking on the phone 
to her brother-in-law and had asked, “What does he say?” The answer was as follows. 
(62) [ɡulá thí kar]     
 where be.PRS.F MRM     
   ‘(He is asking) “where is (Beate)?”’ (conversation 5.10.2012) 
Example (63) is an instance of a quotation of a reported intention, taken from a narrative about a 
flash flood. 
(63) khẽ sayõṍ man-áthe [khaṣàa wa-ínt hãã bé 
 then 3PL.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV flash.flood come.down-PRS.F and 1PL  
 
 ḍee-wìž karee]      
 flee-SBJV.1PL MRM      
   ‘Then they said, “A flash flood is coming down; let’s get away”’ (The torrent #92) 
In my data, the majority of such quoted utterances marked by karee does not contain descriptions of 
states of affairs but rather expresses assumptions, questions, intentions and requests. 
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The quoted utterance in example (64) below contains a command. The background to it is as 
follows: One of my language consultant’s daughters-in-law came into the room where we were sitting 
and said something to her. As I did not understand her I asked my language consultant, what she had 
said. She replied, 
(64) ṹ man-àynt [miiɡeé man-áthe [é karee]]  
 3SG.PROX say-PRS.F 1SG.DAT say-PRS.PFV come.IMP.2SG MRM  
   ‘She is saying that (her father-in-law) told her to come’ (conversation 6.9.2013) 
Note that this utterance contains a quote within a quote, both of them in square brackets: the father-in-
law’s reported speech is embedded in the daughter-in-law’s quote. It is not clear if both of them or only 
the former one is marked by karee because in either case karee has to be the sentence-final element. 
However, considering the fact that most of the clauses marked by karee do not contain descriptions of 
states of affairs but thoughts, intentions, assumptions, requests etc. (see the introduction in  4.3.1), karee 
probably marks just the last clause, the quote of the father-in-law’s utterance. 
4.3.1.2 karee as marker of self-quotations 
As already mentioned above, karee may also mark quotations of a speaker’s own previous utterances, as 
example (65) below illustrates. With very few exceptions, the instances of self-quotations marked by 
karee in my data contain not descriptions of states of affairs but intentions, assumptions, requests, and 
directives. One of these exceptions is example (65). 
(65) má man-ãĩ̀s nií=aa če ṣṹ W-ãã puúc ̣
 1SG say-PST.IPFV.F NEG=Q COMP 3SG.DEM name-GEN.M SON 
 
 maar-áthe karee     
 kill-PRS.PFV MRM     
   ‘Didn’t I tell you that (they) killed the son of W?’ (conversation 25.6.2012) 
The proposition marked by karee in this example is the description of a state of affairs. Note, however, 
that the speaker uses the tag question nií=aa which could mean that she was not quite sure if she did 
tell me about the killing of W’s son. In fact, the other two instances of self-quotations containing 
descriptions of states of affairs are similar to this example in that the speaker introduces the quote by 
saying “Didn’t I tell you…?”. At this point it is not clear to me if (i) the speaker uses karee just because 
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she quoted herself or (ii) the speaker uses karee because she is not sure if she really had quoted the 
marked utterance or only thought that she had quoted it. 
The following examples contain quotations that are not descriptions of states of affairs. 
(66) khẽ mẽẽ̀ màayn [bíɡi ho-ṣát kar]  
 DEVM 1SG.ERG say.PFV1 something become-FUT.M MRM  
   ‘Then I said, “There will be something (=she will be pregnant)”’ (conversation 1.2.2014) 
The speaker’s own quotation contains an assumption, a thought about the possible condition of another 
person. 
The quote in the next example (67) expresses an intention. 
(67) mẽẽ̀ man-álaas [má tií mil cẹ-ént karee] 
 1SG.ERG say-PST.PFV 1SG 2SG.OBL with send-PRS.M MRM 
   ‘I had said that I will send (the girls) back with you’ (conversation 20.7.2012) 
The last example (68) of this section shows the self-quotation of a request. 
(68) mẽẽ̀ man-álaas [aá kar]    
 1SG.ERG say-PST.PFV bring.IMP.2SG MRM    
   ‘I had said, “Bring (the patient record)”’ (conversation 12.10.2012) 
4.3.1.3 karee as quotation marker of hypothetical/not realized utterances 
Quite a number of the karee-marked quotations in my data are instances of hypothetical speech 
such as (i) quotations of utterances that someone is told not to say, (ii) quotations of utterances that 
someone might say in the future, and (iii) quotations of utterances that were never said, for instance 
such rhetorical questions as “who told you to do such a thing” where both speaker and addressee know 
that in fact no-one had told any such thing. Example (23), repeated below, is an instance of a quotation 
of a potential future utterance. The speaker of (23) quotes what his wife will in all probability say to 
him if he brings home the wrong size of pan. 
(23) tèe  m  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariṹ man-áṣit [če m  ̃ĩ̀ kira lák 
 then 1SG.GEN wife say-FUT.F COMP 1SG.GEN for small.M  
 
 pateelá a-áthe karaɡal]    
 pan.M bring-PRS.PFV MRM    
   ‘Then my wife will say to me, “you have brought a small pan” (although I was supposed to 
bring a big one)’ (Akbar Badshah #50) 
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In this example, the form karagal (shortened form of karagalee) is used as well as the complementizer 
če. 
In example (69) the speaker is instructing his addressees what not to say. 
(69) wál talá bazií ṣeé nií man-ìi [če zõṍ 
 but there go.CVB such NEG say-IMP.2PL COMP 1PL.ERG  
 
 cạal-áthe karee]     
 find-PRS.PFV MRM     
   ‘But when you gone there don’t say that you have found (the baby)’ (How they found the baby 
# 57) 
Example (70) is a rhetorical question, addressed to young men who dare to voice their opinion in 
the presence of their elders.  
(70) tèe bé man-àant-ø če lakeer-õ̀õ kẽẽ ́ man-áthe 
 then 1PL say-PRS.M-PL.M COMP young.one-PL.DAT who.ERG say-PRS.PFV  
 
 [baal-i-á man-ìi karee]     
 word-F-PL say-IMP.2PL MRM     
   ‘Then we say, “Who has told young people to speak up (in the presence of their elders)?”’ 
(Adab, good manners #60) 
The answer to this question is, as both speaker and addressees know, that no-one would say such a thing 
in this particular cultural context. 
4.3.1.4 Summary: karee as marker of reported speech 
We have seen so far that karee marks reports of speech uttered by persons other than the speaker  
as well as quotes of a speaker’s own previous utterances. The majority of the latter ones, namely self-
quotations, contain  intentions, assumptions, requests and directives. More natural data will be needed to 
find out if self-quotations of descriptions of states of affairs too may be indicated by karee, that is, if 
instances such as example (65) are marked by karee  just because they are quotes of a speaker’s 
previous utterance, or because the speaker was not quite sure if she had really done the previous telling.  
In addition, karee  is used to indicate hypothetical or potential reported speech. Looking at the kind of 
speech in all these utterances it is remarkable that the majority of them do not contain descriptions of 
states of affairs but rather expressions of intentions, requests, commands, and questions. It follows that 
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karee is by no means a default reported speech marker. In my data, quotes within a construction 
involving the complementizer če, and reported speech marked by the “reported” marker lee 
(see  Chapter 5) occur much more frequently. A further point to note is the fact that karee and the 
complementizer če are not mutually exclusive, as has been shown in examples (59), (23) and (70).  
4.3.2 The complementizer  karee 
Literature about grammaticalization of SAY verbs shows that quotation markers often develop into 
complementizers that not only occur together with utterance verbs but also with verbs of cognition and 
perception, and with other complement-taking predicates (Bashir 1996; Güldemann 2008; Hopper and 
Traugott 1993; Lord 1993). Following this grammaticalization path, I describe and illustrate the use of 
karee as a complementizer.  
4.3.2.1 karee as marker of non-speech complements 
According to my data, karee occurs as a marker of complements of a whole range of complement-
taking predicates such as think, know, believe, wish, understand, hope, fear, and pretend. The following 
examples illustrate this function. Remember that karee, a clause-final marker, is also the last element in 
a complement, whereas the complementizer če is always clause-initial. Example (71) shows karee 
marking a hypothetical thought. 
(71) waleé ṣṹ suuč-í nií i-íthi [če baá-ø 
 but 3SG.DEM thought-F NEG  come-PRS.PFV.F COMP house-OBL  
 
 paátyo-on khaṣàa wa-ṣaýt karee]    
 behind-ABL flash.flood come.down-FUT.F MRM    
   ‘But (they) did not think that the flash flood would come down from behind the house’ (The 
torrent #37) 
In this example, the complement is marked by both the complementizer če as well as the marker karee. 
According to my language consultant, the use of če in such matrix clause – complement constructions is 
not obligatory. They are equally grammatical. 
The next example (72) shows a complement of the verb grasp, understand, again both, če and 
karee, are present. 
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(72) mút  poorz-ãĩ̀s naíi [če m  ̃ĩ̀ oolàat-ãĩ zhùuk 
 other understand-PST.IPFV.F NEG COMP 1SG.POSS offspring-GEN.F pain.F  
 
 i-ínt karee] nhaal-á     
 come-PRS.F MRM look-IMP.2SG     
   ‘(She) did not grasp/understand that she was having labor pains, you see’ [lit.: …that I am 
having labor pains] (A mother’s advice #121) 
As already pointed out in section  4.2.1, not only reported speech but also thoughts and feelings are 
presented in direct speech form, as is demonstrated in this example. 
Example (73) is an utterance expressing a wish. 
(73) khẽ piiruú be-ént t  ̃ĩ̀ hìiu ho-ónt [če 
 DEVM to.over.there go-PRS.M 2SG.POSS heart become-PRS.M COMP  
 
 má tãĩ̀ yàa paš-áṣit karee]   
 1SG REFL.POSS.F mother see-FUT.F MRM   
   ‘Then, when you go over there (to Germany) it is your wish to see your mother’ [lit.: ‘ … that I 
will see my mother’] (conversation 22.6.2012) 
The next example (74) shows a complement of the verb hope. 
(74) ṣás kar-áɡil khẽ umèen kar-ãã̀s-e [maasúm zàn 
 3SG.DEM.DOM do-PFV2 SUB hope do-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M child alive.M  
 
 dhar-áṣat karee]      
 stay-FUT.M MRM      
     ‘(They) did this and then hoped that the child would stay alive’ (More old traditions #8) 
The complement in example (75) is expressing a hope that someone did no longer entertain. 
(75) m  ̃ĩ̀ umèen nií ãã̀s [če má zàn dhar-ií 
 1SG.POSS hope NEG be.PST.M COMP 1SG alive.M stay-CVB  
 
 waapás tãã̀ baa-í ba-ṣát karee]  
 back REFL.POSS.M house-DAT go-FUT.M MRM  
     ‘I had no hope of staying alive and coming back home’ (conversation 27.4.2013) 
In the examples seen so far the complement always follows the matrix clause. When the 
complementizer če is not used then the placement of the complement is variable, as shown in (76) 
below where it precedes the matrix clause. In this example, the speaker is wondering why a certain 
event does not happen. 
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(76) [ṹ ɡín nií ho-ínt kar] má hariàan ho-ínt 
 3SG.PROX why NEG become-PRS.F MRM 1SG astonished become-PRS.F 
    ‘I wonder why she is not menstruating’ (conversation 4.2.2013) 
Here the marker karee indicates that the first of the two clauses is not just a question but the 
complement of an (omitted) “think” predicate. 
The next two examples (77) and (78) are instances of expressions of a belief someone entertains.  
(77) m  ̃ĩ̀ yaqìin thú [H. baá-ø i-ṣaýt karee] 
 1SG.POSS belief be.PRS.M.SG name.F house-DAT come-FUT.F MRM 
    ‘I believe/think that H. is at home’ (elicited 18.3.2013) 
The speaker of (78) is telling what she does not believe to happen. 
(78) ṣṹ ḍàaḍ nií thí [če ã  ̃ ́ ṣundá zãã̀ 
 3SG.DEM belief NEG be.PRS.F COMP 3PL.PROX here.DEM 1PL.POSS.M  
 
 baá bhay-áṣit-ø karee]    
 house sit-FUT.F-PL.F MRM    
    ‘(We) don’t believe that they will stay here in our house’ (conversation 19.10.2012) 
Examples (79) and (80) below contain complements of the verb know. Almost all instances of such 
constructions in my data are expressions of what someone does not know. (79) is taken from a folk 
story. At one point one of the main characters, the king, has to state that he does not know the 
whereabouts of his youngest daughter. 
(79) só dhií làa bazíthi pát nií thí [če  
 3SG.DIST daughter away go.PRS.PFV.F knowledge NEG be.PRS.F COMP  
 
 tas  ̃ĩ̀ ṣíṣ khuúr ɡulá ho-ṣát karaɡal] 
 3SG.DIST.POSS head.M foot.M where become-FUT.M MRM 
    ‘That daughter has disappeared; I don’t know where she is’ (The king’s daughter #145) 
In example (80), the speaker is quoting someone else.  
(80) man-àynt miiɡeé pát nií ãĩ̀s tií tiš [ṹ 
 say-PRS.F 1SG.DAT knowledge NEG be.PST.F 2SG.OBL about 3SG.PROX  
 
 uka-íthi karee]     
 go.up-PRS.PFV.F MRM     




The complement in example (81) fills in the subject slot of the matrix clause, “it” being a dummy 
subject. 
(81) pakàar thú [če tú ukèe karee]  
 necessary be.PRS.M.SG COMP 2SG ɡo.up.SBJV.3SG MRM  
    ‘It is necessary that you come up’ (conversation 27.4.2013) 
Examples (82) and (83) below illustrate the use of karee as a marker of complements of the 
predicate pretend, make believe. (82) is taken from a narrative, (83) is elicited. Note that this utterance 
also contains an adverbial clause with the converb kareé. 
(82) ɡát khacạ́p kar-eé ṣeé kar-áthe [šàa kar-àynt karee] 
 again grabbing do-CVB such do-PRS.PFV spinach do-PRS.F MRM 
   ‘Again she did like this, grabbing, pretending to gather spinach’ (How they found the baby #36) 
Another way to translate would be “Again she did like this, grabbing, making (others) believe that she 
was gathering spinach”. 
In example (83), the complement is embedded within the main clause. 
(83) ṹ [sút thú karee] čhoól kar-àant  
 3SG.PROX asleep be.PRS.M.SG MRM deceivinɡ do-PRS.M  
    ‘He is pretending to sleep’ (elicited 16.3.2012) 
Here too, an alternative translation is “He deceives (others) by making them believe that he is sleeping”.  
In the following paragraphs are some more examples of complement clauses marked by karee  that 
are less frequent. The complement-taking predicate in (84) below is the verb show. A king’s daughter 
who had been abandoned by her father gains a kingdom and then invites her father but decides not to 
reveal her true identity. 
(84) ṣṹ dhií … pulí-ɡal bheeṭìil  thí amãã̀ paša-aínt 
 3SG.DEM daughter hide.CVB-throw.CVB sitting.ADS.F be.PRS.F REFL show-PRS.F.  
 
 naíi [če  só má thí karaɡal]  
 NEG COMP 3SG.DIST 1SG be.PRS.F MRM  
   ‘This daughter … she is sitting there having disguised herself; she does not reveal that she is the 
one (the king is talking about)’ (The king’s daughter #140) 
Note that in this example, the second form of the marker karee, karagalee, shortened to karagal, is used. 
The verb look in example (85) is used in the sense of find out. 
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(85) tú nhaal-áṣit  [če zòṛ šiš-íthe ɡí nií 
 2SG look-FUT.F COMP clothes dry-PRS.PFV.M.PL what NEG  
 
 šiš-íthe  karee]      
 dry-PRS.PFV.M.PL MRM      
    ‘You will see/find out if the clothes have dried or not’ (conversation 6.4.2013) 
So far, we have seen that most of the complements marked by karee are extra-posed, with the 
exception of (76) where the complement clause is pre-posed, and (83) with an embedded complement. 
In most of them we also find the complementizer če (though not in (77) and (84)), although, according 
to my language consultant, its use with such complements is not obligatory; they would be equally 
acceptable without če.  
4.3.2.2 karee as marker of “think” complements 
The examples of sentences with “think” complements that I will present in this section are different 
from the ones seen so far in that, with only a few exceptions, they do not contain an explicit 
complement-taking predicate think, nor is the complement necessarily extra-posed. In example (86) 
below the “think” complement is embedded within the main clause. As there is no explicit mention of 
think, it is only the presence of karee  that indicates that the embedded clause is not a description of a 
state of affairs but an interpretation of a thought.   
(86) khẽ sã  ̃ ́ ɡharimaaṣ-õṍ zúno~zuno [maasúm mar-èel thú 
 DEVM 3PL.DIST woman-PL.OBL quickly~REDUPL child die-ADS.M be.PRS.M.SG  
 
 karee] [karápu này kar-eé] maasúm piiruú ɡal-áɡil 
 MRM cutting umbilical.cord do-CVB child over.there put-PFV2 
   ‘Then the women, thinking that the baby is dead, would quickly cut the umbilical cord and put 
the baby aside’ (Conception, birth #229) 
Note that in this example, the word karee occurs twice: as the grammaticalized marker following the 
“think” clause in square brackets, and as the converb ‘having done’ in the following adverbial clause, 
also in square brackets.  
In example (87), the “think” complement is pre-posed. Here again, the presence of karee  is the 
only indicator that the preceding clause is not a description of a state of affairs but someone’s thought. 
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(87) yaá [ɣarìib màaṣ-ø ɡee pèes tsèe thé 
 or poor man-OBL with money.M much.M.PL be.PRS.M.PL  
 
 karee] tás kuṭ-ãã̀s-e     
 MRM 3SG.DIST.DOM beat-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M     
   ‘Or, when they thought that a poor man (man from a poor tribe) had a lot of money, they beat 
him up’ (Tribes and their occupations #178) 
The next example (88) was uttered during a conversation with my language consultant, when a hen 
was sitting on a pile of bedding. My language consultant said to someone else in the room, 
(88) pií ṣás ẓhalíẓ-ø tal dé ta [ṹ 
 over.there 3SG.DEM.OBL young.hen-OBL on give.IMP2SG DM 3SG.PROX  
 
 ṣalá ɡaṛ-àynt karee]     
 there.DEM defecate-PRS.F MRM     
   ‘Throw something at that hen over there (to chase her away), she will defecate 
there!’(conversation 9.11.2012) 
My language consultant told me that another way of saying would be the following (89). 
(89) pií ṣás ẓhalíẓ-ø tal dé ta. má suučí 
 over.there 3SG.DEM.OBL young.hen-OBL on give.IMP2SG DM 1SG thought  
 
 kar-àynt [ṹ ṣalá ɡaṛ-àynt karee]  
 do-PRS.F 3SG.PROX there.DEM defecate-PRS.F MRM  
   ‘Throw something at that hen over there (to chase her away), I think she will defecate there!’ 
(conversation 9.11.2012) 
So in (89) the speaker explicates that what is marked by karee is her own quoted thought.  
In example (90) the speaker talks about her intention or thought to talk to her husband.  
(90) laá [má tãã̀ xawànd-i man-àm karee] [če 
 upto.now 1SG REFL.POSS.M husband-DAT say-SBJV.1SG MRM COMP  
 
 tẽẽ̀ zeetìi ɣòor neer-ìl. sãĩ̀ ɡí hàal 
 2SG.ERG later.on enquiry do.not-PFV1 3PL.POSS what condition   
 
 ho-ínt]. ɡatá má oṣ-íthi    
 become-PRS.F again 1SG forget-PRS.PFV.F    
   ‘Up to now I intended/thought to talk to my husband such as “You have not enquired (after 




This utterance contains a “think” clause marked by karee and expressing an intention of the speaker, 
and a speech complement marked by če (also in square brackets). 
In the next example (91) the clause marked by karee may express a thought, an intention or a 
purpose. 
(91) [má amã  ̃ ́ rac-̣àant karee] dhaý aá amãã̀ ɡee 
 1SG REFL raise-PRS.M MRM hold.CVB bring.CVB REFL.OBL with  
 
 rac-̣álaas      
 raise-PST.PFV      
   ‘Thinking that/intending to raise her himself he had taken her, had brought her (to his family) 
and had raised her’ (A’s family #35) 
In this section I have presented “think” clauses marked by karee that have no overt “think” verb as 
a complement-taking predicate. The syntactic position of such a clause within the main clause seems to 
be quite variable: the complement may precede or follow or be embedded within the main clause. As 
we will see in the next section, these constructions are very similar to purpose clauses marked by karee. 
4.3.3 The marker karee in purpose and reason clauses 
When SAY verbs (and other categories, see Güldemann 2008) that develop into quotatives and then 
complementizers, grammaticalize further, another function to develop on the grammaticalization 
pathway or cline is that of purpose and reason clause marker. In this section I describe and illustrate the 
use of karee as such a marker. It is obvious that such clauses are very similar to the “think” clauses 
presented in the previous section. In fact, I argue in section  4.5 that there is no clear distinction between 
the two categories; Indus Kohistani purpose and reason clauses marked by karee are similar to “think” 
clauses in that both are reported thoughts.  
4.3.3.1 karee as marker of purpose clauses 
As a first example of a purpose clause construction marked by karee, consider example (92) below, 
taken from a narrative. The main character of the story is picking apples in a tree for his son, when he 
sees another boy taking the apples. His reaction is described in (92).  
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(92) muná way-ɡal-eé só maṭoó tal sẽẽ̀ [čuúṭ 
 down go.down.CVB-throw-CVB 3SG.DIST boy.OBL on 3SG.ERG slap  
 
 dàm karee] hàa buí kìir   
 give.SBJV.1SG MRM hand upwards do.PFV1   
   ‘Having climbed down (from the tree) he raised his hand to hit the boy’ [lit.: ‘Having climbed 
down he “I will hit the boy” karee  raised his hand’] (Hair parting story #21) 
As already pointed out, this construction is similar to the “think” complements. The purpose is still 
expressed as a thought that is reported as “mental” direct speech: the verb give  is marked for first 
person singular. The purpose clause is embedded within the main clause. 
In the next examples, too, the purpose is presented as a thought from the perspective of the thinker. 
(93a) B: moomaá ɡulú bazíthu    
  uncle where.to go.PRS.PFV.M.SG     
 
(92b) A: [ɡay-  ̃ĩ̀ rupày cẹele-aám kar] bazíthu  
  cow-GEN.F money.F deliver-SBJV.1SG MRM go.PRS.PFV.M.SG  
   ‘B: “Where has uncle gone to?”  A: “He went to hand over the money for the cow”’ [lit.: ‘“I 
will hand over the money for the cow” kar he went’] (conversation 7.1.2013) 
Here too, the purpose is expressed as direct speech that precedes the main clause. 
In example (94), the purpose clause follows the main clause; again the purpose is presented as an 
utterance in direct speech form. 
(94) X-ãĩ̀ yàa tèe ẓhaa-ṭuú žhaazày i-ílaas-ø [boó 
 name-GEN.F mother and brother-DIM sister.in.law come-PST.PFV.M-PL.M up 
 
 báṣ  hó-iž kar]     
 appearinɡ become-SBJV.1PL MRM     
   ‘X’s mother and her brother and his wife had come to see (Y) up there’ [lit.: ‘X’s mother and 
her brother and his wife had come, “let’s appear up there” kar’] (conversation 5.7.2013) 
Example (95) shows an embedded purpose clause.  
(95) sã  ̃ ́ [phaý kha-ýnt-ø karee] ròoṛ-an munií bazíthi 
 3PL.DIST fig eat-PRS.F-PL.F MRM road-ABL downwards go.PRS.PFV.F 
   ‘They went down below the road to eat figs’ (How they found the baby #2) 
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As the (co-referential) subject of the dependent clause in (95) has been omitted and the verb is not 
marked for person, the direct-speech character of the purpose clause is not obvious, as in the examples 
seen so far. 
In the following examples (96) to (98) the subjects of main clause and purpose clause are not co-
referential. 
(96) ṣã  ̃ ́ šulũĩ-á tsha-ánt-ø. [suɡàa ho-ṣát karee] tsha-ánt-ø 
 3SG.DEM pebble-PL place-PRS.M-PL.M nice become-FUT.M MRM place-PRS.M-PL.M 
   ‘(We) put these big pebbles (on the grave). (We) put (them there) so that (the grave) looks nice’ 
(Graves, graveyard #73-4) 
In the second clause, the subject of the main clause and of the purpose clause are different albeit both of 
them have been omitted. The clause marked by karee precedes the verb of the main clause. 
The next example consists of a whole string of clauses. Here each clause is in square brackets. 
(97) [cḥáp kìir khẽ] [sã  ̃ ́ kimáṭ-ø kha-ánt karee] [tsìm 
 throwinɡ do.PFV1 SUB 3PL.DIST worm-PL eat-PRS.M MRM fish 
 
 muuṭhú hùn khẽ] [ãĩ̀-ø man ṣṹ kunḍá bazíɡaa] 
 ahead become.PFV1.M SUB mouth-OBL in 3Sɡ.DEM hook go.PFV2.M.SG 
   ‘When (they) throw in (the fishing line), when the fish comes forward to eat the worms, the 
hook gets stuck in its mouth’ (More about fishing #5) 
Here, the first clause is an adverbial clause of time (‘when they throw in the fishing line’), the second 
one is the purpose clause followed by another adverbial time clause (‘when the fish comes forward 
(intending) “I will eat those worms”’) which is then followed by the main clause (‘the hook gets stuck 
in its mouth’). 
In example (98) the purpose clause follows the main clause. 
(98) tèe sã  ̃ ́ baṭá tàl  tsòor kar-eé awál  diír 
 then 3PL.DIST stone.PL on  below do-CVB first gravel  
 
 peeṣ-ãã̀s-e [baáṭ sám hòo karee]   
 grind-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M stone neat become.SBJV.3SG MRM   
   ‘Then, having put the (mill-) stones one on top of the other, (they) first grinded fine gravel so 
that the mill stones become smooth’ (Watermills #82) 
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Note that in this example karee occurs twice: first as the converb kareé ‘having done’ in the adverbial 
clause “having put the (mill-) stones one on top of the other”, then as purpose clause marker karee. 
In this section I have shown that purpose clauses marked by karee are similar to “think” 
complements in that the dependent clause is reported as direct speech (“mental” or “inner” speech), 
from the quoted agent’s perspective. Such clauses may precede, be embedded within, or follow the main 
clause. 
4.3.3.2 karee as marker of reason clauses 
Like purpose clauses, reason clauses may be embedded within, precede or follow the main clause. 
In example (99) the reason clause is post-posed, and the reason is presented in direct-speech form. 
(99) miiɡeé ɡuulìi waal-á=loo. ã  ̃ ́ meešwaalá  
 1SG.DAT pills bring.down-IMP.2SG=DUM 3PL.PROX menfolk   
 
 nheel-àant-ø naíi [zãĩ̀ laáz di-ínt karee]  
 take.out-PRS.M.-PL.M NEG 1PL.POSS.F embarrassment.F give-PRS.F MRM  
   ‘Tell her to bring medicine for me. The men do not buy it because it is embarrassing for them’, 
[lit.: ‘…the men do not buy it, “It is embarrassing for us” karee’ (conversation 20.4.2013) 
This and the following examples show that syntactically reason clauses are similar to the purpose 
clauses seen in section  4.3.3.1; both are marked by the same indicator karee; in other words, there is no 
linguistic element, such as because in English that helps to distinguish reason from purpose clauses. The 
hearer of such an utterance has to infer from the context which way the clause marked by karee has to 
be interpreted. 
Example (100) below is taken from a folk story. Here the reason clause precedes the main clause. 
The main character of the story encounters giants and pretends to be a messenger sent by God to get 
their hides. He presents the reason like this: 
(100) [diw-õ̀õ tsàm pák ho-ónt-ø karee] xodaepàak-e mií 
 giant-PL.GEN hide.PL robust become-PRS.M-PL.M MRM God-ERG 1SG.DOM  
 
 boolãã ́ ṣeé cẹ-éthe     
 from.above such send-PRS.PFV     




In example (101), the reason clause follows the main clause. The utterance is taken from a 
conversation about one of my language consultant’s sons who recently had lost his job as a driver. 
(101) màaṣ-e eýt kar-i-aáthe [miiɡeé pèes  nií thé 
 man-ERG abandoninɡ do-CAUS-PRS.PFV 1SG.DAT money NEG be.PRS.M.PL  
 
 karee]       
 MRM       
   ‘The man made him lose (his job) because he had no money (to pay an employee)’ 
(conversation 19.11.2013) 
In this particular example, the second clause could also be translated as a reported speech; however, 
looking at the context, interpreting the clause as providing a reason for the man’s behavior makes more 
sense.  
In example (102), the reason clause looks like a complement clause preceded by the 
complementizer če, but it is also marked by karagalee, the allomorph of karee. 
(102) ã  ̃ ́ bhìil-õõ nií i-íthi [če ṣṹ lambár 
 3PL.PROX fear-OBL.PL NEG come-PRS.PFV.F COMP 3SG.DEM number.M  
 
 nií mil-áṣat karaɡalee]     
 NEG obtain-FUT.M MRM     
   ‘They have not come for fear/because (they) fear that (they) will not get this15 number (to be 
seen at the hospital)’ (conversation 31.12.2012) 
In this example, the third person plural subject is omitted in the reason clause. The hearer has to infer 
the subject from the immediate context, that is: the preceding clause. As here the complementizer če is 
present, the reason clause has to follow the main clause. In  Chapter 5 we will see that the 
complementizer če, too, may be used to mark purpose and reason clauses. This example might then be 
an instance of “double” marking. 
The next example (103) shows again a reason clause that is preceding the main clause. The reason 
is presented in form of a thought, reported as direct speech. 
                                              
15 Indus Kohistani is partially pronoun-dropping (pro-drop) in that it allows subject pronoun deletion. The 
demonstrative adjective ṣṹ ‘this’ in this example belongs to the head noun lambár ‘number’. 
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(103) ã  ̃ ́ dùu ɡharĩ  ̃ ́ ãĩ̀s-ø. [miiɡeé zìib nií i-ínt 
 3PL.PROX two wife.PL be.PST.F-PL.F 1SG.DAT tongue NEG come-PRS.F  
 
 kar] ẽẽ̀ tás har-álaas amãã̀ mil 
 MRM 3SG.PROX.ERG 3SG.DIST.DOM take-PST.PFV REFL.OBL with 
   ‘They were two women (who went to see the doctor). Because (the woman who was ill) did not 
speak the language she had taken her (the second woman) along with her’ (conversation 
10.5.2013) 
Literally this example would be translated as ‘They were two women. “I don’t speak the language 
karee” she took (the other woman) with her’. 
The context of the last example (104) of this section is that of a meal that the family of my 
language consultant prepared for relatives and friends, following a car accident. I had asked if the meal 
was related to the accident. My language consultant answered with the following utterance. 
(104) aa, [báč hu-úthe karee]    
 yes escaping become-PRS.PFV.M.PL MRM    
   ‘Yes, because they have escaped unharmed’ (conversation 17.5.2013) 
Here the reason clause stands independently; the main clause “We made this meal” has to be inferred 
from the preceding discourse. 
To summarize, like purpose clauses, reason clauses marked by karee  may precede, be embedded 
in, or follow the main clause. Similar to reported direct speech, such clauses are presented from the 
perspective of the main clause subject as far as deixis, pronominal and time reference is concerned. 
Both types of clauses may additionally be marked by the complementizer če, but compared with 
reported speech and other complement clauses shown above, the majority of which have both markers, 
in purpose and reason clauses it is rather the exception. In my corpus of data, less than 30% of purpose 
clauses marked by karee also contain the complementizer če; for reason clauses, it is less than 10%. 
Section  5.2.2 will deal with če as a purpose and reason clause marker. It seems that there is a gradual 
progression from “think” complements as seen in section 4.3.2.2 to purpose and reason clauses. 
Furthermore, the addressee has to infer from the context if a particular clause has to be interpreted as a 
purpose or as a reason clause.  
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4.3.4 Further uses of the marker karee 
So far I have described the marker karee as marker of reported speech, as complementizer of 
complements of speech, cognition, and perception verbs, and as marker of purpose and reason clauses. 
Such markers may further grammaticalize and, in Güldemann’s words, “encroach on other functional 
domains”. Güldemann lists such markers as occurring in naming constructions, indicating illocution 
reinforcement, similarity and manner, internal awareness and functioning  as clause linkers (Güldemann 
2008:397). Other authors describe similar developments (Bashir 1996; Chappell 2008; Lord 1993 
among others )  
In this section I present examples of two further uses of karee that are found in my data. In 
examples (105) and (106) below, karee follows a name. In this particular use karee indicates “is called” 
or “they say”; this function of grammaticalized quotative markers is referred to as naming. The 
background to (105) is a conversation about a man the family of my language consultant had had some 
dealings with. She described him to me with the following words. 
(105) ɡúzur thú [Z xàan karee].  ɡhẽẽrá màaṣ  thú 
 Gujjar be.PRS.M.SG name Khan MRM elder man be.PRS.M.SG 
   ‘(He) is a Gujjar called Z Khan. He is an elder’ (conversation 7.1.2013) 
Note that it is no longer a full clause that is marked by karee but a part of it, namely a noun phrase, see 
also the following example. 
Example (106) is taken from the description of a hotel that was destroyed in an earthquake. 
(106) nào hooṭál=uk de-élaas saaid-õ̀õ [qaasím šaa hooṭál  karaɡalee] 
 new.M hotel.M=INDF give-PST.PFV Sayyid-PL.ERG Qaasim Shah hotel MRM 
   ‘(They) had built a new hotel, the Sayyids, it was called Qaasim-Shah-Hotel’(The earthquake 
#317) 
These two examples are the only instances of the naming function found in my data but my 
language consultant assures me that this particular construction is often used in conversation. 
The next examples demonstrate the use of karee when expressing the notion “x is like/similar to 




(107) ɡí waxt-á lík maaṭìi thí [E kar] 
 what time-OBL young.F girl.PL be.PRS.F name.F MRM  
 
 [D kar]      
 name.F MRM      
   ‘When there are young girls, like E, like D …’ (field notes 6.9.2013) 
Example (108) has been elicited. 
(108) ṣṹ baá [zãã̀ mùuṭ baá kar] atiãã ́
 3SG.DEM house.M 1PL.POSS.M former.M house.M MRM this.kind.M  
 
 thú       
 be.PRS.M.SG       
   ‘This house is similar to/like our former house’ (elicited 18.10.2013) 
Note that here again karee marks a noun phrase, no longer a clause. 
The final example (109) of this section was uttered when my language consultant explained to me 
the concept of using karee to indicate similarity or likeness. She had reminded me of a woman I had 
introduced to her a few days earlier and said, “You would say like this to me”: 
(109) zãã̀ [tú kar] ṹ m  ̃ĩ̀ ṣeé puniaák thí 
 1PL.POSS.M 2SG MRM 3SG.PROX 1SG.POSS such acquainted be.PRS.F. 
   ‘She is an acquaintance of ours, like you are’ (conversation 13.12.2013) 
So far I have no evidence of other uses of karee than those mentioned above. Collection and 
analysis of more natural data may show that the marker has even more uses than those presented here.  
In section  4.3 I have described and illustrated the uses of the marker karee, originally a converb, as 
marker of reported speech, both others’ and one’s own, its use as complementizer with complement-
taking predicates of speech, cognition and perception, furthermore as marker of purpose and reason 
clauses, and as a marker indicating “naming” and the notion of being “similar to/like X”.  
4.4 Literature review 
In this section I give a brief overview of relevant literature on grammaticalization in general and of 
grammaticalization of quotation markers in particular.  
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4.4.1 What is grammaticalization? 
Hopper and Traugott define grammaticalization as “the process whereby lexical items and 
constructions come in certain linguistic contexts to serve grammatical functions, and, once 
grammaticalized, continue to develop new grammatical functions” (Hopper and Traugott 1993:XV). In 
other words, categories such as nouns, verbs and adjectives (or constructions built of such words) over 
time may develop into words with grammatical content such as prepositions, complementizers, adverbs, 
and auxiliaries which may further grammaticalize into affixes (McMahon 1994:160). The term 
grammaticalization itself has first been used by Meillet (1912). 
Seen from a diachronic perspective, this process is gradual, along a grammaticalization pathway or 
cline. The grammaticalization of the noun back in many languages exemplifies this cline: a noun that 
stands for a body part will at some point be used to describe a spatial relation such as “at the back of”, 
then may develop into an adverb and further in an apposition or even a case affix (Hopper and Traugott 
1993:6). In the course of this process, the item being grammaticalized undergoes semantic, syntactic, 
morphological and phonological changes, such as loss of semantic content, what Givón (1975) called 
“semantic bleaching” (gradual change of specific semantic content towards one that is generalized and 
reduced and may eventually be lost completely); syntactically, such words or constructions become 
increasingly fixed and may end up in a morphologically changed or reduced form such as a clitic or 
affix; this may be accompanied by a change in phonological properties, for instance loss of accent.  
Examples of typical grammaticalization paths described in literature are main verbs developing into 
auxiliaries, postpositions into case markers, demonstratives and verbs of speech, action, and verbs 
encoding similarity into quotatives, complementizers and clause linkers, and constructions with the verb 
go into future markers, to name just a few (Campbell 2006:294-6). 
Concerning possible motivations for grammaticalization, Hopper and Traugott note among other 
enabling factors (child language acquisition, and different types of linguistic contact within 
communities) that “grammaticalization … is motivated by speaker-hearer interaction and 
communicative strategies” (1993:66), or, more specifically, is motivated by the desire to maximize 
informativeness of the communicated content on the one hand and to economize mental effort on the 
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other hand. They further point out the role of inference in grammaticalization, showing that in its early 
stages, conversational implicatures (using Grice’s terms) frequently become conventionalized (1993:75).  
 LaPolla defines grammaticalization as “the fossilization of constraints on interpretation” (LaPolla 
1997:1). Drawing on Relevance Theory, on work on contextualization cues by Gumperz, and on his 
own work on Sinitic languages he argues that as all communication, and all aspects of linguistic 
communication, are based on inference, grammaticalization, and indeed all grammar, has to be seen as 
evolving through discourse as a means to make a speaker’s intention more explicit and less costly in 
terms of processing effort on the addressee’s side. In other words, the function of grammar is to 
constrain the inferential process of interpreting discourse. Grammaticalization, then, starts with a fully 
lexical form of a linguistic item that is used frequently in a particular context and whose implicatures in 
that context, and other aspects of interpretation, may become fixed over time, or, in LaPolla’s words, 
“fossilized”. Such a form ends up containing procedural information and making these implicatures 
explicit, thereby constraining the interpretation process, that is, the search for relevance. In this view, 
grammar is not “a priori” or fixed but a constantly evolving and developing set of conventions resulting 
from discourse. All languages have such sets of conventions aimed at constraining the search for 
relevance but they differ in what functional domains and to which degree such constraints develop. 
4.4.2 Grammaticalization of quotation markers 
Hopper and Traugott (1993:14) mention the development of SAY verbs into complementizers and 
further grammatical markers as a “well-known example of grammaticalization”. Multifunctional 
markers such as the Indus Kohistani karee have been described in many languages, such as West 
African languages (for example Lord 1976, 1993; Güldemann 2008), languages of the South Asian 
linguistic area (Bashir 1996; Saxena 1995 among others), and Sinitic lanɡuaɡes (Chappell 2008). Out of 
the large amount of literature on this particular grammaticalization path, both in individual languages 
and crosslinguistically, I want to mention only a few sources that are relevant for the analysis of karee.  
Lord (1976, 1993) was the first to note that in many West African languages that complementizers 
have historically developed from SAY verbs (although she also mentions verbs such as be like as 
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possible historical source in several languages) and display many similarities in the range of their 
functions. She describes the typical path of development of such verbs as follows:  
SAY verb > marker of speech > marker of thought > marker of 
complements of verbs of cognition and perception = complementizer 
From there, such a marker may further develop into a marker of dependent clauses such as purpose, 
reason, result and conditional clauses; but the process may as well stop much earlier, leaving a marker 
that indicates speech and thought only (Lord 1993:209). Generalizations drawn from Lord’s description 
of this particular grammaticalization cline have then influenced further studies of this phenomenon in 
other languages. Within literature about “quotation complex” grammaticalization (a term used by 
Güldemann 2008) it is generally assumed that SAY verbs are the most likely sources; likewise there 
seems now to be a general consensus about what the most typical grammaticalization pathway looks 
like:  
Original form > quotation marker > complementizer > purpose-
clause linker > reason-clause linker > conditional-clause linker > 
naming marker > marker used with onomatopoeic words/ideophones 
> comparative marker > mirative marker  
Further uses mentioned in literature are listing constructions marker, topic marker, clause-final discourse 
particle expressing self-evident assertions, warnings and echo questions, and clause-initial discourse 
marker for exclamations (Chappell 2008:5; see also Bashir 1996; Güldemann 2008; Lord 1993).  
This list does not necessarily reflect the order in which a particular form grammaticalizes, neither 
does it imply that a form, once on this particular cline, will go through all stages.  
4.4.3 Grammaticalized SAY verbs on the Indian Subcontinent 
Grammaticalized SAY verbs are by no way uncommon on the Indian subcontinent. Bashir (1996) 
looks at complementizers developed from SAY verbs in languages of Northern Pakistan and compares 
them with other such grammaticalized markers in languages of the Indian subcontinent. In South Asian 
languages, complementizers derived from a SAY verb are quite widespread (Masica 1991:402-3); they 
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are usually clause-final whereas other complementizers are clause-initial. Terms used for such 
complementizers are “quotative particle”, “SAY complementizer”, “SAY quotative”, or just 
“quotative” (Bashir 1996:192-3). On the Indian subcontinent, SAY complementizers are extensively 
found in Dravidian languages in the South, in other South Asian languages such as Dakkhini Urdu, 
Marathi and Bengali (Bashir 1996:194), as well as in some of the Dardic languages of northern 
Pakistan, but not in standard Urdu and Hindi. Bashir lists many more functions of such grammaticalized 
markers: they may be used with onomatopoetic expressions, when introducing or naming a person, as a 
story starter, they may be used to convey deliberateness, as meaning clarifier, as introducer and so on. 
Her list of functions of SAY complementizers in Dravidian and in several Northern Pakistan languages 
can be found in Bashir (1996:215-23).  
She also raises the question of how SAY complementizers in the Dardic group of languages 
developed. SAY complementizers with similar functions have been described in many different 
language families and geographical areas.  The emergence of SAY complementizers from speech verbs 
can be observed in creole languages (Lord 1993:202). This suggests that there is a “universal tendency” 
in the way and direction of the development of SAY complementizers and that this is a language-
internal process. On the other hand, such markers may diffuse and emerge (or disappear) into 
neighboring languages through intensive contact, as Aikhenvald notes for evidentials in general 
(Aikhenvald 2004:271). So, according to Bashir, the emergence of SAY complementizers in Dardic 
languages may be due to either language-internal development or/and influence from proto-Dravidian 
languages, Turkic languages of Central Asia or Tibeto-Burman languages, all of which are known as 
having grammaticalized SAY verbs.  
Finally, she notes that in a small cluster of Northern Pakistan languages, i.e. in Shina, Palula and 
Domaki, the source of such a complementizer is the “unusual” (her term) DO verb16 (Bashir 1996:205). 
These three languages are related in so far as Palula is a Shina variety, and Domaki a language enclave 
within a Shina speaking area. However, according to Liljegren, the Palula quotative marker thani  is the 
                                              
16 DO verb stands for the semantic field of generic performance or action verbs. 
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converb form of the verb thane ‘say’ (Liljegren 2008:334). Furthermore, the source of the quotative 
marker theé in Shina Kohistani, another Shina variety, is the verb thoón ‘to do, to say’ (Schmidt and 
Kohistani 2008:225), see also Radloff (1998:28) for the Shina of Gilgit. For Domaki I have no further 
information. Bashir does not mention the Indus Kohistani marker karee that has as source a DO verb. 
To my own knowledge, further in the West, one of the Nuristani languages of Eastern Afghanistan, 
Waigali, does have a DO complementizer (Buddruss 1987); and Strand mentions a DO quotative for 
Kamviri, another Nurestani language (Strand 2012). 
4.4.4 Güldemann’s survey of quotative indexes in African languages 
Güldemann (2008) in his extensive survey of what he calls quotative indexes (= matrix clauses of 
complements of speech, cognition and perception verbs) in African languages raises several questions 
concerning the general perception of the SAY verb grammaticalization path presented in much of the 
literature. Besides showing that in the case of African languages quite often the SAY verb origin of such 
complementizers is less than clear, he points out that the cline “SAY verb > quotative > 
complementizer > other” is not necessarily the default scenario for this particular grammaticalization 
path. He shows that there are several other sources of grammaticalized complementizers besides those 
originating in speech verbs. As lexical sources, attested in the languages surveyed by him, he notes 
verbs of equation, of inchoativity, verbs of action and of motion, markers of similarity and manner, 
pronominal items referring to the quote as well as ones referring to the speaker, and markers of focus, 
presentation and identification.  
Concerning the syntactic classification of clauses of speech verbs, verbs of cognition and verbs of 
perception as sentential complements, Güldemann proposes to treat all of them as independent clauses 
in their own right. Firstly he claims that such clauses are conceptually all quotes in a very general sense, 
as in the following definition. 
Reported discourse in the representation of a spoken or mental text 
from which the reporter distances him-/herself by indicating that it is 
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produced by a source of consciousness in a pragmatic and deictic 
setting that is different from that of the immediate discourse (2008:244). 
He then points out that quotes in this sense (“speech complement” in traditional grammar) can be 
without matrix clause but the latter cannot occur without the quote; in other words, the “dependent 
speech complement” (traditional grammar) is syntactically autonomous whereas the matrix or main 
clause of a speech complement construction is not, but functions rather like a tag or a dispensable 
appendix (2008:231-3). Hence he proposes to treat such quotes as distinct from other sentential 
complements.  
As to grammaticalized forms of SAY verbs or elements of other origin, Güldemann shows that 
they are not only used to mark quotes in the widest sense but they also appear in connection with a 
number of other types of expressions, namely with non-linguistic sound imitations (such as the imitation 
of an animal sound), with ideophones17 and similar linguistic signs, and with representational gestures, a 
fact he demonstrates with data from African languages for at least ideophones and non-linguistic sound 
imitation. In other words, he claims that like quotes, such expressions/gestures have to be “inserted” 
into discourse, and furthermore that often the same means is used to do this, namely, grammaticalized 
complementizers that index quotes also index such expressions. In the literature about 
grammaticalization of the quotation complex, such functions are commonly seen as secondary, due to 
semantic bleaching, or as the result of an expansion into the non-speech domain (2008:285). Güldemann 
proposes instead an alternative account of markers of these functions, arguing that the one (for instance, 
marking ideophones) is not derived from or secondary to the other (marking speech quotes). Instead, all 
four constructions indexed by the same grammaticalized marker are instances of mimesis and belong to 
the same domain, speech quotes just being one of them. The term mimesis, “imitation, representation, 
mimicry” is used by Güldemann to define the common ground of all four abovementioned 
constructions; in his own words, 
                                              
17 Definition by Doke (1935:118): “A vivid representation of an idea in sound. A word, often onomatopoeic, 




The behavior of the speaker is such that (s)he PERFORMS the 
communicated state of affairs rather than linguistically describing it, as 
if the unmarked employment of the signs of language failed to achieve 
the particular communicative goal. The speaker attempts to 
demonstrate, to re-instantiate, to imitate, to replay the event as close to 
the purported original as is desired in the context and as human means 
of expression allow him/her to do so (2008:286). 
This description includes non-linguistic sound imitation, representational gestures, ideophones as 
well as quotation of speech. Each of them is a representation of either a quotation or a demonstration. 
Güldemann further claims that within this account, it is not necessary that a linguistic form on the 
grammaticalization cline has to start out as a speech quotation marker and then expand into further 
categories. It might as well start as a marker of, for example, ideophones, or representational gestures 
and later on develop into a quotation marker as it will all be within one common domain.  
Concerning further functions of grammaticalized items beyond that of complementizers marking 
clauses of speech, cognition or perceptive verbs, Güldemann notes that in the literature about SAY verb 
grammaticalization, there is a tendency to over-generalize not only the SAY-verb-to-
speech/cognition/perception-verb-complementizer grammaticalization process but also the subsequent 
development into clause linkers and other functions. He casts doubt on the claims put forward by 
Saxena of there being a “unidirectional chain of stages which must be passed through by a language-
specific element in order to reach a later stage, as well as an implicational hierarchy of possible 
grammaticalizations” (Güldemann 2008:445; Saxena 1995) that implies that if for instance a particular 
language has a grammaticalized form X as marker of purpose clauses then the same form is also found 
marking complement clauses and speech/thought clauses, but it need not be the other way round. In 
essence, he shows that the grammaticalization of quotation markers is by no means only one of SAY 
verbs, as there are many more sources; quotation markers are not only sources but may themselves be 
the product of a grammaticalization process; furthermore, subsequently developing functions such as 
clause linkage, naming and so on are the “result from the context extension of RD [reported discourse]-
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constructions as a whole and not just of individual linguistic elements” (Güldemann 2008:523), a point I 
will come back to in section  4.5.2. 
In this section I have briefly defined the term grammaticalization as described in literature, and 
presented current views on grammaticalization in general. I have then looked at the particular 
grammaticalization path of SAY verbs as first described by Lord, followed by a brief overview of 
Bashir’s study on SAY complementizers in the South Asian language area (to which Indus Kohistani 
belongs). Finally I have reviewed Güldemann’s study that offers alternative analyses of the processes 
that are commonly subsumed under the term “SAY verb grammaticalization path”. 
4.5 Indus Kohistani karee: a metarepresentation marker 
In this section I propose an analysis of the Indus Kohistani marker karee  within the framework of 
Relevance Theory as an indicator of metarepresentations of both utterances and thoughts; within this 
approach all seemingly diverse functions of karee can be accounted for. Furthermore, looking at 
“speech verb channel” (Güldemann’s term, 2008:265) grammaticalization in general I offer some 
thoughts on how the analysis of karee might be relevant for other such grammaticalized markers. 
In her study on metarepresentations in linguistic communication Wilson defines metarepresentation 
as “a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with a lower-order representation 
embedded within it” (Wilson 2012:230), the lower-order representation being the description of a 
(desirable or actual) state of affairs and the higher-order representation an interpretation of the former 
one (Sperber and Wilson 1995:232). In  Chapter 2, I have described different types of 
metarepresentations and have also mentioned that languages differ in what kind of metarepresentation 
they encode, whether the encoding is conceptual or procedural, and what is left to the hearer to infer. 
Where in languages such as English or German the addressee may have to infer if a particular utterance 
is the representation of a state of affairs or the interpretation of another utterance or thought, in Indus 
Kohistani the latter is encoded linguistically by a metarepresentation marker, thus reducing processing 
effort and time on the addressee’s side by making explicit what would otherwise have to be inferred. In 
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LaPolla’s words, the use of a particular lexical item for marking reported speech has “fossilized” 
(LaPolla 1997); the metarepresentation marker karee is now part of the Indus Kohistani grammar.  
It follows that in Indus Kohistani, the presence of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed 
utterances and thoughts has to be made explicit by using the linguistic device karee (or one of the other 
Indus Kohistani metarepresentation markers that are the topic of this study) together with such 
constructions. What distinguishes karee from the Indus Kohistani “reported” marker lee (see  Chapter 3), 
is the fact that karee, in addition to indicating reported speech, also marks attributed thoughts of persons 
other than the speaker’s as well as self-attributed speech and self-attributed thought, whereas lee marks 
only utterances attributed to persons other than the reporting speaker.  
As to the particular range of functions of karee I show that all constructions marked by it are 
metarepresentations, be they public or mental. So the analysis of karee as metarepresentation marker can 
account for all its uses. Furthermore, the grammaticalization of the “reported speech” marker towards a 
clause linker, naming construction marker, and similarity construction marker can be explained as an 
extension from being the marker of one kind of metarepresentation to including the marking of other 
kinds of metarepresentations. The following sections present evidence to support this claim.  
4.5.1 karee as marker of metarepresentations of attributed and self-attributed speech 
The first stage on the grammaticalization cline of SAY verbs and other sources of this particular 
grammaticalization path is typically that as a quotative or reported-speech marker. At this point, I want 
to underline Güldemann’s claim that in such cases, the source does not have to be, in fact, often is not a 
SAY verb, the Indus Kohistani karee being an instance of a marker having as its origin another 
linguistic item, namely the verb do. How the converb form of this verb came to mark reported speech is 
something I can only speculate about. In my data there are very few instances of a form of the verb kar-  
‘do’ being used as a SAY verb. I have found just one instance, example (110) where the verb do is used 
as a speech complement-taking verb. The speech complement is in square brackets. 
(110) ìiṣkaal šárla pucọ̃ṍ tsày aś kar-álaas=lee [če 




 béetus bìẓ munií]     
 1PL.INCL go-SBJF.1PL downwards     
   ‘This year in fall the sons had often said this (to their father), “Let’s go down”’              
(Avalanche story #232) 
However, according to my language consultant this use of the verb do is an instance of the below 
mentioned expression baaliá karõṍ ‘to speak, talk’, where baaliá ‘words’ has been omitted. 
One other use of kar- ‘do’ where it is used like a speech verb is the following expression in example 
(111). 
(111) tas  ̃ĩ̀ kira tsìinõõ khasàr   khasàr kar-ãã̀s-ø   
 3SG.DIST.POSS to lovingly baldie  baldie DO-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M   
   ‘(They) called him lovingly ‘baldie’’ (G. story 1 #4) 
This seems to be a fixed expression consisting of the verb kar- ‘do’ and the reduplicated name. It is, as 
far as I know, used to tell a person’s nick name. Furthermore there are expressions such as baál karõṍ 
‘to speak’, literally ‘to do word’ and qasá karõṍ ‘to tell’, literally ‘to do story’ but in nowadays’ Indus 
Kohistani of Pattan, the default SAY verb is manõṍ ‘to say’.  
Nevertheless, the grammaticalization of karee ‘having done’ resulted in the typical stages along the 
cline that are seen in the “speech verb channel” grammaticalization process. It is not so much the source 
of the grammaticalized marker that determines its development of multiple functions as the fact that it is 
at some point used to mark metarepresentations of attributed utterances. The context extension of such 
reported-speech constructions determines the subsequently developing additional functions. Seen from a 
relevance-theoretic perspective, the marking of one kind of metarepresentation by expansion leads to 
indicating other types of metarepresentations as well. In the case of karee, I argue, it is the extension 
from marking metarepresentations of speech to marking such of thought (in a sense which implies 
cognition in general and perception).  
In section  4.3.1 we had seen examples of karee  marking reported speech of both speakers other 
that the reporter and of self-reported speeches. Example (60), the reported utterance of someone not 
specified is repeated here. 
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(60) bé bilàal xabár ho-óthe [sã  ̃ ́ wa-íthe karee] 
 1PL.EXCL yesterday news become-PRS.PFV.M.PL 3PL.DIST come.down-PRS.PFV.M.PL MRM 
   ‘Yesterday we got the news that they have come down’ (conversation 8.6.2012) 
Here, the speaker metarepresents an utterance attributed to someone other than herself or the addressee, 
this metarepresentation is made linguistically explicit by both the complement-taking predicate “to get 
the news, hear” and by employing the marker karee. 
Example (112) is a self-reported quotation. The speaker of the utterance wanted to remind me of 
what she had said earlier on a particular topic. 
(112) má man-ãĩ̀s  nií=aa [Q-õ̀õ ék puc-̣eé du-  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariṹ 
 1SG say-PST.IPFV.F   NEG=Q Name.F.GEN.M one son-ERG two-GEN.F WIFE  
 
 a-áthe karee]      
 bring-PRS.PFV MRM      
   ‘Didn’t I say that one of Q’s sons has taken a second wife?’ (conversation 27.8.2012) 
Here the question arises: does a quotation of one’s own previous utterance as in this example count as a 
metarepresentation of an attributed utterance? I think yes. Here, too, part of the speaker’s actual 
utterance, namely the part “one of Q’s sons has taken a second wife” is the representation (or 
metarepresentation) of a representation that had been uttered at some time in the past. The actual 
metarepresentation is not identical with the original; it resembles it to some degree or, in other words, is 
an interpretation of the original utterance. So this self-attributed quotation fulfills the same criteria as 
any quote that is attributed to someone other than the speaker, that is, it is a metarepresentation of an 
earlier utterance of the speaker’s, a fact that is indicated by the use of the marker karee. 
Many of the instances of reported speech in my recorded texts that are marked by karee are 
actually hypothetical speeches, as already described in section  4.3.1.3. These include quotations of 
possible future utterances, utterances that were considered but never actually uttered, utterances that 
someone is being told not to produce, and quoted utterances within the frame of a rhetorical question, 
where both speaker and addressee know that the quoted speech is purely fictional. What distinguishes 
such quotations from the ones that were actually uttered is an extra layer of representation. Example 
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(23), repeated here, is an instance of a quotation of a potential future utterance. The speaker of (23) 
quotes what his wife will in all probability say to him if he brings home the wrong size of pan. 
(23) tèe  m  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariṹ man-áṣit [če m  ̃ĩ̀ kira lák pateelá 
 then 1SG.POSS wife say-FUT.F COMP 1SG.POSS for small.M pan.M 
 
 a-áthe karaɡal]    
 bring-PRS.PFV MRM    
   ‘Then my wife will say to me, “you have brought a small pan” (although I was supposed to 
bring a big one)’ (Akbar Badshah #50) 
Here, the speaker is not quoting or, in relevance-theoretic terms, interpreting, what his wife said at some 
point in the past but what he thinks she might say in the future under certain circumstances. That is, the 
speaker does not interpret the representation of a state of affairs entertained and uttered by another 
person; it is his own thought about a possible attributed representation of a state of affairs. In other 
words, there is an additional layer of representation in the form of mindreading or more generally, 
thought, involved. This extra representational layer is present in all instances of hypothetical quotes. 
Take for instance example (113), a case of an utterance that was not said. 
(113) [béetus bíž karee] baačãã̀ puc-̣eé man-áthe naíi 
 1PL.INCL go.SBJV.1PL MRM king.GEN.M son-ERG say-PRS.PFV NEG 
   ‘The king’s son did not say, “Let’s go”’ (Prince and fairy #43) 
Here again, the story teller’s utterance is not the metarepresentation or interpretation of an utterance 
actually uttered but of a thought the story teller entertains about a possible but not realized utterance.  
As in these examples there is an additional layer of thought involved, I am not quite sure if 
hypothetical quotes should not rather be grouped together with marked metarepresentations of thought, 
a development further along the grammatical cline which will be treated in the next section. 
4.5.2 karee as marker of metarepresentations of attributed and self-attributed thoughts 
Lord (1993) among others describes the typical further development of a quotation marker as a 
progression from marking reported speech to marking reported thoughts and beliefs and subsequently 
also marking of complements of other verbs of cognition and verbs of perception. The further 
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development of such an element into a clause linker, as noted in subsection  4.4.1, may include marking 
of purpose, reason, and conditional clauses.  
According to Güldemann there are four essential triggers that may cause a complementizer to 
grammaticalize into a clause linker: (i) the meaning of a lexical item i.e. of the quotation marker, (ii) the 
meaning of a construction, (iii) inferential processes in clause linkage, and (iv) the combination of a 
subordinator and a semantically explicit item (Güldemann 2008:447). Here I will argue that it is point 
(ii), the meaning of a construction that triggers the development of the reported speech marker karee 
into a complementizer and a clause linker, and that also allows a unifying analysis of the multifunctional 
marker. More specifically, it is the construction “reported speech” being a metarepresentation that 
underlies the functional extension of karee. 
Within Relevance Theory, there is no basic distinction between reported speech and reported 
thought: both are metarepresentations, or interpretations, of a public representation in the case of 
speech, and of a mental representation in the case of thought. So, from this point of view, the 
development mentioned above is just an extension from marking metarepresentation of public 
representations only to including metarepresentations of both public and mental representations.  
In my data many instances of attributed thoughts marked by karee occur in the form of a 
complement clause that follows a complement-taking verb such as think, believe, know, hope, wish, 
grasp, see in the sense of find out, wonder, attempt to and so on. Example (73), repeated here, is 
exemplary for other such constructions. 
(73) khẽ piiruú be-ént t  ̃ĩ̀ hìiu ho-ónt [če 
 DEVM to.over.there go-PRS.M 2SG.POSS heart become-PRS.M COMP  
 
 má tãĩ̀ yàa paš-áṣit karee]   
 1SG REFL.POSS.F mother see-FUT.F MRM   
   ‘Then, when you go over there (to Germany) it is your wish to see your mother’ (conversation 
22.6.2012) 
As already noted before, the wish or thought is expressed as a kind of “mental speech” in regard to 
deixis, pronominal and time reference. It seems then that in Indus Kohistani, thought is perceived and 
reported as speaker-internal speech. And just as the presence of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed 
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utterances is made explicit by using karee so is the presence of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed 
thoughts. 
Example (82), repeated here, is an interesting example in that there is no verb of cognition or 
perception involved; karee is the only indicator that the marked clause is a thought.  
(82) ɡát khacạ́p kar-eé ṣeé kar-áthe [šàa kar-àynt karee] 
 again grabbing do-CVB such do-PRS.PFV spinach do-PRS.F MRM 
   ‘Again, grabbing, she did like this, pretending to gather spinach’ (How they found the baby #36) 
Another translation would be, ‘… giving the impression of gathering spinach’ or ‘… making 
(onlookers) believe that she was gathering spinach’. In this particular example karee indicates a 
metarepresentation and, in the absence of a complement-taking matrix clause, constrains the addressee 
to construct a higher-level explicature such as “The speaker said, ‘Again, grabbing, she did like this: 
someone believes that she is gathering spinach’”. In more detail: the basic explicature of this utterance 
would be, “The speaker said, ‘Again, grabbing, she did like this: she is gathering spinach karee’”. The 
higher-level explicature of the karee clause is “Someone entertains the thought (thinks/believes) that she 
is gathering spinach”. Note that the need to construct the higher-level explicature is indicated by karee 
whereas the identity of “someone” has to be inferred. In this case, it is clear from the context that 
“someone” is anyone who passes by and might see the woman grabbing down toward the spinach. So, 
in the same way as the “reported” marker lee may induce the construction of a higher-level explicature 
such as “X said, ‘[quote]’”, the marker karee constrains the hearer toward the construction of a higher-
level explicature such as “X entertains the thought ‘[quote]’”. In matrix clause – complement 
constructions that contain a verb of speech, cognition or perception, this higher-level explicature “X 
entertains a thought” is already linguistically encoded and part of the explicature of the utterance. 
A last example of a reported thought is (86), repeated here. 
(86) khẽ sã  ̃ ́ ɡharimaaṣ-õṍ zúno~zuno [maasúm mar-èel thú 
 DEVM 3PL.DIST woman-PL.OBL quickly~REDUPL child die-ADS.M be.PRS.M.SG  
 
 karee] karápu này kar-eé maasúm piiruú ɡal-áɡil 
 MRM cutting umbilical.cord do-CVB child over.there put-PFV2 
   ‘Then the women, thinking that the baby is dead, would quickly cut the umbilical cord and put 
the baby aside’ (Conception, birth #229) 
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Here again, the basic explicature of the marked clause is “The baby is dead karee”; the presence of 
karee indicates that it is a thought and that a higher-level explicature such as “the women entertain the 
thought that the baby is dead” has to be constructed.  
Looking at my data it seems that there are two quite distinct strategies to express reported thought 
in the sense used here: one is the complement strategy, consisting of a complement-taking predicate of 
cognition or perception followed by the complementizer če and the complement clause plus karee, the 
other strategy is a clause followed by karee that precedes, follows or is embedded in another clause. 
This latter “think” clause could be considered an independent clause but for the presence of karee. With 
the information available at this point I can only guess that the latter strategy seems to be the older one 
and that it is gradually being replaced by the more recently introduced complement strategy (the 
complementizer če is a later addition to the Indus Kohistani lexicon). I will come back to this question 
in section  4.5.3 and  Chapter 5. 
4.5.2.1 Purpose and reason clauses 
There is no distinct difference between “think” clauses marked by karee, and purpose and reason 
clauses. The latter clauses are really thoughts or “inner speeches” expressing the intentions or reason for 
the state of affairs represented in the main clause. Where the subjects of main and purpose or reason 
clause are co-referential it will be similar to a direct speech in that the clause marked by karee is 
presented from the main-clause subject’s perspective (first person) as shown in examples (114) and 
(115). Example (114) is the answer to the question “Why did your son quit his job?”  
(114) [miiɡeé ruuṣí hoónt karee] bás kar-áthe  
 1SG.DAT angry.INCH become.PRS.M MRM stop do-PRS.PFV  
   ‘(He) quit because (his employer) was angry with him’ (conversation 28.9.2013) 
The literal translation of this example is “‘(He, the employer) is angry with me karee’ (he, the speaker’s 
son) quit”. The pronoun miiɡeé ‘to me’ in the reason clause refers to the main clause subject “he (the 
speaker’s son)” that has been omitted (subject pro-drop). The marker karee indicates that the clause 
marked by it is the interpretation of an attributed thought and therefore a metarepresentation. As 
described in the previous section, karee also constrains the addressee to construct a higher-level 
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explicature such as “The speaker says that her son quit his job because he (the son) thinks/says that his 
employer is angry with him”. 
Example (115), a purpose clause, is similar in this aspect; it is the answer to the question “Why 
had your mother gone to Y’s house?” 
(115) pií [Y-ãĩ̀ šíd kar-àm karee] bazíliis  
 over.there Name.F-GEN.F news do-SBJV.1SG MRM go.PST.PFV.F  
   ‘(She) had gone over to enquire about Y’s health’ (conversation 11.3.2013) 
As in (114) and in the examples shown in section 4.3.3.1 and 4.3.3.2, the purpose of the visit is 
expressed in the form of a mental or inner speech, the person marking on the verb kar- ‘do’ reflecting 
the direct speech character. Again, karee indicates the presence of a metarepresentation (it is left open if 
it is one of an attributed utterance or of an attributed thought) and triggers the construction of a higher-
level explicature. 
We can therefore say that purpose and reason clauses in Indus Kohistani are clauses of reported or 
attributed thoughts; intentions in the former, and reasoning thoughts in the latter kind of clauses. In fact, 
both - complements marked by karee - and purpose and reason clauses are instantiations of what is 
called internal awareness (Güldemann 2008:422), awareness attribution (Longacre 1976:145-9) and 
inner speech by other authors. These terms refer to the fact that in languages of which Indus Kohistani 
seems to be an instance there is no structural difference between reported speech constructions marked 
by karee on the one hand and such constructions as treated in this section on the other hand. Güldemann 
therefore argues that both “reported speech” and “internal awareness” should be seen as one functional 
domain, implying that there is no need to assume a grammaticalization process leading from the former 
to the latter constructions. Seen from a relevance-theoretic standpoint, what unites both kinds of 
constructions in one domain is their being metarepresentations of attributed representations (public or 
mental).  
But what about purpose and reason clauses in languages where thought is not reported as direct 
“inner speech”? Would such clauses still be regarded as metarepresentations of an agent’s thoughts? I 
think, yes. In her study of metarepresentations in linguistic communication Wilson (2012) notes that 
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such metarepresentations need not be linguistically encoded (for instance as “direct speech”). The fact 
that one of the two clauses in a purpose or reason construction has to be interpreted not as a description 
of a state of affairs but as a quote of an attributed utterance or thought has to be inferred by the 
addressee. Wilson’s example to illustrate this point is cited here as (116) (example (18) in 2012:248). 
(116) a. The grass is wet, because it’s raining. 
 b. It’s raining, because the grass is wet. 
Both (116a) and (116b) are reason clauses but they are interpreted differently. The speaker of (116a) 
describes two states of affairs, “it rains” and “the grass is wet”, and then indicates their causal relation 
by using the word because: the rain causes the grass to get wet. (116b) on the other hand has a different 
interpretation. The speaker expresses that she believes it to rain; this belief is caused by the state of 
affairs at hand, i.e. the fact that the grass is wet. Here the causal relation is that between a state of 
affairs (“the grass is wet”) and a belief or, more general, a thought (“if the grass is wet then it must be 
raining”).  
An Indus Kohistani speaker would express (116a) as follows in (117) and (118). 
(117) ɡhaá bilz-íthu àẓ de-ént   
 grass get.wet.MI-PRS.PFV.M.SG rain give-PRS.M   
   ‘The grass is wet; it is raining’ (elicited), or 
(118) ghaá bilz-íthu àẓ-ãĩ wàž-ø hin  
 grass get.wet.MI-PRS.PFV.M.SG rain-GEN.F reason-OBL with  
   ‘The grass is wet because of the rain’ (elicited) 
(116b) in Indus Kohistani would be marked by karee as seen in (119). 
(119) ɡhaá bilz-íthu [àẓ de-ént karee]  
 grass get.wet.MI-PRS.PFV.M.SG rain give-PRS.M MRM  
    ‘It is raining, because (the speaker reasons) the grass is wet’ (elicited) 
Wilson’s illustration answers both questions asked above: firstly, metarepresentations may or may 
not be overtly marked as such. In the English example it is the order of the clauses, not a word that 
marks the difference between (116a) and (116b). In Indus Kohistani it is the marker karee that indicates 
the presence of a metarepresentation, that is the representation of a (self-) attributed thought. Secondly, 
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not every reason or purpose clause is a reported thought; see the English example (116a). I assume that 
in Indus Kohistani only such purpose and reason clauses are marked by karee  that are 
metarepresentations of (self-) attributed thoughts whereas utterances such as (116a) and (117), where 
each clause is a description of a state of affairs, will not be marked by karee.  
4.5.2.2 Self-attributed thoughts 
Similarly to self-reported speech that is marked by karee  we may expect self-reported or self-
attributed thought that is indicated in this way. Wilson (2012:247) notes that expressions such as “I say 
…”, “I think …”, “I fear …” etc. are self-attributive or self-quotative counterparts of expressions used 
to quote others; all of them indicate that what is following is a metarepresentation. Example (88), 
repeated here, is an instance of a self-attributed thought; it was uttered during a conversation with my 
language consultant, when a hen was sitting on a pile of bedding. 
(88) pií ṣás ẓhalíẓ-ø tal dé-ø ta [ṹ 
 over.there 3SG.DEM.OBL young.hen-OBL on give-IMP.2SG DM 3SG.PROX 
 
 ṣalá ɡaṛ-àynt karee]     
 there.DEM defecate-PRS.F MRM     
   ‘Throw something at that hen there (to chase her away), she will defecate there!’ [lit.: … I think 
she will defecate there!’] (conversation 9.11.2012) 
In this utterance, as well as in the next example (120), karee is the only indicator that marks the clause 
as being a thought, not a description of a state of affairs. The context of (120) is as follows: I heard the 
wind causing the door to rattle and asked if this happened also at night. My language consultant replied, 
“Yes, when there is wind” followed by (120). 
(120) [lhuúṣ e-ént karee] hár ho-ónt-ø   
 thief come-PRS.M MRM awake become-PRS.M-PL.M   
   ‘We wake up thinking that a thief is coming’ (conversation 1.12.2012) 
It follows that in both (88) and (120), karee constrains the addressee towards the construction of a 
higher-level explicature such as “the speaker thinks/assumes that …”.  
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The second way to express self-attributed thoughts is by employing a complement-taking predicate 
plus complement. The majority of such constructions in my Indus Kohistani data are of the kind “I 
don’t know” followed or preceded by a complement, as seen in example (121). 
(121) [h  ̃ĩ̀ katyúk mar-íthe ɡí ho-óthu kar] ṣṹ 
 now how.many die-PRS.PFV.M.PL what become-PRS.PFV.M.SG MRM 3SG.DEM  
 
 laá pát nií thí   
 yet knowledɡe NEG be.PRS.F   
   ‘Now how many died, what has happened, this we don’t know yet’ (conversation 28.9.2012) 
In this example, too, karee  indicates the presence of a metarepresentation but whereas in (120) the 
addressee has to construct a higher-level explicature (“the speaker assumes that …”) the self-attributed 
expression “we don’t know” is part of the explicature. 
Example (122) is an utterance that I started and my language consultant completed for me. 
(122a) B. umèen thu [če -------   
  hope be.PRS.M.SG COMP    
 
(122b) A. i-ṣát kar]=aa     
  come-FUT.M MRM=Q     
    ‘B: “I hope that ---- (my visa)”    A: “---- will come, you think?”’ (conversation 28.9.2013) 
The clause that expresses my hope, in other words, my thought, is marked by karee. The 
complementizer če is not obligatory here; according to my language consultant the clause would be as 
grammatical without it.  
Looking at all instances of self-attributed thoughts marked by karee in my data, it is obvious that 
most of them (in the case of know nearly all of them) are negated, that is, the speaker does “not know”, 
“not believe”, or “not understand”. Here we have to ask if karee marks only such negated propositions. 
However, (122) is a counter-example where the speaker’s hoping is being asserted. Furthermore, many 
elicited examples show that karee is also used in constructions of the pattern “I know that …” as 
example (123) shows. 
(123) h  ̃ĩ̀ miiɡeé pát thí [ṣṹ zhùuk pít-ãĩ 




 wáž-ø hin thí karee]    
 cause-OBL with be.PRS.F MRM    
   ‘Now I know that this pain is caused by the gallbladder’ (elicited) 
This utterance would be said in a context where the speaker had previously assumed another reason for 
her pain but now has learned what really causes it. The speaker is using this construction to point out 
the shift from “not or wrongly knowing” to “knowing”. I assume that the default scenario for the 
“know” construction in Indus Kohistani is as follows: what is known will be told simply as a 
description of a state of affairs, that is, there is no representation of a representation involved, except in 
cases such as (123) above. However if a speaker tells what she does not know, it is no longer a 
description of but the speaker’s thought about a state of affairs and has therefore to be marked as a 
metarepresentation. 
Another observation when looking at the data is that all clauses expressing what a speaker does not 
know are embedded questions such as “I don’t know whether …”. Within Relevance Theory, 
interrogatives are seen as metarepresentations of their relevant answers (Sperber and Wilson 1995:252). 
So is it possible that such constructions are marked not because they represent a thought of the speaker 
but because they are questions? What distinguishes interrogative metarepresentations from the ones we 
are looking at in this chapter is that the former ones are non-attributed whereas the latter ones are 
attributed: to someone other than the speaker or to the speaker herself. The next (elicited) examples 
(124) and (125) show that it is indeed a metarepresentation of a (self-) attributed thought that is marked 
by karee, not the non-attributive metarepresentation of a relevant answer. (124) is a simple question. 
(124) asií ɡí čhál thú    
 3SG.PROX.DAT what matter be.PRS.M.SG    
   ‘How is he doing?’ (elicited) 
(125) má suučí kar-àynt [asií ɡí čhál thú karee] 
 1SG thought do-PRS.F 3SG.PROX.DAT what matter be.PRS.M.SG MRM 
   ‘I am thinking about how he is doing’ (elicited) 
Indus Kohistani interrogatives per se cannot be marked by karee (124); however, if the question is 
being formulated as a (self-) attributed thought (or utterance) then the use of karee is grammatical. 
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The question remains to be answered: are all clauses relating to verbs of cognition, perception, of 
propositional attitude, of verbs expressing emotions … marked by karee? This is not the case. 
In  Chapter 5 we will see that the complementizer če quite often is the only marker of complements of 
such complement-taking predicates; neither does karee have to be used in constructions with a 
parenthetical comment such as shown in (126).  
(126) aáz m  ̃ĩ̀ yaqìin cạyõ̀õ dìis thú tasií  gee 
 today 1SG.POSS belief three.ORD day be.PRS.M.SG 3SG.DIST.OBL with 
   ‘Today it is the third day (with the baby), I believe’ (How they found the baby #120) 
Let me summarize: the marker karee  may but does not have to be used to mark the complement of 
a complement-taking predicate of the kinds mentioned above. The presence of the complement-taking 
predicate/matrix clause makes it already explicit that the complement is an attributed utterance or 
thought. In  Chapter 5 I will further argue that the complementizer če is taking over functions of karee as 
a marker of metarepresentations. If karee too is employed in such a case we could speak of a double (če 
plus karee, or karee plus verb of speech, cognition or perception) or even triple (če plus karee plus verb 
of speech, cognition or perception) marking. Example (127), taken from a conversation, is such an 
instance where both verbs of speech and the marker karee, occur. The speaker is talking about a relative 
who had been ill, and what had caused the illness. 
(127a) bé man-ãã̀s-ø [pári i-ínt kar]   
 1PL.EXCL say-PST.IPFV-PL.M fairy/jinn come-PRS.F MRM   
    ‘We were saying that she is possessed by a jinn’ [lit.: …a jinn comes (into her body)]  
(127b) moholàa-e màayn [sã  ̃ ́ pári-ø nií thí bíɡi 
 maulana-ERG say.PFV.1 3PL.DIST fairy-PL.F NEG be.PRS.F some.or.other  
 
 bimaarìi thí]      
 illness.F be.PRS.F      
   ‘The religious scholar said that it is not the jinns, it is some kind of illness’ (conversation 
12.7.2013) 
In both (127a) and (127b) there is a matrix clause with a speech verb and speech complement. The first 
of the two is additionally marked by karee; the second has no such marking (complements of the verb 
man- ‘say’, as above, may be juxtaposed, that is, are without complementizer). As it is already clear 
115 
 
from the speech verb that the complements are reported utterances one wonders why karee occurs in 
(127a). Is it just a case of double or redundant marking? One other suggestion would be that (127a) has 
been marked by karee because the reported utterance is not the description of a state of affairs; rather it 
is the representation of an assumption, a thought that was entertained by the speaker and her family at 
some time in the past. In other words, the presence of karee in such a construction would indicate 
another layer of representation, namely that of a thought (in the sense which includes assumptions, 
beliefs, doubts, hopes, fears, intentions and so on). If this suggestion is true then it might explain why 
karee marks the first reported utterance but not the second one. Whereas the first utterance in (127a) is 
really an assumption, the religious scholar’s utterance is presented as a representation of a state of 
affairs. He is the expert and is able to prove or rule out what the speakers of (127a) had assumed. 
When we look at the distribution of the marker karee and the complementizer če (see  Chapter 5) 
within Indus Kohistani reported or (self-) attributed speech and thought (in the widest sense), the 
following picture emerges: (i) the majority of reported speech has the form of a speech complement that 
is preceded by the complementizer če, but some instances of reported speech are marked by karee, (ii) 
many of the “reported thought” clauses are marked by karee, but some of them are marked by če, or by 
both, karee and če. That is, there are two co-occurring “reported speech and thought” markers with an 
uneven distribution. In the next chapter I will argue (section  5.3.1) that the more recently acquired 
complementizer če is in the process of replacing karee as a marker of reported speech and, increasingly, 
as a marker of reported thought. This process has been described by Bashir for Kalasha, another 
language of the area, where the Persian complementizer ki is replacing the older grammaticalized SAY 
marker ɡhõi (Bashir 1996), and this would explain the particular distribution of karee and če. 
One possible outcome of this process might be that the marker karee is on the way to become a 
marker of reported thought only. 
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4.5.2.3 Naming and similarity 
The functions of karee not considered so far are those of marking naming and similarity 
constructions. In this section I show that the analysis as marker of metarepresentations of (self-) 
attributed utterances and thoughts also works for these two uses of karee.  
The grammaticalization of a quotative into a marker of a naming construction is quite common and 
has been described in many languages (for a list see Güldemann 2008:398), for instance in languages of 
the South Asian linguistic area. As an example of a naming construction, example (105) is repeated 
here. 
(105) ɡúzur thú [Z xàan karee].  ɡhẽẽrá màaṣ  thú 
 Gujjar be.PRS.M.SG name.M Khan MRM elder man be.PRS.M.SG 
   ‘(He) is a Gujjar named Z Khan. He is an elder’ (conversation 7.1.2013) 
As already mentioned above, another translation of the element marked by karee would be ‘called 
Z Khan’ or ‘people say Z Khan to him’. This makes the nature of “Z Khan”, a reported quote, “what 
people say”,  more obvious and fits in with other reported utterances. Güldemann notes that reported 
speech and naming/labeling are both quotations: of an utterance in the former, and of a name in the 
latter case. More specifically, the name in the example above and in naming constructions in general 
does not refer to a person, an entity in the object world, but to an entity of the linguistic world, a 
“label”; so this is a case of mention, to be distinguished from a case of use as for instance in “They 
asked Z Khan to come to a meeting”, where “Z Khan” refers to a person, an entity in the object world 
(2008:399). A similar analysis of such naming constructions can be found in Noh (1998:113). It has to 
be noted that such “mention” use is not attributive metarepresentative use, of the kind we have seen so 
far. In naming constructions the metarepresentation is that of a non-attributed abstract entity. Its 
implication is that by marking naming constructions, karee  is no longer just a marker of (self-) 
attributed but also of non-attributive metarepresentations. That is, underlying the development from 
quotative, complementizer and purpose/reason clause marker into a marker of naming constructions is 
the extension from marking attributive metarepresentations only to also including non-attributive ones. 
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As for the occurrence of grammaticalized quotatives in similarity constructions, this use, too, is 
quite common. In literature, often such “likeness” markers are said to have developed from SAY verbs, 
although Lord mentions that the “speech verb channel” grammaticalization path may have as sources 
verbs such as resemble and be like (Lord 1993:210).  
What I want to emphasize again is the fact that it is not the meaning of the source element that 
leads to the extended use as similative marker (it would be difficult to establish such a connection for 
Indus Kohistani karee) but its use as a quotation marker or, in the terms of Relevance Theory, as a 
marker of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed utterances. So, utterances containing a similarity 
construction marked by karee should also contain a metarepresentation. I claim that this is indeed the 
case. The following examples (108), repeated here, and (128), where karee is employed to mark a 
notion of similarity between two items and two persons respectively, can be analyzed as a case of a 
(hypothetical) attributed or self-attributed utterance or such a thought. 
(108) ṣṹ baá [zãã̀ mùuṭ baá kar] atiãã ́
 3SG.DEM house.M 1PL.POSS.M former.M house.M MRM this.kind.M  
 
 thú       
 be.PRS.M.SG       
   ‘This house is similar to/like our former house’ (elicited 18.10.2013) 
We could also translate, “This house is, one could say, like our old house” or “This house is, let’s say, 
like our old house” or “This house is, I think, like our old house”. 
(128) m  ̃ĩ̀ lák ẓhaa-ṭõ̀õ lák puúc ̣ [R kar] 
 1SG.POSS small brother-DIM.GEN.M small son name.M MRM  
 
 atiãã ́ thú      
 this.kind.M be.PRS.M.SG      
   ‘My younger brother’s small son is just like, let’s say, R’ (elicited 18.10.2013) 
Here I want to point out that in constructions such as these karee does not encode the notion of 
similarity, that is, its meaning is not “like x”. As we can see in (108) and (128), this is done by atiãã ́
‘like this’, ‘this kind’.  In fact, in Indus Kohistani there are several other ways to express the likeness 
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between the two persons in example (128), as illustrated in examples (129) to (131). These do not have 
to employ karee. 
(129) ṹ R só thú    
 3SG.PROX name.M 3SG.DIST be.PRS.M.SG     
   ‘He is like R’ 
(130) ṹ R lak thú    
 3SG.PROX name.M -ish/like be.PRS.M.SG     
   ‘He is like R’ 
(131) ṹ R šìi thú    
 3SG.PROX name.M like be.PRS.M.SG    
   ‘He is like R’ (elicited 4.1.2014) 
This confirms my claim that in similarity constructions, karee does not encode itself the meaning 
“like, similar to” but indicates the presence of a metarepresentation. It follows that a speaker will 
employ karee only when she wants to make explicit what she thinks concerning a particular similarity 
between two entities. In all other cases karee will be left out.  
The same can be claimed for naming constructions. Indus Kohistani has other ways to say “ X’s 
name is …” that are used frequently, as seen in the following example (132), taken from a story. 
(132) pucạ̃ã̀ nàa ãã̀s šeexčelí    
 son.GEN.M name be.PST.M Sheekhcelii    
   ‘The son’s name was Sheekhceli’ (A.’s story #9) 
Another construction that has already been mentioned in section 4.5.1, used to tell someone’s 
nickname, is illustrated in (133). 
(133) as  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariãã̀ kira D D kar-àant-ø  
 3SG.PROX.POSS wife.GEN.M to name.F name.F do-PRS.M.-PL.M  
   ‘(They) call his wife “D”’ (conversation 4.1.2014) 
This seems to be a fixed expression, with the nickname repeated once. Although the verb kar- ‘do’ is 
used here, it is a finite verb form, not the metarepresentation marker karee. 
So we see that the naming expression using karee  is neither the only nor the default construction. 
A speaker will use karee when she wants to make explicit that people call someone something, that is, 
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when she quotes people. In the other cases the naming construction is just a description of a state of 
affairs. 
I conclude that karee is used to mark both naming and similarity constructions when a speaker 
wants to convey not so much a proposition of a state of affairs such as “his name is X”, “this is like 
Y”, than what she herself  or someone else says/thinks, as in “he is called X”, “this is, I think, similar 
to Y”. In the former case karee indicates the representation of a (self-) attributed representation, in the 
latter one a non-attributive representation, or in other words, a metarepresentation. 
4.5.3 Other functions of grammaticalized quotation markers 
So far, I have not encountered other uses of karee apart from the ones described above. In the 
literature about grammaticalization of quotation markers a number of other functions have been 
mentioned. These include the marking of conditional clauses, of causal clauses, the occurrence together 
with onomatopoeic words, the functions as topic marker, as mirative marker, as discourse marker for 
exclamations and as “discourse particles expressing self-evident assertions, warnings and echo questions 
(different construction types)” (Chappell 2008:5). Güldemann (2008) and Bashir (1996) among others 
provide similar lists. I cannot comment on these functions as apparently they are not found in Indus 
Kohistani. However, a look at them shows that most if not all of them could be subsumed under the 
basic function of marking metarepresentations. For instance conditional clauses: Hopper and Traugott 
present the following example (134) (example(21) in Hopper and Traugott 1993:14). 
(134) If/Say  the deal falls through, what alternative do you have? 
Their intention in presenting this example is to show that the use of a SAY verb form to mark a 
conditional clause is less exotic than it seems on first sight. That does, however, say nothing about what 
motivates the development of a quotative marker into a conditional marker. But there seem to be 
explanations for this use. In the example above, the antecedent could be interpreted as a representation 
of a (hypothetical) utterance or, if assume is used instead of say, an attributed thought of the addressee 
which would justify the use of a metarepresentation marker in such a construction. Noh (1998:242-287) 
shows that certain kinds of conditional clauses are best analyzed as containing metarepresentations, that 
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is, representations of attributed utterances or thoughts (antecedents, consequents or both). In such cases 
it would make sense in a given language to use an already existing metarepresentation marker for 
indicating conditionals as well. It is beyond the scope of this study to look at conditionals in more detail 
but it would be interesting to see which kinds of conditionals are being indicated by grammaticalized 
quotative markers. 
Onomatopoeic words are by nature imitations or interpretations of another representation namely 
that of a sound. That is, they qualify as metarepresentations of another representation; so the use of a 
metarepresentation marker would be appropriate. 
As to other functions mentioned above: warnings such as “I warn you, there will be consequences” 
are instances of self-quotation which is metarepresentational.  Echo questions and exclamatives are both 
analyzed as metarepresentations (the former attributed, the latter non-attributed) within the framework 
of Relevance Theory.  
At this point I claim that Indus Kohistani karee, a grammaticalized quotative marker, should best 
be analyzed as a metarepresentation marker as this can account for all its uses. The grammaticalization 
path has been such that the marker has extended its function of marking metarepresentations of (self-) 
attributed speech to marking of metarepresentations of (self-) attributed thoughts and non-attributive 
metarepresentations in the case of naming constructions. The question whether my analysis may also be 
applied to grammaticalized quotation markers of other languages, and whether it can also account for 
other functions of such markers, remains a topic for further studies. 
4.6 Summary: the metarepresentation marker karee 
In this chapter I have described the Indus Kohistani grammaticalized marker karee  that originates 
in the converb form of the verb kar- ‘do’. It is used to mark reported and self-reported utterances, 
complements of verbs of cognition and perception, “think” clauses other than complements, and 
purpose and reason clauses. Furthermore karee occurs in naming and in similarity constructions. 
Considering its range of uses the marker karee is a typical instance of what is described in literature as 
grammaticalized SAY quotative or SAY complementizer (Bashir 1996). 
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For my analysis of karee I used the framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995) 
and drew on research by Güldemann (2008) and LaPolla (1997). Within Relevance Theory, the marker 
karee is analyzed as a marker of representations or interpretations of (self-) attributed representations, or 
in short, as a marker of metarepresentations. At the beginning of the grammaticalization process these 
may have been attributed representations of utterances only, but now they also include (self-) attributed 
representations of thoughts and non-attributive representations of names (“mentions”).  
Indus Kohistani karee  marks clauses that are complements of verbs of speech, of cognition and of 
perception; it may also be the only indicator of a (self-) reported speech or thought, thereby triggering 
the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “X is saying/thinking …”. 
This analysis can account for all uses of karee; it also sheds light on why such a marker develops 
along this particular grammaticalization path. In the case of karee, the function of marking 
metarepresentations of attributed utterances gradually extended to other forms of metarepresentations 
such as self-attributed utterances, (self-) attributed thoughts and non-attributive “mention”. 
Within this analysis, karee is seen as an indicator that, by making explicit the presence of a 
metarepresentation, constrains the addressee’s search for relevance and thereby reduces processing 
effort and time. In this sense, the Indus Kohistani metarepresentation marker karee is a “fossilized 
constraint” on utterance interpretation (LaPolla 1997). 
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Chapter 5  
 The Indus Kohistani marker če 
In this chapter I am concerned mainly with the Indus Kohistani marker če in its functions as a 
replacement for the marker karee, that is, as a complementizer and marker of purpose and reason 
clauses. The full range of uses of če is much wider: it may mark relative clauses, conditional clauses, 
adverbial clauses of time; it is found as clause linker in dependent clauses that describe a quality 
mentioned in the main clause, and in constructions where the main clause consists of a question that is 
answered in the dependent clause. It may even introduce independent clauses. Although I briefly 
illustrate these uses, a thorough description and analysis of all its functions goes beyond the topic of this 
study and deserves further research in its own right. 
In the following sections I describe the complementizer and introducer of purpose and reason 
clauses če and illustrate its various uses; then I compare it with the metarepresentation marker karee 
(see  Chapter 4). I show that če, a later addition to the Indus Kohistani lexicon, is on its way to replace 
karee as a quotative, complementizer and marker of purpose and reason clauses. In these uses, če may, 
like the marker karee, be analyzed as a procedural indicator of (self-) attributed public and mental 
metarepresentations, that is, of quoted speech and thought. As a procedural marker of attributed 
representations it constrains an addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explicature. The 
data used in this chapter are mainly taken from recorded oral texts as described in section  1.5; only a 
few examples have been taken from recorded conversations. 
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5.1 The marker če: oriɡin, definition, properties 
5.1.1 Origin 
The marker če seems to be a borrowing from Pashto če. Pashto, belonging to the Eastern Iranian 
languages group, is one of the languages of wider communication in the area. The Pashto marker’s entry 
is as follows. 
“conj.  Because, whether, or  that, as, whereas, etc” (Raverty 
1860:378).  
Neighboring Shina Kohistani has a similar marker če ‘that’, introducing subordinate clauses (Schmidt 
and Kohistani 2008:253). A similar, multifunctional conjunction, the Persian ki (or ke), is found in 
many languages of the Indian Subcontinent, due to several centuries of Persian influence. Urdu ki  is 
one such instance. Its entry as conjunction includes  
“That, in order that, to the end that, so that, for that, in that, because, 
for; if; and; [illegible]; whether; namely, to wit, saying, thus, as follows 
[…] ; lest; when; but even” (Platts 1911/1994:866).  
In the North of Pakistan, Kalasha ki (Bashir 1996:206) and Palula ki  (Liljegren 2008:334) are instances 
of such Persian borrowings. At present, I do not know if Pashto če  and Persian ki are related at all; a 
look at their respective uses, however, shows many similarities. The entry in the Indus Kohistani 
dictionary (Zoller 2005:181) is as follows. 
“čeʰ (J, G18) conj. (introducing a nominal clause) ‘that; whatever, 
whichever’ (Ur. ki; joki). Psht. če.” 
What seems to be sure is that both če and its Persian counterpart ki are more recent additions to several 
languages of Northern Pakistan that have SAY complementizers, due to the influence of surrounding 
languages. I will discuss this further in section  5.3.1.  
                                              




It is already obvious from the introductory words above that it will be difficult to define the Indus 
Kohistani marker če. The most frequent use is that as a complementizer, but a definition of če as a 
complementizer would not account for its other uses such as subordinator and relativizer. In this study, I 
use the terms marker, complementizer, and clause linker.  
5.1.3 Properties 
In  Chapter 4 I have discussed the metarepresentation marker karee, a particle that always follows 
the clause marked by it. Its syntactic property, namely being a clause-final marker, is typical for verb-
final languages. The clause-linker če, on the other hand, is a clause-initial marker. As to their placement 
within a clause, the two markers are in complementary distribution and it is not possible for them to 
“swap” places. This has consequences for the placement of complements and dependent clauses within 
a sentence. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the position of clauses marked by the clause-final karee 
within the matrix or main clause is not restricted: they may precede, follow or be embedded within the 
main clause. Clauses with the initial marker če are much more restricted in this aspect; they are always 
postposed, following the finite verb of the main clause. The one exception to this generalization is the 
case of relative clauses marked by če, to be discussed in section  5.2.3. This difference, that is, the 
restricted placement of complements with clause-initial markers versus less restricted placement of 
complements with clause-final markers, holds true for all languages of the Indian subcontinent that have 
such constructions (Subbarao 2012:218-23).  
5.2 Uses of the marker če 
In this section I describe the uses that če shares with the marker karee, namely as complementizer, 
as indicator of speech and “think” clauses and as marker of purpose and reason clauses. I also briefly 
illustrate other functions of če such as being a relativizer, occurring in conditional clauses, introducing 
several other types of subordinate clauses and introducing independent clauses. 
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5.2.1 The complementizer če 
The most frequent use of the Indus Kohistani marker če is that as a complementizer, introducing 
speech and other sentential complement clauses. In the previous chapter, I have already introduced the 
metarepresentation marker karee as a complementizer. When comparing the frequency of occurrences of 
karee and če in complement constructions it is obvious that the overwhelminɡ majority of sentential 
complements is marked by če, and furthermore that the range of semantic classes of complement-taking 
predicates marked by če is wider than that marked by karee. It can therefore safely be said that če is the 
default and unmarked member of the two Indus Kohistani complementizers. If we find in Indus 
Kohistani the same process of replacing an older SAY complementizer by a more recently acquired loan 
complementizer as has been described by Bashir for Kalasha (Bashir 1996:206), another Northern 
Pakistan language, then this particular distribution of če and karee makes sense. 
In the following sections I want to describe and illustrate the function of če in complement clauses 
as they occur in natural data. As in the previous chapters, the clauses marked by če are in square 
brackets. 
5.2.1.1 The complementizer če as marker of complements of verbs of saying, 
perception and cognition 
In section  4.2.2.1 I mentioned that one Indus Kohistani complement strategy is that of 
juxtaposition; this is found only with the complement-taking predicate man- ‘say’, and is optional. Most 
speech complements, whether containing the verb man- ‘say’ or another utterance predicate, however, 
are marked by če, as the following examples show. In (135), the speech verb used is man- ‘say’. The 
complementizer če is always the first element in the complement clause. 
(135) sã  ̃ ́ baačãã̀ nookar-õõ̀ man-áɡil [če tús ɡulú 
 3PL.DIST king.GEN.M servant-ERG.PL say-PVF.2 COMP 2PL where.to  
 
 be-ént-ø]       
 go-PRS.M-PL.M       
   ‘The king’s servants said, “Where do you go to?”’ (Prince and fairy #23) 
The three following examples show complements of shout, announce, and preach. 
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(136) abàa-e kòu kar-áthe [če hĩaál wa-íɡee kãã ́
 father-ERG shoutinɡ do-PRS.PRF that avalanche come.down-PFV2.F.SG who  
 
 amãã̀ bač-aa-h-aánt khẽ bač-aái]    
 REFL escape-CAUS-POT-PRS.M.SG SUB escape-CAUS.IMP.2PL    
   ‘The father shouted, “An avalanche is coming down, save yourselves if you can”’ (Avalanche 
story #62) 
The speech complement in this example contains two clauses: the first is the description of a state of 
affairs (“an avalanche is coming down”), the second one is a conditional clause, indicated by the clause-
final subordinator khẽ  (“save yourselves if you can”). 
(137) hukmát eelàan di-ínt reeṛõ̀õ man [če aáz 
 government announcement ɡive-PRS.F radio.PL.OBL in COMP today  
 
 béetsãã rozá ho-ṣát]     
 1PL.INCL.POSS.M fasting become-FUT.M     
   ‘The government announces through the radio that today our fasting will begin’ (Ramazan #6) 
Note that the postpositional phrase “through the radio” in this example is added to the matrix clause as 
an afterthought, therefore it follows the verb ‘give’. 
(138) sayãã̀ kira taqrìir kar-áṣat wàaz kar-áṣat [če tús ṣeé 
 3PL.DIST.POSS..M to speech do-FUT.M sermon do-FUT.M COMP 2PL in.this.way  
 
 sabáq man-ìi]    
 lesson say-IMP.2PL    
   ‘(He) will give a talk, will preach how they should recite (the Quran)’ (Men’s duties #110) 
Recall that Indus Kohistani has no indirect speech; in all these examples the complement is in 
direct speech form. 
The complementizer če also introduces complements of predicates of perception; example (139) 
contains the predicate look for, example (140) the verb see. 
(139) tèe mút ḍòol-ø man nhaal-áṣat-e [če ɡhàn ḍòol tshìil 
 then other field-OBL in look.for-FUT.M-PL.M COMP which field wide  
 
 thú sám ḍòol thú]  
 be.PRS.M.SG right field be.PRS.M.SG  
   ‘Then (they) will look in other fields for such a field that is wide and right (for threshing the 
maize)’ (About deqani #62) 
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(140) kasĩĩ-  ̃ ́ baá-ø man mẽẽ̀ nií paš-áthe [če ɡõ̀õ 
 who.POSS-also house-OBL in 1SG.ERG NEG see-PRS.PFV COMP yarn  
 
 sand-àynt-ø]      
 make-PRS.F-PL.F      
   ‘I have not seen in anyone’s house (women) making/spinning yarn’ (Sheep #74) 
The next example (141) contains a complement of hear. 
(141) bé ṣo-àant-ø kàlkal [če zãã̀ watan-á man 
 1PL.EXCL hear-PRS.M-PL.M sometimes COMP 1PL.POSS.M country-OBL in  
 
 ṣeé màaṣ-e ìicḥ maar-áɡil]    
 such man-ERG bear kill-PFV.2    
   ‘Sometimes we hear that in our area a man killed a bear in such a way’ (Hunting in Kohistan 
#115) 
The following examples show complements of predicates of cognition, marked by če. Example 
(141) contains the propositional attitude predicate believe. 
(142) m  ̃ĩ̀ yaqìin thú [če xodaepàak mií haž-ií har-áṣat] 
 1SG.POSS belief be.PRS.M.SG COMP God 1SG.DOM hajj-DAT take-FUT.M 
   ‘I believe that God will take me for Hajj’ (Men’s duties #99) 
The complement of example (143) expresses someone’s thought. The utterance is taken from a 
conversation about beggars entering busses and asking passengers for money.  
(143) khẽ tèe ã  ̃ ́ suúči kar-àant-ø [če má 
 DEVM then 3PL.PROX thought do-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 1SG  
 
 
saphar-á tal be-ént khẽ miiɡeé pèes thé] 
 journey-OBL on go-PRS.M SUB 1SG.DAT money be.PRS.PL.M 
   ‘So then they (the passengers) consider that as they are travelling they have money with them’ 
[lit.: ‘So then they consider that “When I am going on a journey then I have money with 
me”’] (Beggars, begging, charity #25) 
Note again that the thought is expressed as direct reported speech. 
Example (144) below is an instance of a complement of a commentative predicate. Such predicates 
provide a comment such as a judgment, an evaluation of or an emotional reaction to the complement 
proposition (Noonan 2007b:127).  
(144) hãã tèe  bé sáx xušàal ho-ónt-ø [če zãĩ̀ 




 mheéṣ zaá-ɡee]     
 buffalo.cow give.birth-PFV2.F     
   ‘And then we are very glad that our buffalo cow has calved’ (About cattle #67) 
The next examples are utterances containing predicates of knowledge and acquisition of 
knowledge, such as know, discover, find out, realize, and dream.  
(145) ayõṍ paš-áɡil [če m  ̃ĩ̀ ṣṹ ɡhariṹ yaá m  ̃ĩ̀ 
 3PL.PROX.ERG see-PFV2 COMP 1SG.POSS 3SG.DEM wife or 1SG.POSS  
 
 ṣṹ žhaazày ṣás màaṣ-ø mil haraamtùup kar-àynt] 
 3SG.DEM sister-in-law 3SG.DEM.OBL man-OBL with adultery do-PRS.F 
   ‘Suppose they (husband, or brother-in-law) see (come to know) that his wife or his sister-in-law 
is committing adultery with this man’ [lit.: ‘… that my wife or my sister-in-law ...’] (Feuds 
#76) 
Here again, the complement is presented in direct speech form, as if spoken by the agents of the matrix 
clause although it represents a mind-internal process, a conclusion the agents have come to. 
In example (146), the complement expresses what someone learns by dreaming. 
(146) kãã ́ sũ̀ũ paš-àant [če ṣṹ màaṣ-ãĩ suɡày 
 someone dream see-PRS.M COMP 3SG.DEM man-GEN.F fine.F  
 
 ɡàaḍii thí]      
 car.F be.PRS.F      
   ‘Someone dreams that this man has a fine car’ (Dreams and their interpretations #56) 
Example (147) shows a complement of the predicate know. 
(147) h  ̃ĩ̀ tasií pát nií thí nhaal-á [če ṹ 
 now 3SG.DIST.DAT knowledge.F NEG be.PRS.F look-IMP.2SG COMP 3SG.PROX  
 
 m  ̃ĩ̀ abàa ãã̀s ɡí  mút kãã ́ pičhàa ãã̀s] 
 1SG.POSS father be.PST.M what other some uncle be.PST.M 
   ‘Now he does not know, look, if he (the deceased) was his father or someone else, an uncle’ 
[lit.: ‘Now he does not know, look, if “he was my father or someone else, an uncle”’] (About 
inheriting #131) 
Example (148) is another instance of a predicate of knowledge acquisition, with the complement in 
direct reported speech form. 
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(148) gí wáxt-a xawàand pooruz-íɡaa [če ṹ 
 what time-OBL husband understand-PFV2.M.SG COMP 3SG.PROX 
 
 maasúm m  ̃ĩ̀ nií thú]    
 child 1SG.POSS NEG be.PRS.M.SG    
   ‘When […] the husband finds out that (his wife’s) child) is not his own …’ [lit.: ‘… that the 
child is not mine’] (Feuds #91) 
The following example (149) contains a predicate of fearing. 
(149) h  ̃ĩ̀ má bhi-íthi [če boó tàlan baṭá 
 now 1sg fear-PRS.PFV.F COMP up downward rock.PL  
 
 wa-ṣát-ø]       
 come.down-FUT.M-PL.M       
   ‘Now I was afraid that rocks would come down from above’ (The earthquake #39) 
In example (150), the complement expresses someone’s hope, again in direct speech form. 
(150) umèen ho-ónt baadeaadam-ãã̀ nhaal-á [če  má zànd 
 hope become-PRS.M human.being-GEN.M look-IMP.2SG COMP 1SG alive.M  
 
 ho-ṣát má ɡát i-ṣát tãã̀ baí]  
 become-FUT.M 1SG again come-FUT.M REFL.POSS.M house.DAT  
   ‘(When leaving for a long travel) it is man’s hope, look, that he will be alive and come back to 
his house’ (Prayer #216) 
The manipulative predicate order in (151), too, induces direct reported speech form of the 
complement. 
(151) tèe  xodaepàak  mulaakì-õõ áḍar de-ént [če ṣás 
 then God angel-PL.OBL command give-PRS.M COMP 3SG.DEM.OBL  
 
 wáxt-a man  ṣás sazàa as  ̃ĩ̀ kira muqarár 
 time-OBL in 3SG.DEM.DOM punishment 3SG.PROX.POSS to appointed  
 
 kar-ìi]       
 do-IMP.2PL       
   ‘Then God orders the anɡels to assign such a punishment at such a time (for the deceased) 
(More about sin #156) 
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In this section I have illustrated the use of če as a complementizer of complements of speech, 
perception and cognition predicates. All complements of this class of complement-taking predicates are 
presented in direct speech form. 
5.2.1.2 The complementizer če as marker of other complements 
The complement-taking predicates of utterance, perception and cognition seen so far all take 
sentential complements with the clause-initial complementizer če. For modal predicates, this is not the 
only complementation strategy available. Example (152) shows a sentential complement with če, 
whereas the complement in (153) is of the non-finite type. 
(152) ek màaṣ-e atshàk kar-áɡil khẽ mut màaṣ-i pakàar 
 one man-ERG bad.M do-PFV2 SUB other man-DAT necessary  
 
 thi [če sábur kar-á]   
 be.PRS.F COMP patience do-IMP.2SG   
   ‘When one man did something bad then it is necessary for the other one (who was wronged) to 
be patient’ [lit.: ‘… then it is necessary for the other one that “you be patient”’] (More about 
sin #93) 
Example (153) shows a non-finite complement clause embedded within the matrix clause, without the 
complementizer če. 
(153) ṣás  wáxt-a  man ṣás ɡharĩ  ̃ ́ tal xawànd tal 
 3SG.DEM.OBL time-OBL in 3SG.DEM.OBL wife.OBL on husband.OBL on  
 
 [ɣúsul de-ṍ] pháraz thú   
 ritual.bath give-INF obligation be.PRS.M.SG   
   ‘At that time the woman and the husband have the obligation to take a (ritual) bath’ (Women’s 
duties #130) 
We see again that the sentential complement of (152), introduced by če, has utterance form, that is 
direct reported speech form whereas this is not the case in example (153) where če is not used and 
where the complement does not consist of an “inner speech”. 
Complements of achievement predicates may be of the sentential type and are introduced by the 




(154) bazií koošìiš kar-àant-ø [če ṣás icḥáni-ø tal 
 go.CVB attempt do-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 3SG.DEM.OBL bear.F-OBL on  
 
 ɡuzàar kar-íž ás  hinḍa-áiž]    
 shot, bullet do-SBJV.1PL 3SG.PROX.DOM drive.away-SBJV.1PL    
   ‘Having gone (they) try to shoot at the female bear, to drive her away’ [lit.: ‘Having gone (they) 
try that “let’s shoot at the female bear, let’s drive her away”’] (Hunting in Kohistan #97) 
Again, there is an alternative complement construction used with achievement predicates such as try, as 
is shown in (155). The non-finite complement, a verbal noun, is embedded within the matrix clause. 
(155) phòož-e [ás dhay-  ̃ĩ̀] koošìiš kìir   
 army-ERG 3SG.PROX.DOM ɡrab-NMLZ.GEN.F attempt.F do.PFV1   
   ‘The army attempted to get hold of him’ [lit.: ‘The army did the attempt of getting hold of him’] 
(Q’s story #28) 
Concerning predicates of immediate perception, verbs such as see and hear in my data generally 
have the meaning of “come to understand” and “reported”, respectively. The following examples of 
complements of immediate perception predicates are elicited. Besides the če strategy, other complement 
types may be employed which I show here to complete the picture. Example (156) shows a sentential 
complement introduced by če. 
(156) mẽẽ̀ paš-áthe  [če ṣã  ̃ ́ dùu ɡàaḍii-ø riŋɡ-íthi] 
 1SG.ERG see-PRS.PFV COMP 3PL.DEM two car-PL be.touched-PRS.PFV.F 
   ‘I have seen these two cars crash’ (elicited 7.2.2014) 
(157) mẽẽ̀ [ṣã  ̃ ́ dùu ɡàaḍii riŋɡ-ãĩ̀s-ø] paš-áthe  
 1SG.ERG 3PL.DEM two car-PL be.touched-PST.IPFV.F-PL.F see-PRS.PFV  
   ‘I have seen these two cars crash’ (elicited 7.2.2014) 
(158) mẽẽ̀ [ás bhãã ́ dhay-ĩ  ̃ ́ tal] paš-áthe  
 1SG.ERG 3SG.PROX.DOM dishes wash-NMLZ.OBL on see-PRS.PFV  
   ‘I have seen her doing the dishes’ (elicited 7.2.2014) 
(159) mẽẽ̀ [mayṭyuú rõ̀ĩs] ṣo-áthe    
 1SG.ERG girl.DIM weep.PST.IPFV.F hear-PRS.PFV    
   ‘I have heard the little girl cry’ (elicited 7.2.2014) 
In (157) and (159), the complement is finite, embedded within the main clause but without a 
complementizer. The complement in example (158) contains an inflected verbal noun with postposition, 
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again embedded within the main clause. At this point I am not able to tell which of these strategies is 
the one used most frequently with such predicates. 
The last examples of complements presented in this section are complements of the predicate wait. 
In main clauses with the verb intezàar kar- ‘wait’, what the agent of the clause is waiting for may be the 
content of a subordinate clause introduced with če, as example (160) shows.  
(160) ás wáxt-a man só deeqàan intezàar kar-àant 
 3SG.PROX.OBL time-OBL in 3SG.DIST tenant waiting do-PRS.M  
 
 [če h  ̃ĩ̀ ṣṹ makày m  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhã  ̃ ́ ho-ṣaýt] 
 COMP now 3SG.DEM corn 1SG.POSS big.INCH become-FUT.F 
   ‘At that time the tenant is waiting for his corn to grow’ [lit.: ‘… is waiting that “now my corn 
will become big”’] (About deqani #32) 
The direct reported speech in the subordinate clause expresses the tenant’s internal speech, as seen from 
the waiting person’s perspective.  The notion of waiting for a person is expressed in a different way, 
whereby če is not used, as example (161) shows. 
(161) ṹ tãã̀ xawànd-ãã intezàar kar-àynt   
 3SG.PROX REFL.POSS.M husband.OBL-GEN.M waiting.M do-PRS.F   
   ‘She is waiting for her husband’ (elicited) 
Here, not a complement but a possessive construction is used: “she does her husband’s waiting”.  
In this section I have shown that there are several complementation strategies available for 
complements of predicates other than those of speech, perception and cognition. The complementizer če 
is used when the complement expresses an “inner speech/cognitive process”; this is always presented as 
direct speech. 
5.2.1.3 The complementizer če replacing the complement-taking predicate 
In section  4.3.2.2 I described clauses marked by karee that are reported thoughts or “think” 
complement clauses although such constructions do not contain a “think” complement-taking predicate. 
I also mentioned that it may be difficult to differentiate such clauses from purpose and reason clauses 
marked by karee for two reasons: (i) the “think” as well as the purpose and reason clauses are always in 
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direct reported-speech form, (ii) there is no syntactic difference between such “think” clauses on one 
hand and purpose and reason clauses on the other hand.  
Looking at clauses marked by če we find a similar use: constructions consisting of a main clause 
and a dependent clause that contains a reported speech or thought in direct-speech form, but without a 
corresponding complement-taking utterance- or predicate of cognition. Here, the complementizer če 
indicates, without the presence of a complement-taking predicate, that the following clause is a reported 
speech or thought. The direct speech form aids in interpreting such clauses correctly as what they are. 
In this section I present some instances of this use. In example (162) below the subordinate clause 
cannot be the complement of the main clause verb show  or cause to see; the (omitted) complement-
taking predicate has to be a verb of saying. 
(162) tèe bé ḍaakṭar-ií paša-ánt-ø [če tú nhaal-á ta 
 then 1PL.EXCL doctor-DAT show-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 2SG look-IMP.2SG DM  
 
 ṹ ɡí thú]    
 3SG.PROX what be.PRS.M.SG    
   ‘Then we show (the boil) to the doctor (and ask him) to look at it and find out what kind it is’ 
[lit.: ‘Then we show (the boil) to the doctor COMP “Look at it, what is it?”’] (About boils 
#25) 
The subordinate clause in (163) contains a command which presupposes the actual saying of the 
command.  
(163) khẽ  ḍoóm cẹ̃ẽ̀s-ø [če ṣaś màaṣ xabár 
 DEVM Dom send.PST.IPFV.M-PL.M COMP 3SG.DEM.DOM man news  
 
 kár-ø ṣás màaṣ xabár  kár-ø ...]  
 do-IMP.2SG 3SG.DEM.DOM man news do-IMP.2SG   
   ‘Then (they) used to send a Dom (a member of the Dom tribe), telling him to inform this man, 
that man …’ [lit.: ‘Then (they) used to send a Dom COMP “Do inform this man, do inform 
this man …”’] (About the Dom tribe #11) 
However, there is another way to translate this utterance, namely ‘then (they) used to send a Dom to 
inform this man, that man, …’ In such a construction the clause in square brackets is a purpose clause. 
This example demonstrates that there is no clear distinction between clauses where če stands in place of 
a verb of speech or thoughts, and purpose and reason clauses. 
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Example (164) is from the same text; če indicates that the following clause is a reported speech. 
(164) tèe ɣárak rupày-ø ṣás ẓàb-an ṣã  ̃ ́ rupày-oon 
 then plenty rupee-PL 3SG.DEM.OBL bride.price-ABL 3PL.DEM rupee-ABL.PL  
 
 cẹé ḍom-ãã̀ kira dẽẽ̀s-ø [če ã  ̃ ́ t  ̃ĩ̀ 
 send.CVB Dom-GEN.M to give.PST.IPFV.M-PL.M COMP 3PL.PROX 2SG.POSS  
 
 ṣíṣ waal-ìil rupày-ø thí tú har-á]  
 head bring.down-ADS.F rupee-PL be.PRS.F 2SG take-IMP.2SG  
   ‘Then (they) sent plenty of money, of this bride-prize money, and gave it to the Dom (member 
of the Dom tribe) (saying) “This money is the money for the head-shaving; take it”’ (About 
the Dom tribe #17) 
Example (165) is another instance of če standing in for a predicate of utterance. 
(165) khẽ béetus hisàab kar-áṣat-ø nhaal-á [če tẽẽ̀ 
 then 1PL.INCL calculation do-FUT.M-PL.M look-IMP.2SG COMP 2SG.ERG  
 
 m  ̃ĩ̀ atyúk màaṣ-ø maar-áthe]    
 1SG.POSS this.many man-PL kill-PRS.PFV    
   ‘Then we (we and you) will count (the men killed in the feud), look, (and say), “You have 
killed this many men of my family”’ (Feuds #158) 
In example (166) the complement contains a thought; the omitted complement-taking predicate is 
one of knowledge acquisition, something like find out. 
(166) talãã ́ ayõṍ h  ̃ĩ̀ bhìilõõ hàa muuṭhú neer-áthe 
 from.there 3PL.PROX.ERG now fear-PL.OBL hand forward not.do-PRS.PFV  
 
 [če ɡí tsìiz thú]    
 COMP what thing be.PRS.M.SG    
   ‘After that, now, out of fear they did not dare to put out the hand (toward the bundle of clothes) 
to find out what it was’ [lit.: ‘After that, now, out of fear they did not dare to put out the hand 
(toward the bundle of clothes), COMP “What is this thing?”’] (How they found the baby #15) 
The final two examples of this section are again ambiguous ones; the clauses preceded by če  may 
be interpreted either as reported speech or as reason (167) and purpose clause (168). The background of 
(167) is the fact that although in Islam women are entitled to inherit a share of their father’s property, in 
Kohistan it is the custom for women to hand over their share to their brothers. In exchange the brothers 
will look after their sisters as long as they live and help in times of illness etc. If however a woman 
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does take her share as is her right (for instance because she does not have a brother) then people may 
make the following remark.  
(167) tèe hasàant-e [če ayõṍ tãã̀ abãĩ̀ miràas 
 then laugh-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 3PL.PROX.ERG REFL.POSS.M father.GEN.F inheritance  
 
 kha-áthe]       
 eat-PRS.PFV       
   ‘Then (people) use to laugh (at the women) (saying) “They have eaten up their father’s 
inheritance”’ (About inheriting #31) 
But an equally appropriate translation of this example is “Then (people) use to laugh (at the women) 
because they have eaten up their father’s inheritance”; in this interpretation the clause preceded by če is 
a reason clause. 
In example (168), likewise, the clause preceded by če may be interpreted either as reported speech 
or as a purpose clause. As in all previous examples, it is in direct reported-speech form. 
(168) maasúm dùu kaál-ø huúɡaa khẽ tèe bé tas  ̃ĩ̀ 
 child two year-PL become.PFV2.M.SG SUB then 1PL.EXCL 3SG.POSS  
 
 ṣás dacḥõ̀õ hàa muná ɡóli-ø man de-ént-ø 
 3SG.DEM.DOM right hand down bread-OBL in give-PRS.M-PL.M  
 
 [če tú ṣás tãã̀ dacḥõ̀õ hatoó hin 
 COMP 2SG 3SG.DEM.OBL REFL.POSS.M right hand.M.DIM.OBL with  
 
 ɡóli khá]    
 bread eat.IMP.2SG    
   ‘When a child is two years old then we put his right hand down to the food (and say), “Eat the 
food with your right hand”’ or ‘When a child is two years old then we put his right hand 
down to the food so that he eat the food with his right hand’ (Food, meal times #121) 
In this section I have described and illustrated the use of če in such subordinate clauses that seem 
to be speech or “think” complements but where the complement-taking predicate is absent. I have also 
shown that such clauses may be ambiguous in that both an interpretation as speech or “think” 
complement and an interpretation as purpose or reason clause is possible. Structurally there is no 
difference between these two types of subordinate clauses. In both cases, what is reported as said or 
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thought, or as purpose or reason, has the form of direct reported speech. There is no clear distinction 
between clauses treated in this section and purpose and reason clauses that will be the topic of the 
following section. 
5.2.2 The marker če in purpose and reason clauses 
In this section I present more examples of clauses marked by če that seem to be reported speech or 
thought clauses because of the use of direct reported speech but for which interpretations as purpose and 
reason clauses are more appropriate. In example (169) the clause marked by če is one of purpose. 
(169) hãã má boolãã ́ asií waat bazíthi baalṭìi-ø waat 
 and 1SG from.up 3SG.PROX.OBL for ɡo.PRS.PFV.F pail-OBL for  
 
 bazíthi [če ɡaá doóm]   
 ɡo.PRS.PFV.F COMP cow milk.SBJV.1SG   
   ‘…and I went from up there for it, I went for the pail in order to milk the cow’ (The evil eye 
#141) 
The speaker of the following example (170) talks about people’s reasons to get a charm. One of 
those reasons is that at times, men do not find a job and so they acquire a charm for the purpose of 
getting employment. 
(170) ás wáxt-a man ɡát taawìiz kar-i-aánt-ø [če 
 3SG.PROX.OBL time-OBL in again charm do-CAUS-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 
 
 miiɡeé mazduurìi hòo miiɡeé pèes hòo]  
 1SG.DAT labour become.SBJV.3SG 1SG.DAT money become.SBJV.3SG  
   ‘At that time again (men) get made a charm so that they may get work, may get money’ (The 
evil eye #168) 
Note that as in the examples of the previous sections, the clause preceded by če is in direct speech form, 
taking the perspective not of the actual speaker of this utterance but of the men who go to get a charm. 
In the next example (171) the speaker talks about a daughter-in-law’s duties when her mother-in-
law is elderly and frail. 
(171) khẽ asií kũzoó man wìi har-eé čaarčubìi-ø man 




 tsha-ɡìl [če tú adùus kar-á] ee žaanamàaz riza-áɡil 
 place-PFV2 COMP 2SG ablution do-IMP.2SG and prayer.mat spread-PFV2  
 
 [če tú niwàaz kar-á]    
 COMP 2SG ritual.prayer do-IMP.2SG    
   ‘(The daughter-in-law) would take water in a jar and put it in the bathroom for her so that she 
(the mother-in-law) might perform ablution, and (the daughter-in-law) would spread out the 
prayer mat so that (the mother-in-law) might say prayers’ (Women’s duties #170-1) 
Again, both purpose clauses are in direct reported speech form, the respective verbs being marked for 
second person imperative. 
The following example (172) contains a reason clause. The speaker explains why in the past, young 
fathers did not take up their infant children. 
(172) hãã maasúm nií dhay-ãã̀s buí kar-eé [če m  ̃ĩ̀ 
 and child NEG hold-IPFV.PST.M up do-CVB COMP 1SG.POSS  
 
 laáz  di-ínt]     
 embarrassment give-PRS.F.     
   ‘And (the husband) used not to take up and hold (his) child because he was embarrassed’ [lit.: 
‘… COMP “embarrassment gives to me”’] (A mother’s advice #64) 
In example (173), again, the purpose clause is reported as from the perspective of the agents, in 
direct speech form. 
(173) khẽ kàlkal raál amãã̀ dhayãã̀s-e [če oktá 
 DEVM sometimes at.night REFL wash.IPFV.PST.M-PL.M COMP in.the.morninɡ  
 
 šòur  icọóṣ mií paš-áṣat-e yaá yàa  abàa mií paš-áṣat-e] 
 parents.in.law 1SG.DOM see-FUT.M-PL.M or parents 1SG.DOM see-FUT.M-PL.M  
 
 khe kùi  bariùu nikaý raál amãã̀ dhay-aá bazií 
 DEVM husband.and.wife come.out.CVB at.night REFL.POSS wash-CVB go.CVB  
 
 sút bẽẽ̀s-ø      
 to.sleep go.IPFV.PST.M-PL.M      
   ‘Sometimes (a husband and wife) used to take a bath at night because (if taking a bath) in the 
morning the parents-in-law would see them or the parents would see them, so husband and 




As already noted, there is no structural difference between purpose and reason clauses. The hearer 
of such an utterance has to infer from the context if a particular clause should be interpreted as 
expressing a purpose or a reason. Often the verb form helps to disambiguate between the two, as in the 
last example (174) of this section. 
(174) tèe kukõṍ maar-ãã̀s-e maar-eé búṭ xaandàan ṭùl 
 then chicken.PL kill-IPFV.PST.M-PL.M kill-CVB all family toɡether  
 
 huú ɡóli khãã̀s-e [če aáz ẽẽ̀ tãã̀ 
 become.CVB bread eat.IPFV.PST.M-PL.M COMP today 3SG.PROX.ERG REFL.POSS.M  
 
 pucạ̃ã̀ ṣíṣ waal-áthe]     
 son.GEN.M head bring.down-PFV.PRS.     
   ‘Then (they) used to kill a chicken, having killed the chicken all the family would gather and 
have a meal because that day (the father) had shaved his son’s head’ (More old traditions 
#14) 
The verb of the reason clause is marked for past tense; this would not fit in with an interpretation as 
purpose clause where often (but not always) the verb has irrealis marking, for instance subjunctive such 
as in examples (169) and (170), or imperative as in (171). Thus the verb marking helps the hearer to 
arrive at the correct interpretation. 
So far, the uses of če have been similar to that of the metarepresentation marker karee. In all the 
examples seen so far it would be possible to replace če with karee. In the following sections I will 
briefly describe other uses of če where it cannot be substituted by karee. 
5.2.3 The marker če in relative clauses 
In the previous sections, I have described the uses of the marker če as a complementizer, as a 
marker of (self-) reported speech and thought, and as clause linker in purpose and reason clauses. In this 
section I present a brief overview of Indus Kohistani relativizing strategies and then describe če as a 
marker of relative clauses, or relativizer.  
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5.2.3.1 Indus Kohistani relativizing strategies 
Indus Kohistani has several relativizing strategies available which I briefly describe here, following 
Payne’s outline (Payne 1997). The first relative clause construction is a prenominal relative clause that 
may be participial or finite and that is externally headed, as illustrated in examples (175) and (176).  
(175) [kùl-ø bhay-aa-z-èel] zòṛ     
 bead-PL sit-CAUS-PASS-ADS.M clothes.M     
   ‘Clothes that are trimmed with beads’ or ‘clothes trimmed with beads’ (field notes) 
The relative clause is participial and precedes the head of the clause. This kind of relative clause might 
also be analyzed as an adjective phrase whereas the next example (176) can only be interpreted as a 
relative clause construction. 
(176) khẽ ã  ̃ ́ pií [ṣã  ̃ ́ hàt-i e-ént-ø] maasmá 
 then 3PL.PROX over.there 3PL.DEM hand-DAT come-PRS.M-PL.M child.PL  
 
 dhaý-ɡal ṣás khíŋ nika-íthe    
 grab-CVB 3SG.DEM.OBL side come.out-PRS.PFV.PL.M    
   ‘So they grabbed the children who were within reach over there and came out this side’ (The 
avalanche #76) 
The verb of this prenominal relative clause is finite. With this relativizing strategy neither relativizer nor 
relative pronoun are used, as the above examples show.  
The second relativizing strategy that is available is again a prenominal construction. This  
prenominal finite relative clause contains as relativizer the marker če and the relative pronoun kãã ́
‘who’, which refers to the head noun, as can be seen in example (177). Here and in the following 
examples, the relative clause is left-dislocated.  
(177) hãã [só ɡàaḍii-ø maz če kãã ́ ãã̀s-ø] sã  ̃ ́
 and 3SG.DIST car-OBL in COMP who be.PST.M-PL.M 3PL.DIST  
 
 dùu màaṣ-oon ék màaṣ rùuɣ muts-íthu 
 two man-ABL.PL one man well become.free-PRS.PFV.SG.M 
   ‘And one of the two men who were in the car got away unhurt’ (A car accident #56) 
The head of the relative clause is the noun phrase “one of the two men”; its co-referent within the 
relative clause is the question word and relative pronoun kãã ́‘who’. Here the marker če that sets off the 
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clause in square brackets as relative clause is not clause-initial as it is in complement clauses but clause-
internal, preceding relative pronoun and copula of the relative clause. The position of the relativized 
noun phrase within the relative clause is that as a subject hence the zero case-marked relative pronoun 
kãã ́‘who’. In the next example (178) the relative pronoun is marked for ergative case. 
(178) tèe zãã̀ baá-ø man [qoràan šarìip če kẽẽ̀ 
 then 1PL.POSS.M house.M-OBL in quran noble COMP who.ERG  
 
 paṛ-áthe] ṣás màaṣ-i bé man-àant-ø ... 
 read-PRS.PFV 3SG.DEM.OBL man-DAT 1PL.EXCL say-PRS.M-PL.M  
   ‘Then we say to that man in our house who has read the Quran, “…”’(Traditional treatments 
#96) 
In example (179), the relativized noun phrase in the relative clause is a possessor. Again, both če 
and a relative pronoun are used; the relative pronoun is marked for genitive case. 
(179) khẽ  tèe [só ḍòol če kas  ̃ĩ̀ thú] só 
 DEVM then 3SG.DIST field COMP who.POSS be.PRS.SG.M 3SG.DIST  
 
 maalík man-àant če amã  ̃ ́ khá  
 owner say-PRS.M COMP REFL eat.IMP.2SG  
   ‘Then the owner to whom the field belongs says “You eat!”’ (How to cook maize #26) 
In this example the marker če occurs twice: first as relativizer and then as complementizer introducing a 
speech complement. In all three examples of such prenominal relative clauses with če, we have seen 
that če is not clause-initial but clause-internal, preceding the relative pronoun and verb/copula and 
following an object or adjunct phrase. 
A third relativizing strategy is that of a postnominal finite relative clause. Within this construction, 
head noun and relative clause are always left-dislocated; in the main clause the head noun is referred to 
by a pronoun or a full noun phrase. In such postnominal clauses the relativized NP always takes the 
subject position in the relative clause, therefore the relative pronoun kãã ́‘who’ may be omitted as there 
is no need for case marking. The following example (180) shows a relative clause marked by če  and 
kãã ́‘who’. 
(180) [ɡharimaáṣ če kãã ́ heleék thúl-i thí] tás 




 ɡharimaaṣ-ãã̀ kira bé tás paxál de-ént-ø  
 woman-GEN.M to 1PL.EXCL 3SG.DIST.DOM a.local.medicine give-PRS.M-PL.M  
   ‘To the woman who is a bit plump we give pakhal (name of a local medicine)’ [lit.: ‘The 
woman who is a bit plump, to that woman we give pakhal’] (Conception, birth #468) 
Both head and relative clause are left-dislocated; in the following main clause the head noun is again 
referred to by the full noun phrase “to that woman”, the indirect object of the main clause. The 
relativized noun within the relative clause “the woman” takes subject position. 
The majority of Indus Kohistani postnominal relative clauses are “empty” or seemingly 
superfluous relative clauses such as shown in example (181).  
(181) khẽ [ṣã  ̃ ́ màaṣ-ø če kãã ́ ãã̀s-ø] ã  ̃ ́
 DEVM 3PL.DEM man-PL COMP who be.PST.M-PL.M 3PL.PROX 
 
 zãã̀ saká ãã̀s-ø     
 1PL.POSS.M relatives be.PST.M-PL.M     
   ‘As for these people, they were our relatives’ [lit.: ‘These people who were, they were our 
relatives’] (Avalanche story #6) 
Here, the pronoun ã  ̃ ́ ‘they’ in the main clause refers to the left-dislocated head of the relative 
clause.  
Example (182) contains a similar ‘empty’ relative clause. 
(182) khẽ [só ék ɡharĩ  ̃ ́ na če ãã̀s] nií=aa 
 DEVM 3SG.DIST one wife.OBL from COMP be.PST.M NEG=Q  
 
 tas  ̃ĩ̀ kira tsìinõõ khasàr khasàr kar-ãã̀s-ø 
 3SG.DIST.POSS to lovinɡly baldie baldie do-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M 
   ‘As for him, (son) of the one wife (of two co-wives), (they) lovingly called him “baldie”’ [lit.: 
‘He of the one wife who was, (they) lovingly called him “baldie”’] (G. story 1 #4) 
Note that in this example, the head of the relative clause só ‘he’ and the referring pronoun tas  ̃ĩ̀ kira ‘to 
him’ in the main clause fulfill two different grammatical roles: the former is a subject whereas the latter 
is an indirect object. The left-dislocated head plus relative clause are not really part of the main clause. 
This kind of relative clause cannot be translated literally without sounding odd. It does not contain 
information but gives thematic prominence to the head noun. Such “empty” relative clauses are used to 
reactivate a participant in a discourse. They are also found in other languages of the Indian 
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subcontinent. In colloquial Urdu one can often hear the phrase jo hai ‘that/who is’ following the 
mention of a name or entity. Gojri, another Indo-Aryan language, has the same construction (Fast 
2008:24). It seems that this particular type of left-dislocated relative clause is used as a topic 
construction whose function is to “allow the speaker to activate a referent without including it into the 
scope of assertion (or another illocutionary operator) i.e. to separate reference to an entity from the act 
of assertion” (Maslova and Bernini 2006:69).  
On the whole, relative clauses are not very common in Indus Kohistani. The most frequently used 
ones are the “empty” relative clauses, followed by the prenominal sentential and participial 
constructions. To summarize, the operator če is used to mark the former two of these three types. Often 
we also find the question word kãã ́‘who’ as a relative pronoun; it is obligatory where the relativized 
noun phrase takes a position within the relative clause other than subject. 
5.2.3.2 Characteristics of relative clauses marked by če 
As we have seen above, there are several relativizing strategies available in Indus Kohistani, among 
them the prenominal strategy that uses neither relativizer nor relative pronoun. At this point I assume 
that this was the default strategy before the adoption of the marker če into the Indus Kohistani lexicon. 
In Gilgiti Shina, the neighboring language to the North, this strategy is the only one up to today. Not 
incidentially, Gilgiti Shina does not have a clause-initial complementizer either; that is, the Persian ki 
did not make it into the Gilgiti Shina lexicon as it did in other languages of the area. Both languages 
show SOV order which typologically goes along with prenominal relative clauses as well as clause-final 
complementizers. So I think that, as the clause-initial marker če is on its way to gradually replace the 
clause-final marker karee in complements and purpose and reason clauses, a process which entails the 
change from embedded to right-extraposed (dependend) clauses, in the same way the marker če might 
encroach on Indus Kohistani relative clause constructions so that we have now a mixture of prenominal 
and left-dislocated relative clauses.  
As far as I can see, all Indus Kohistani relative clauses are restrictive; they are used to identify the 
entity represented by the head noun. What is interesting is that all the relative clauses marked by če do 
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not only identify someone or something but at the same time function as a reminder to the hearer that 
the entity in question has been mentioned previously, or that it is shared knowledge. This is especially 
true of the seemingly empty relative clauses such as examples (181) and (182), shown above. One could 
translate such clauses with “X [head noun] that I mentioned earlier” or “recall X” or “X, you know” or 
“as for X”. The other relative clauses marked by če that are not “empty” work in the same way: the 
information given in the relative clause helps the hearer to identify and reactivate the entity represented 
by the head noun.  
5.2.4 če in clauses that answer a question asked in the main clause 
This kind of construction is very common in Indus Kohistani discourse. The main clause has the 
form of a question albeit without the intonation of a question; its function is to arouse interest in an 
answer or, in other words, to offer information which is then given in the subsequent subordinate clause 
introduced by če. Examples (183) and (184) below illustrate such question-answer clauses.  
(183) khẽ só ɡí kàam kar-ãã̀s duruzɡár [če só 
 DEVM 3SG.DIST what work do-PST.IPFV.M carpenter COMP 3SG.DIST  
 
 hoól sand-ãã̀s]     
 plough make-PST.IPFV.M     
   ‘As for his, the carpenter’s occupation: he used to make ploughs’ [lit.: ‘What work did he use to 
do, the carpenter, he used to make ploughs’] (Tribes and their occupations #12) 
In the next example, the answer to the question posed in the main clause starts in the subordinate clause 
and goes over the following couple of utterances. 
(184) khẽ as  ̃ĩ̀ xoraák ɡulãã ́ be-ént [če  muúṭyõ 
 DEVM 3SG.PROX.POSS food where.from go-PRS.M COMP before  
 
 miiɡeé pát nií ãĩ̀s]    
 1SG.DAT knowledge NEG be.PST.F    
   ‘As for where the food (for the fetus) comes from: I did not know it before’(But you have said 
that there is the companion [placenta]; from the companion through the umbilical cord into 
the child’s tummy the food is passing) (Conception, birth #43) 




(185) khẽ duzúq ɡí thí [če anɡàar]  
 DEVM hell what be.PRS.F COMP fire  
   ‘What is hell: fire’ or ‘As for what hell is, (it is) fire’ (Death, burial #77) 
The overwhelming majority of these question-answer constructions are found in texts describing people, 
events, procedures or things in general, as the above instances illustrate. In (183), the speaker is talking 
about carpenters in general; in (184) about any fetus, not a specific one. Example (186) below is taken 
from the narrative of a mud slide and is one of the few instances where this construction is used to 
describe a specific event. 
(186) zànd kãã ́ nika-íthe máz-an [če dùu tsinṭoó 
 alive who come.out-PRS.PFV.M.PL in-ABL COMP two boys  
 
 lák~lak hãã dùu ṣã  ̃ ́ ɡharimaaṣ-á]   
 small~REDUPL and two 3PL.DEM woman-PL   
   ‘As for those that came out alive: two boys, small ones, and these two women’ (The torrent 
#82) 
Here, too, it is just noun phrases that constitute the answer and that are marked by če.  
5.2.5 če in clauses that describe a quality mentioned in the main clause 
In this section, I present another often used construction of main and dependent clause where the 
latter is introduced by če. In a way, this construction is similar to the “question - answer” ones we have 
seen in the previous section. As Baart notes in his description of such clauses in Kalam Kohistani, they 
are used “to describe a quality that is mentioned in the main clause. This can be a property of a person 
or a thing, but also a property of a situation or event” (Baart 1999:146) . But instead of a question word, 
a demonstrative in the main clause points towards the description given in the dependent clause. Let me 
give an example (187). 
(187) kàlkal ṣṹ húm ho-ínt nhaal-á [če kãã ́ xálak 
 sometimes 3SG.DEM also become-PRS.F look-IMP.2S COMP some people  
 
 abãã̀ baí cẹ-ént naìi]   
 father.GEN.M house.DAT send-PRS.M. NEG   
   ‘Sometimes this, too, happens, look, that some people do not send (the bride) to her father’s 
house’ (A mother’s advice #49) 
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The demonstrative ṣṹ ‘this’ functions as a dummy subject of the main clause, standing in for the 
explanation that is given in the subordinate clause introduced by če . Technically, the second clause is a 
subject complement, that is, it replaces the subject of the main clause. However, the subordinate clause 
is not always a complement (an argument of the main clause) as example (188) shows. 
(188) waleé ṣás wáxt-a bài [če tsõṍ kãã ́
 but 3SG.DEM.OBL time-OBL go.IMP.2PL COMP 2PL.DOM any  
 
 meešwaál páš-ee naíi]     
 man see-SBJV.3SG NEG     
   ‘But go at such a time when no man can see you’ ((Graves, graveyard #59)  
The main clause is intransitive, the subordinate clause contains a specification of “such a time”, itself an 
adjunct in the main clause. 
In example (189) the speaker explains the nature of one particular sin. 
(189) ék  ɡunàa ṣeé thú [če tú baazaar-ií bèe 
 one sin such be.PRS.M.SG COMP 2SG market-DAT go.SBJV.2SG  
 
 ṣiṣlúṭiõ hòo]     
 bareheaded become.SBJV.2Sɡ     
   ‘One sin is this, that you go to the market with your head uncovered’ (About sin #6) 
Another common use of this construction is illustrated in (190). 
(190) xawànd-ãã kira ṣṹ pháraz thú [če niwàaz-ãĩ 
 husband-GEN.M to 3SG.DEM duty be.PRS.M.SG COMP ritual.prayer-GEN.F  
 
 baari-á man ɡhariãã̀ kira  baali-á mán-ee]  
 turn-OBL in wife.GEN.M to word-PL say-SBJV.3SG  
   ‘The husband has this duty that he talk to his wife (teach her) about the ritual prayer’ (Men’s 
duties #124) 
(191) sã  ̃ ́ khuṣi-á atĩ  ̃ ́ hõ̀ĩs-ø [če ɡáz]  
 3PL.DIST sleeve-PL this.much.F become.PST.IPFV.F-PL.F COMP yard  
   ‘Those sleeves used to be this [deictic] wide: one yard’ (Music, singing, dancing #86) 
In the last example of this section, the clause introduced by če is a reported direct speech. 
(192) as  ̃ĩ̀ xawànd tal háq sand-z-àant [če tús 




 aspatàal-i har-ìi]      
 hospital-DAT take-IMP.2PL      
   ‘It is her claim on the husband [and on the son] that they take her to the hospital’ [lit.: ‘… that 
“you take (me) to the hospital”’] (Men’s duties #28) 
In this section I have shown dependent clauses introduced by če that describe a quality mentioned 
in the main clause, a construction that Indus Kohistani speakers use very frequently. 
5.2.6 če in conditional clauses 
Conditional mood in Indus Kohistani conditional clauses is indicated by the verb suffix -uú that is 
added to the perfective verb stem, as in (ẽẽ̀) kar-il-uú ‘if (he) does’. Another way to signal a condition - 
consequence relationship between two clauses is the use of the subordinator khẽ , as seen in example 
(193) (the protasis clause is in square brackets). 
(193) khẽ neék man-àant če [tú xúš thú khẽ] 
 DEVM landowner say-PRS.M COMP 2SG pleased be-PRS.M.SG SUB  
 
 ɡatá m  ̃ĩ̀ ḍòol kam-á   
 again 1SG.POSS field cultivate-IMP.2SG   
   ‘Then the landowner says, “Cultivate (my) field again if you like”’ (About deqani #87) 
The conditional clause construction in this example is a speech complement introduced by če. 
There are a few instances in my data where the marker če occurs in a conditional clause. Examples 
(194) and (195) illustrate this use. 
(194) pàat alùuz xaandàan man-àant [če kaṇaý má tèe 
 next other family say-PRS.M COMP enmity 1SG then  
 
 xátam kar-áṣat ás kaṇaý [če mẽẽ̀ t  ̃ĩ̀ 
 stop do-FUT.M 3SG.PROX.DOM enmity COMP 1SG.ERG 2SG.POSS  
 
 màaṣ maar-il-uú]]     
 man kill-PFV1-COND     
   ‘Next the other family says, “I will end the enmity only then, if/when I have killed a man of 
yours”’ (A way to end a feud #3) 
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Here, too, the conditional construction is a speech complement introduced by če. Therefore če occurs 
twice: first as a complementizer, then it introduces the protasis. Note that the clause containing the 
condition in this as well as in the next example is marked as such by the verbal conditional suffix -uú. 
(195) khẽ sẽẽ̀ man-áthe [če pičàa hãã ɡòli má 
 DEVM 3SG.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV COMP uncle and bread 1SG  
 
 tiiɡeé tèe di-ínt [če tẽẽ̀ qasá kar-il-uú]] 
 2SG.DAT then give-PRS.F COMP 2SG.ERG story do-PFV1-COND 
   ‘Then she said, “Uncle, I will give you a meal on the condition that you first tell a story”’ 
(Prince and fairy #115) 
I conclude that, as in these examples, the marker če is present in addition to the conditional verb form, it 
does not indicate conditional mood as such, it must have some additional function about which at this 
point I am not able to comment. 
5.2.7 Other uses of the marker če 
There are a number of other constructions introduced by če that do not fit in either of the above 
described categories. Here I want to present some examples in order to give a more complete picture of 
the uses of če. As these examples have to be seen in the wider context I use the translation only. 
Example (196) is from a text about people’s clothes. 
(196) (a) ‘Men wear socks.  
 (b) To them we say muuzìi, muuzìi.  
 (c) You were sayinɡ that you have seen (men) wearinɡ socks made of leather.  
 (d) če  to them we say muuzìi.  
 (e) Only men wear the gaiters made of leather’  
   (About clothes #29-32) 
In this example clause (196c) introduced by če seems to be a repetition of clause (196b). 
In example (197), če introduces an independent clause19. 
                                              
19 The decision to term such clauses as independent is based on the intonation of the preceding clause and length 
of pause between the two clauses. 
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(197) (a) ‘On the shirt front we sew buttons. 
 (b) These (buttons) are there in all colors and shapes, up in our country; 
we used to fix them (on the shirt front) in this way, fixing (a lot of them). 
 (c) Now the Maulvi Sahib is displeased, he does not allow to wear them. 
 (d) It is a bad thing (to wear clothes adorned in this way); 
it (wearing them) will be punished in the grave.  
 (e) če now we sew simple clothes, we sew simple clothes.’   
   (About clothes #78-82) 
Here, če might be translated as either “so” or “for this reason”. 
In the next example, če again introduces an independent clause. 
(198) (a) ‘Sometimes (the female jinns) do not leave (the patient). 
 (b) Then the patient won’t become well. 
 (c) Then what can we do? 
 (d) We sit and watch (her) and do not let her bake bread. 
 (e) And we do not allow her to go outside after sunset. 
 (f) We will sit and watch (her), če when she gets a seizure then she will be in trouble. 
 (g) There will be much trouble for the other people in the house. 
 (h) če we have to wait (with) her (for a seizure ?)’   
   (About seizures and jinns #38-41) 
In clause (199f), če seems to introduce a reason clause. In (199h), an independent clause, če might be 
translated as “for this reason”, or it might indicate a reformulation of what has been said in the 
preceding utterances.  
So far I have described and illustrated the different uses of če: as a complementizer in complements 
of utterance, perception and cognition predicates, as complementizer in complements of other 
predicates, as a marker of complements of utterance and cognition predicates but where the predicate is 
absent, as marker of purpose and reason clauses, and as marker of relative clauses. Furthermore, če can 
occur in conditional and other subordinate clauses and may introduce independent clauses.  
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5.3 Analysis of the marker če 
In this section I present an analysis of the marker če that is limited to its uses as a replacement of 
the marker karee. I leave aside the use of če as a marker of relative and conditional clauses and of other 
clauses that are neither complements nor purpose or reason clauses as this would go beyond the scope 
of this study. 
5.3.1 The marker če replaces karee 
In section  4.5.2.2 I already noted that the functions of the two markers karee and če seem to be 
overlapping a good deal. In this section I want to take a closer look at the distribution of both markers 
and offer a possible explanation for the particular distribution pattern. 
Let me recall the typical grammaticalization path of SAY verbs as quoted in section  4.4.2:  
Original form > quotation marker > complementizer > purpose-
clause linker > reason-clause linker > conditional-clause linker > 
naming marker > marker used with onomatopoeic words/ideophones 
> comparative marker > mirative marker,  
We have seen in Chapter 4 that karee is used as quotation marker, as complementizer, as purpose and 
reason clause linker, and in naming constructions. However, occurrences of karee are not distributed 
evenly along this path. In my data, the frequency of karee as a quotation marker is rather low, as is its 
occurrence as a complementizer. On the other hand, the complementizer če is used much more 
frequently; it seems to be the default marker of utterance and other complements. When looking at 
purpose and reason clauses, what I can gather from my data is that karee is the marker used more often; 
examples with če as an indicator of such clauses are scarce. As to naming constructions, only karee can 
be used as naming marker. What causes this particular distribution of karee as well as of če? Recall that 
karee is the older marker whereas če is a later borrowing, most probably from Pashto. Bashir (1996) 
offers an explanation by looking at a similar pattern of two such markers in Kalasha, another language 
of Northern Pakistan, but from a diachronic perspective. Kalasha has two co-existing complementizers, 
the older SAY complementizer ɡhõi and the more recently borrowed ki  (Persian via Khowar/Urdu) 
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(1996:206). Bashir notes that where predicates can take either of the two markers, complements with the 
SAY complementizer ɡhõi are semantically more marked, emphasizing “specific intentionality and 
emotional commitment”, whereas complements with ki are neutral in this aspect (1996:207-8). 
Furthermore, ki seems to follow the SAY verb grammaticalization path in that ki starts to appear in 
purpose and reason clauses. Bashir concludes by saying that the more recent marker ki seems to become 
the default complementizer with unmarked predicates of saying, that is, it is mostly found on the left 
end of the quotative - complementizer - purpose/reason clause marker path, but at the same time follows 
this path, as its occasional use in purpose/reason clauses shows. On the other hand, ɡhõi  is found more 
frequently towards the right end of this path.  
In Indus Kohistani, the picture is somewhat similar, as I have pointed out above. On the left end, 
most utterance predicates take če as complementizer. Towards the right end, that is, in purpose and 
reason clauses, both markers may be used but karee  is more frequent. As in Kalasha, clauses marked 
with karee are more marked in that intentionality is emphasized, karee being used especially in 
complements/clauses where thoughts and intentions (metarepresentations of thoughts) are expressed. 
That is, in Bashirs words, we have a “bottom-truncated” hierarchy (1996:208) where complements of 
utterance predicates constitute the bottom, with če as the default marker, and purpose/reason clauses, 
naming constructions etc. are found on the higher end, with karee as the default marker.  
The fact that če seems to follow karee on this particular path has implications for its analysis which 
will be the topic of the following section. 
5.3.2 če: a metarepresentation marker where it replaces karee 
In  Chapter 4 I have analyzed karee as a marker of metarepresentations of (self-)attributed speech 
and thought. In this section I propose the same analysis for the complementizer če where it follows in 
the “footsteps” of the marker karee, that is: as a complementizer with predicates of utterance, 
perception and cognition (section  5.2.1.1), as a complementizer with other predicates (section  5.2.1.2), 
in cases where če is the only indicator of reported speech or thought (section  5.2.1.3), and as a marker 
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of purpose and reason clauses (section  5.2.2). Such an analysis of a complementizer has been suggested 
by Blass for the English complementizer that (Blass 1990:123).  
The following examples from these sections will illustrate my claim. Example (135), repeated here, 
shows če as complementizer of a speech clause. 
(135) sã  ̃ ́ baačãã̀ nookar-õõ̀ man-áɡil [če tús ɡulú 
 3PL.DIST king.GEN.M servant-PL.ERG say-PVF.2 COMP 2PL where.to  
 
 be-ént-ø]       
 go-PRS.M-PL.M       
   ‘The king’s servants said, “Where do you go to?”’ (Prince and fairy #23) 
Here če indicates that what follows is the metarepresentation of someone’s speech. As the utterance 
predicate man-  ‘say’ is also present in this construction, this is a case of double marking. 
Example (154), repeated here, contains a predicate taking complements other than of utterance, 
perception and cognition, namely the verb koošìiš kar- ‘try to’. 
(154) bazií koošìiš kar-àant-ø [če ṣás icḥáni-ø tal 
 go.CVB attempt do-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 3SG.DEM.OBL bear.F.OBL on  
 
 ɡuzàar kar-íž ás  hinḍa-áiž]    
 shot/bullet do-SBJV.1PL 3SG.PROX.DOM drive.away-SBJV.1PL    
   ‘Having gone (they) try to shoot at the female bear, to drive her away’ [lit.: ‘Having gone (they) 
try that “let’s shoot at the female bear, let’s drive her away”’] (Hunting in Kohistan #97) 
Here again, če indicates that the clause introduced by it is a metarepresentation - in this case it may be 
of a speech or of a thought. Note that the complement clause has direct speech form; this is another hint 
that the complement does not contain the proposition of a state of affairs but the metarepresentation of 
someone’s speech or thought. As we have seen in section  5.2.1.2, the predicate koošìiš kar-  ‘try to’ 
does not always take a sentential complement introduced by če, see example (155), repeated here. 
(155) phòož-e [ás dhay-  ̃ĩ̀] koošìiš kìir   
 army-ERG 3SG.PROX.DOM ɡrab-NMLZ.GEN.F attempt.F do.PFV1   
   ‘The army attempted to get hold of him’ [lit.: ‘The army did the attempt of getting hold of him’] 
(Q.’s story #28) 
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This example is simply the proposition of a state of affairs, someone tried to do something, as seen from 
an outsider perspective. Example (154) on the other hand describes a case of trying to do something 
from an insider perspective, as an intention or thought.  
I suspect that in such cases, where there are several complementation strategies possible for one 
particular predicate, the sentential complement option with če is chosen when the speaker wants to 
emphasize the intentional aspect of the notion that the predicate is expressing. In such a case, the 
complement will contain the metarepresentation of a thought in the widest sense. With other 
complementation options such as shown in (155), the content of the complement is presented as the 
proposition of a state of affairs.  
Example (162), repeated here, is an instance of an obvious speech complement introduced by če 
but without the respective speech predicate. 
(162) tèe bé ḍaakṭar-ií paša-ánt-ø [če tú nhaal-á ta 
 then 1PL.EXCL doctor-DAT show-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 2SG look-IMP.2SG DM  
 
 ṹ ɡí thú]    
 3SG.PROX what be.PRS.M.SG    
   ‘Then we show (the boil) to the doctor (and ask him) to look at it and find out what kind it is’ 
[lit.: ‘Then we show (the boil) to the doctor COMP “Look at it, what is it?”’] (About boils 
#25) 
Here both the presence of the complementizer če and the direct speech form of the complement help the 
hearer to interpret the complement as the metarepresentation of an attributed speech.  
If my analysis is correct then the presence of če on its own, in a complement where the direct 
speech form is not obvious, will indicate the metarepresentation of a speech or thought. In the following 
example (199), the clause introduced by če cannot be recognized as direct speech as such. 
(199a) khẽ xálak ɡatá xušàal huú khàn tal bhay-ãã̀s-e 
 DEVM people again happy become.CVB mountain.OBL on sit-PST.IPFV.M-PL.M  
 
 [če h  ̃ĩ̀ ɣaráz atyúk hĩṹ de-ént naíi. 




(199b) khàn tal bhay-íž]     
 mountain.OBL on sit-SBJV.1PL     
    ‘So the people were happy (because there had not been much snow in the past years) and were 
staying up the mountain, saying, “nowadays there is not much snow. Let’s stay up the 
mountain”’ [lit.: ‘… were staying up the mountain COMP nowadays there is not much snow 
Let’s stay up the mountain’] (Avalanche story #9-10) 
Note that in clause (199a) there are no pronouns that would indicate a direct speech form, neither 
does the verb form give any indication. It is the presence of the complementizer če that marks this 
clause as the metarepresentation of someone’s speech or thought. Only in the following sentence (199b) 
the verb form bhayíž ‘let’s stay’ is an additional indicator of the complement being a reported speech. 
In such a case, če is not just an indicator of a metarepresentation, it also constrains the hearer to 
construct a higher-level explicature such as “the people say/think that nowadays, there is not much 
snow”. 
Purpose and reason clauses marked by če are similar in that če may be the only hint that the clause 
introduced by it contains someone’s reported thought/intention. Example (169), repeated here, is a 
purpose clause. 
(169) hãã má boolãã ́ asií waat bazíthi baalṭìi-ø waat 
 and 1SG from.up 3SG.PROX.OBL for ɡo.PRS.PFV.F pail-OBL for  
 
 bazíthi [če ɡaá doóm]   
 ɡo.PRS.PFV.F COMP cow milk.SBJV.1SG   
   ‘…and I went from up there for it, I went for the pail in order to milk the cow’ (The evil eye 
#141) 
Here the marker če as well as the verb form used in the subordinate clause (subjunctive 1SG) help to 
identify it as a reported thought/intention.  
In this section I have proposed to analyze the complementizer če as a marker of 
metarepresentations of (self-) reported speech and thoughts. These include complements of utterance, 
perception and cognition predicates, other sentential complements of predicates such as try and wait, 
complements where the respective predicate is missing, and purpose and reason clauses. 
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5.3.3 Other uses of  če 
In the previous section, I have proposed an analysis of the marker če where it is used as a 
complementizer and marker of purpose and reason clauses. But what about če as marker in relative 
clauses, in conditional clauses, and in clauses such as the ones described in section  5.2.7? At this point, 
I am not able to offer an analysis that would include all the uses described above. Such an undertaking 
would go beyond the limits of this thesis.  
It seems that on the Indian subcontinent and beyond, če is not the only complementizer with such 
diverse uses. The similarly multifunctional Persian subordinator/complementizer ki (a “relative” of če?), 
has made its way into many languages of the area, such as Urdu, Kalasha and Khowar, as described by 
Bashir (1996), Balochi (Farrell 2005), Palula (Liljegren 2008), and also Turkic among other languages. I 
know of one study that analyzes Balochi kɪ as an interpretive use marker (Farrell 2005). However, it 
seems to me that “indicator of interpretive use/metarepresentation” may be just one aspect of its 
meaning and does not cover all its uses. As already pointed out, such an analysis that includes all 
functions of če would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
5.4 Summary: the marker če 
In this chapter I have looked at the Indus Kohistani multifunctional marker če, as far as its uses 
overlap with those of the marker karee: as quotative and complementizer, and as marker of purpose and 
reason clauses. I have also briefly illustrated its further uses. The clause linker če has most probably 
been borrowed from Pashto and seems to be on its way to gradually replace the older marker karee. 
Whereas karee is a clause-final marker, če is positioned clause-initial; clauses introduced by it are 
postposed, that is, they follow the clause-final verb of the main clause, with the exception of relative 
clauses. 
The marker če is most frequently used in complements; it is the default complementizer in 
complements of speech predicates. It also occurs in complements of perception and cognition predicates 
and of others that take sentential complements. It marks complements where the complement-taking 
utterance or “think” predicate has been omitted. It functions as clause linker in purpose and reason 
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clause constructions. Further uses that have not been treated in-depth in this chapter include marking 
relative clauses, conditional clauses, adverbial clauses, and introduction of independent clauses. 
I have then compared karee and če in their distribution and have followed Bashir (1996) in 
suggesting that the more recently acquired complementizer če is on the way to replace the older marker 
karee. This would account for če being the default complementizer in complements of utterance 
predicates, whereas karee  rarely occurs in such complements. On the other end of the 
grammaticalization path  of quotative > complementizer > purpose/reason clause marker, it is karee 
that is used more frequently, with a few occurences of če.  
Like karee, the marker če indicates metarepresentation in those instances where it is used like 
karee. However, this can be only part of its meaning; further research will be needed to find the 






Chapter 6  
The Indus Kohistani marker loo 
In this chapter, I introduce and describe the Indus Kohistani discourse marker loo, the last of the 
four metarepresentation markers investigated in this study. Like lee, karee, and če, this marker has so 
far not been described in the literature. However, Buddruss (1959:21) in his notes on texts of Kanyawali 
(see section  1.4)  mentions verb forms ending in -lō ̃, for instance harálō ̃ which he translates as ‘er 
möge nehmen’ [‘he may take’20], at the same time noting that he is not sure as to how to classify these 
forms.  
In the following sections I give a definition and describe the syntactic properties of loo. Then I 
illustrate its two main uses in detail: loo as marker of utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to 
say to a third person, or, in other words, loo as marker of desirable utterances, and secondly, loo as 
marker of third person imperative utterances. In the last section I show that Relevance Theory allows 
for an analysis that can account for all uses: both, utterances that a speaker wishes her addressee to 
convey to a third person, and directives aimed at a third person (third person imperative) are 
metarepresentations of desirable utterances; it follows that loo is best analyzed as a procedural indicator 
of such metarepresentations of desirable utterances. 
6.1 Definition of loo 
The Indus Kohistani marker loo is a discourse marker with a seemingly twofold function. First, it 
marks utterances that a person A wants her addressee B to reproduce to a person C. An English example 
illustrates this use. Person A tells person B, “Tell person C that tonight I will be at home after five 
                                              
20 Translation into English by the author. 
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o’clock”. The part in bold of person A’s utterance is the part that she wants to be reproduced; and this is 
the part that is marked by loo in Indus Kohistani. 
In its second function, loo seems to indicate third person imperative. In such a clause marked by 
loo, the subject is a third person singular or plural; the verb has a second-person singular or second-
person plural imperative suffix and is followed by loo. The meaning conveyed by such a construction is 
“he/they should do s.th.” (command), or “she/they are allowed to/may do s.th.” (permission/agreement).  
As in both cases the clause that is marked by loo is part of or constitutes an utterance, loo can be 
described as a speech marker. In both uses a person A wants a person C to do or know something. But 
whereas in the former kind of utterance, a person B is asked to reproduce person A’s utterance to person 
C, in the latter kind, person A’s uttered command or permission does not necessarily require a person B 
as a conveyor. I will show in section 6.4 that both cases are instances of metarepresentations of a 
desirable utterance. Throughout this chapter, loo will be glossed as “desirable utterance marker” or 
DUM. 
6.2 Syntactic properties of loo 
Like the “reported” speech marker lee, loo is an enclitic that follows the final element of a clause 
which usually is the verb. loo may precede or follow other clause-final clitics such as negation marker 
and question marker. Phonologically too, loo behaves like the clitic lee; it is dependent on its host and 
forms a phonological unit with it. loo has no accent of its own; neither does the accent of a host shift to 
the clitic. If the host word ends in a short vowel then this short vowel may be lengthened (see also lee, 
section  3.3), for instance if the host is a verb with a second person singular imperative ending, the 
imperative suffix -á may be lengthened to -áa. The accent remains on the first mora of the now long 
vowel so that phonetically, the lengthened vowel seems to have a falling accent. 
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6.3 Uses of the marker loo 
In this section I describe and illustrate the two above mentioned uses of loo, i.e. loo marking 
clauses that a speaker wants her addressee to convey to a third person, and loo marking third person 
imperative clauses. 
6.3.1 loo as marker of utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to convey to a 
third person 
In Indus Kohistani discourse, loo marks such utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to pass 
on to a third person. In this study I use the terms “speaker A”, “addressee B”, and “addressee, or 
recipient C” to describe such a situation. In utterances of this kind, speaker A may or may not explicitly 
ask her addressee B to pass on her utterance to recipient C. In the following section I look at instances 
where the speaker makes explicit her wish to convey her utterance to recipient C. Such clauses marked 
by loo will be in square brackets. 
6.3.1.1 loo marking a speech complement 
To repeat, a speaker A marks such an utterance with loo that she wants addressee B to convey to a 
person C who may or may not be present. Often such utterances are of the form “tell person C that 
…loo”, that is: the utterance is the complement of a matrix clause with a speech verb in imperative 
form. Example (200) illustrates this use. A girl had been sent by her mother to find out if my language 
consultant was at home; and upon finding her there she got the following answer. 
(200) tú bá tãĩ̀ yàa-i man-á če [má baá-ø 
 2SG go.IMP.2SG REFL.POSS.F mother-DAT say-IMP.2SG COMP 1SG house-OBL  
 
 man thí=loo]       
 in be.PRS.F=DUM       
   ‘Go; tell your mother that I am at home’ (conversation 20.2.2012) 
My language consultant told me that the addressee of the utterance in (200) would then tell her mother 
as follows in (201): 
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(201) koó ṣeé man-áthe če [má  baá thí karee] 
 older.sister.ERG like.this say-PRS.PFV COMP 1SG house be.PRS.F MRM 
   ‘The older sister has said that she is at home’ [lit.: ‘The older sister has said, “I am at home”’] 
(elicited) 
Note that in both examples, the utterance in the complement clause has direct speech form, as Indus 
Kohistani does not use at all indirect speech. The marker karee in (201) indicates reported speech (see 
also section  4.3.1). 
The context in which the next example (202) was uttered was such that person A, the speaker, her 
addressee B, and the addressee C were present. The mother of a toddler ɡave her son a cookie for me 
and told him what to say. 
(202) pií baažìi dé man-á [tú khá=loo]   
 over.there older.sister.DAT give.IMP.2SG say-IMP.2SG 2SG eat.IMP.2SG=DUM   
   ‘Go over and give (the cookie) to Bajii (Older Sister); tell her to eat it’ [lit.: ‘Tell her, “Eat!”’] 
(conversation 4.6.2012) 
And a while later, when the little boy was scribbling with a pen on a piece of paper, the mother uttered 
the following (202): 
(203) beaatée-ø man-á [má lik-àant=loo]     
 Beate.DAT say-IMP.2SG 1SG write-PRS.M=DUM     
   ‘Tell Beate, “I am writing”’ (conversation 4.6.2012) 
The first utterance to be reproduced in (202) contains a command, the second one in (202) the 
description of a state of affairs. In all three examples the clause that the speaker wishes to be reproduced 
is the complement of a speech verb, and addressee B is explicitly told to whom to convey the utterance. 
6.3.1.2 loo marking clauses that are not overt speech complements 
Utterances that a speaker wishes to be reproduced by the addressee do not have to be explicitly 
framed by a complement-taking predicate such as a speech verb. The next example (204) is again taken 
from a conversation between mother and her toddler son. I had greeted the little one and asked how he 
was. The mother then said to him: 
(204) [rùuɣ thú=loo]. t  ̃ĩ̀ ɡí hàal thí   
 well be.PRS.M.SG=DUM 2SG.POSS what condition be.PRS.F   




Here the mother is uttering just what she wants her son to say. The command “say/tell her” is not 
expressed by a speech verb; it is indicated by the presence of the marker loo alone. Note that in this 
utterance, loo follows only the first of the two clauses that the mother wants her son to reproduce, 
however, from the context it is clear that she wants him to utter both clauses. 
The next example was uttered while I was working with my language consultant. In another room 
of the house, a TV was blaring away. My language consultant called one of her daughters-in-law who 
was in sight and told her (205): 
(205) oó D khún kãã ́ thú    
 VOC name.F inside who be.PRS.M.SG     
 
 [ṣás awàaz kám kar-ìi=loo]     
 3SG.DEM.DOM voice less do-IMP.2PL=DUM     
   ‘Oh D, who is inside (the room with the TV)? Tell them to turn down the volume’ [lit.: ‘Oh D, 
who is inside (the room with the TV)? Turn down the volume loo’] (conversation 
29.10.2012) 
The information that her daughter-in-law should tell to whoever was watching TV is conveyed by the 
marker loo alone, without making the command to tell explicit.  
A final example of this use is shown in (206). A had told one of the children to return to G a few 
children’s clothes that G had lent for her daughter’s children who were visiting. She said: 
(206) [ã  ̃ ́ ṣa-áthe naíi=loo]      
 3PL.PROX wear-PRS.PFV NEG=DUM      
   ‘Tell G that (the children) have not worn them (=the clothes are clean)’ (conversation 
24.8.2012) 
Here again, the request to tell has not been made explicit by the use of a speech verb. The presence of 
loo alone is sufficient to indicate the speaker’s wish “tell G that …”. 
6.3.1.3 The marker loo in questions 
A speaker may ask her addressee to convey to a third person any kind of utterance: commands, 
descriptions of states of affairs, questions. Following is an example where a mother tells her son to ask 
me a question (207). 
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(207) beaatée-ø man-á [oó beaatée bi-ínt=aa=loo]    
 Beate.DAT say-IMP.2SG VOC Beate go-PRS.F=Q=DUM    
    ‘Say to Beate, “Beate, are you leaving?”’ (conversation 25.6.2012) 
In this utterance, the marker loo is following the question marker aa, itself an enclitic that follows the 
clause-final element. This indicates that the question marker is within the scope of the marker loo, in 
other words, the utterance to be reproduced is a question.  
Example (208) is another illustration of the use of loo in questions. It is an exchange between 
speakers A and C that happened when  someone outside was rattling the street side door of the house.  
(208a) A: maasmá thé báṣ  hoó ta C  
  child.PL be.PRS.M appearing become.IMP.2SG DM name.F  
    ‘There are children. Come, C!’ 
(208b) C: maasmá thé oó kuú    
  child.PL be.PRS.M.PL VOC older.sister    
    ‘These are children (rattling the door), Older Sister’ 
(208c) A: [ɡií kar-àant-ø=loo] alá     
  what do-PRS.M-PL.M=DUM there     
    ‘Ask them what they are doing there’ [lit.: ‘What are (you) doing loo there?’] (conversation 
4.2.2013) 
The utterance in the scope of loo is a wh-question “What are you doing?” There is no overt 
complement-taking predicate. The presence of the marker loo is enough to indicate the only possible 
interpretation of utterance (208c) namely that C should ask the children “what are you doing?” The 
adverb alá ‘here’ in this clause is following the marker loo because it is an afterthought. 
In the next example (209) below, a yes-no question, the sequence of question marker and marker 
loo is reversed; the marker loo is preceding the question marker. The context of this utterance is as 
follows: I had brought medicine for one of my language consultant’s sons. She then asked me, 
(209) [ã  ̃ ́ khaá baari-aá=loo]=aa     
 3PL.PROX eat.CVB finish.off-IMP.2SG=DUM=Q     
   ‘Should I tell him to finish them (pills/medicine)?’ [lit.: ‘Do you wish me to tell him, “Finish 
them (pills/medicine)!”’] (conversation 14.12.2012) 
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As in the previous example, loo is the only indicator that the utterance should be reproduced. But in 
contrast to example (207), the question marker is outside the scope of the marker loo; the utterance to 
be quoted is a simple command “finish them all”. What is questioned here is whether the speaker 
should reproduce this utterance or not, not the utterance itself.  
6.3.1.4 The marker loo and negation 
Like commands, descriptions of states of affairs, and questions, utterances containing a negation 
may be marked by loo. The default negation marker in Indus Kohistani is nií ‘not’, it precedes the 
clause-final verb. Example (210) shows such an utterance. 
(210) man-á če [uskẽẽ ́ nií bíž=loo]  
 say-IMP.2SG COMP now NEG go.SBJV.1PL=DUM    
 
 [rupày hùn khẽ bíž=loo]     
 rupee become.PFV1 SUB go.SBJV.1PL=DUM     
   ‘Tell (your mother), “let’s not go now, right? Let’s go when we have money”’ (conversation 
2.4.2012) 
The first utterance marked by loo contains the negated proposition “let’s not go now”.  
There is a second Indus Kohistani negation marker naíi ‘not’, used to convey more emphasis on the 
negation. This negation marker follows the verb. Example (206), repeated here, contains such a marked 
negation. 
(206) [ã  ̃ ́ ṣa-áthe naíi=loo]      
 3PL.PROX wear-PRS.PRF NEG=DUM      
   ‘Tell G. that (the children) have not worn them (=the clothes are clean)’ (conversation 
24.8.2012) 
In this example, the marker loo follows the negation marker naíi, thereby including it in its scope.  The 
utterance that the speaker wishes her addressee to convey to a third person contains a negation.  
In the next example (211), loo is preceding the negation marker. My language consultant told me 
what her son had said concerning my visiting them. 
(211) AB man-ãã̀s če tií tiš  [ṹ béetsõõ ɡee 




 uk-á=loo naíi]      
 come.up-IMP.2SG=DUM NEG      
   ‘AB was saying, concerning you, “tell her not to come to us”’ (conversation 10.9.2012) 
This utterance seems to be ambiguous in regard to what is negated, because the negation marker is 
following loo and therefore could be thought of as not being within the scope of loo. So another 
possible interpretation might be “don’t tell her to come to us”, assuming that the negation marker has 
the implied command “tell her” in its scope. However, according to my language consultant, the only 
possible interpretation is the former one “tell her not to come to us”. Why is the latter interpretation not 
possible? The next examples (212) and (213) will illustrate that only utterances that the speaker wants to 
be reproduced by the addressee can be marked by loo. Utterances that she commands not to say have to 
be marked differently as we will see in example (212). Previous to the utterance in (212), the 
addressee’s husband had left the house for work. The addressee was in need of sandals but had not 
asked her husband to bring her some from the bazaar. Her mother-in-law, the speaker, then said to her: 
(212) éqaa tú L-i man-ãĩ̀s ɡín naíi [miiɡeé tsaplia 
 oh! 2SG name.M-DAT say-PST.IPFV.F why NEG 1SG.DAT sandal.PL  
 
 aá kar]      
 bring.IMP.2SG MRM      
   ‘Oh! Why didn’t you tell L to bring you sandals?’ (conversation 18.5.2012) 
In this example, the scope of the negation marker is unambiguous: it is the speech verb man- ‘tell’ that 
is negated, not the utterance that should have been conveyed to the addressee’s husband. However, the 
speaker did not use loo; it is the marker kar (shortened form of karee, see  Chapter 4) that is employed 
here.  
The next example (213) below is a further illustration of this point. The context of the utterance is 
as follows: During one of my visits, the family of one of my language consultant’s daughters-in-law 
called and wanted to meet me at her house. As they did not live nearby my language consultant decided 
that it would be too late that day. She instructed her daughter-in-law to call her family and tell them that 
they should come next week “when Beate would be here”, giving the impression that I was not present 
at the time of their call. 
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(213) man-á [wáxt-ø tal nika-í=loo] šóo=aa  
 say-IMP.2SG time-OBL on come.out-IMP.2PL=DUM right=Q   
 
 man-á naíi [ṹ uka-íliis karee]   
 say-IMP.2SG NEG 3SG.PROX go.up-PST.PFV.F MRM   
   ‘Tell (them) to set off early (next week), right? Do not tell them that she (Beate) was here 
(today)’ (conversation 7.1.2013) 
Here, again, the utterance the speaker does not wish to be conveyed is marked by karee whereas the 
utterance that the speaker wants the addressee to reproduce is marked by loo. Utterances that are only 
hypothetical, that are not to be realized, cannot be marked by loo; the appropriate marker for such 
utterances is karee, the marker for thoughts and hypothetical utterances (see  Chapter 4). 
Coming back to example (211), it is clear that if the interpretation “do not tell her to come to us” 
had been intended then the speaker would have used the marker karee instead of loo. Furthermore, in 
such a case the command “tell not” will be made explicit in which case the negation marker is 
preceding (nií  NEG) or following the speech verb (naíi  NEG), not the utterance to be conveyed. So the 
position of the negation marker naíi in relation to loo (preceding or following) has no influence on the 
interpretation of the utterance. In this regard, negation marker and question marker are distinct (see 
section  6.3.1.3) 
6.3.1.5 The marker loo in utterances that the speaker herself will reproduce 
Can a speaker use the marker loo to mark her own utterances that she intends to reproduce later to 
another audience? In this section, I show that this is possible only under certain conditions. If loo is an 
indicator used to mark utterances that should be reproduced by either addressee B or speaker A then it 
should be possible to mark utterances such as “I will tell my mother that I will visit her next week loo”, 
said in a conversation with my sister. According to my language consultant, this is not possible. Such 
utterances cannot be marked by loo. Neither is there any such instance in my data to be found.  
Let me give another example. Suppose my language consultant has been ill for a time but now is 
again well. I am mentioning that I intend to call my mother, and I say to her “I will tell my mother that 
you are again well”. Here, too, I cannot use loo to mark this utterance that I intend to reproduce to my 
mother. However, if my language consultant explicitly asks me to tell my mother that she has recovered 
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then I can say “I will tell my mother that you are well loo” or, fully explicit, “I will tell my mother that 
you said to tell her ‘I am well’”. Because my language consultant wishes me to tell my mother that she 
is well I can use loo in my utterance that I myself will reproduce. In other words: My utterance marked 
by loo is a repetition of my language consultant’s original utterance ‘tell your mother that I am well 
loo’; I am addressee B who conveys the desirable utterance to a third person. Remember that in the uses 
of loo seen so far there are usually three parties involved: speaker A who wishes her utterance to be 
conveyed to a third person, addressee B who will do the conveying, and addressee or recipient C for 
whom the utterance is intended. To take my above mentioned example “I will tell my mother that I will 
visit her next week”: here there is the speaker (I), the addressee (my sister), and the recipient of my 
intended utterance (my mother), but there is no wish that someone else apart from the speaker reproduce 
the utterance, therefore, loo cannot be used.  
Example (209), repeated here, is a question my language consultant asked me concerning medicine 
I had brought for her son. 
(209) [ã  ̃ ́ khaá baari-aá=loo]=aa    
 3PL.PROX eat.CVB finish.up-IMP.2SG=DUM=Q    
   ‘Should I tell him to finish all the medicine?’ (conversation 14.12.2012) 
In the light of the definition of loo arrived at above the more precise translation of this utterance is “do 
you wish me to tell him to finish all the medicine?” In this case, the one who wishes to convey the 
utterance is Beate (myself), the conveyor of the utterance is the actual speaker of the utterance, and the 
recipient is her son who is not present. It follows that in contrast to the previous example above (my 
sister and I), the use of loo is correct. 
Example (214) is another illustration of this point. It is taken from a conversation between my 
language consultant and one of her daughters-in-law. My language consultant was getting ready to visit 
her oldest daughter. One of the younger daughters-in-law wanted to accompany her and asked: 
(214) [kuú bhaý=loo]=aa      
 older.sister sit.IMP.2SG=DUM=Q       
   ‘Do you want me to tell Older Sister to stay here?’ (conversation 11.5.2012) 
166 
 
Here again, the speaker of the utterance is only repeating an utterance that she thinks (or wishes) that 
her mother-in-law wants to be conveyed to Older Sister. The one that is thought to wish to convey an 
utterance is the mother-in-law, the one who should convey the utterance is the younger daughter-in-law, 
and the intended recipient of the utterance is Older Sister.  
So far we have seen examples with three parties involved: speaker A, addressee B and recipient C. 
Above I pointed out that an utterance that speaker A says with the intention to later repeat it herself to 
recipient C cannot be marked by loo. But what about the following scenario where speaker A says an 
utterance to addressee B asking him to repeat/say this utterance back to speaker A? I do not have any 
instance of this use in my data. But if my analysis of loo as a marker of metarepresentations of desirable 
utterances is correct then such an utterance, too, should be marked by loo, see section  6.4 and especially 
example (239), where we find exactly the same situation, namely speaker A produces an utterance that 
he requests addressee B to repeat back to him. 
In this section I have shown that the marker loo cannot be used to mark utterances that a speaker A 
herself wants to reproduce at some later time to another audience. The use of loo seems to imply that an 
utterance marked by it has to be passed on by a person other than speaker A who wishes it to be 
conveyed. 
6.3.1.6 The marker loo in reported utterances 
Not only the speaker of an utterance that she wishes her addressee to convey to a third person may 
use loo. The direct addressee B of such an utterance as well as the intended third-person recipient C or 
any other person may report what the original speaker said, using the marker loo. The following 
examples will illustrate this use. 
The first example is a case of the addressee B reporting the utterance of speaker A to recipient C.  
(215) as  ̃ĩ̀ yàa-e bilaál miiɡeé minát kar-álaas só 
 3SG.PROX.POSS mother-ERG yesterday 1SG.DAT request do-PST.PRF 3SG.DIST  
 
 man-àynt m  ̃ĩ̀ ṣṹ surát pats-íthi [miiɡeé 




 ɡuulìi- waal-á=loo]     
 pill.PL bring.down-IMP.2SG=DUM     
   ‘Yesterday her mother asked me for a favour; she said, “I am sore; tell Beate to bring some pills 
for me”’ (conversation 20.4.2013)  
Here, the speaker A of the conveyed utterance is as  ̃ĩ̀ yàae ‘her mother’; the addressee B, my language 
consultant, is reporting the utterance to me, the recipient C. The marker loo in this utterance again 
indicates that the original speaker wished my language consultant to pass on the request. By using loo it 
is not necessary for the original speaker A to explicitly say, “tell her…” nor does the addressee B, when 
reporting the utterance, have to make explicit to recipient C that the speaker told her “tell her…”; the 
marker loo on its own indicates the telling. 
In example (216) below, recipient C is reporting the utterance of speaker A to someone else. The 
original speaker of the reported utterance was a daughter of my language consultant who lived far away 
from her mother. At one time, she had sent some clothes material to her mother via a third person X, 
who then conveyed to my language consultant the message her daughter had asked her to pass on. 
Sometime later, my language helper told me about this and quoted her daughter, using the marker loo. 
(216) màayn  če ã  ̃ ́ ráxat mút  kasií nií da-ṣát [ã  ̃ ́
 say.PFV1 COMP 3PL.PROX cloth other who.DAT NEG give-FUT.M 3PL.PROX  
 
 J-ãĩ ɡharĩṹ koé man ɡal-eé dé=loo] 
 name.M-GEN.F wife gift.for.bride.OBL in put-CVB give.IMP.2SG=DUM 
   ‘She said (to X who brought the cloth), “tell her not to give the clothes material to anyone else 
but to put it into J’s wife’s wedding gift box”’ (conversation 27.8.2012) 
Like in the previous example, the presence of the marker loo clearly indicates the wish of the original 
speaker to have her message conveyed to the recipient, that is my language consultant, without the need 
of a speech verb to make it explicit.  
Example (217) is a report of utterances marked by loo, where the person reporting is neither 
speaker A nor addressee B nor recipient C.  
(217) ṹ telfun-á kar-àynt khuná ɡhayàa-ø haát če [abàa 




 wá=loo] [mií har-á=loo] [abàa wá=loo] 
 come.down.IMP.2SG=DUM 1SG.DOM take-IMP.2SG=DUM father come.down.IMP.2SG=DUM  
 
 [mií har-á=loo]      
 1SG.DOM take-IMP.2SG=DUM      
   ‘She is making phone calls (to the place) up-valley, to her grandmother, saying “Tell father to 
come down. Tell him to take me home. Tell father to come down. Tell him to take me 
home”’ (conversation 19.10.2012) 
Here again, loo is the only and sufficient indicatior that the caller on the phone wishes her grandmother 
to convey her message to her father. There is not one speech verb in this quoted utterance. Nevertheless, 
the utterance is not ambiguous. The complementizer če stands in place of a predicate-taking speech 
verb, see section  5.2.1.3. 
In this section I have shown that the marker loo is not only used by a speaker who wants her 
addressee to convey an utterance. Speaker A, addressee B and recipient C as well as any other person 
reporting such an utterance may use loo to mark it as one that the original speaker wished to be passed 
on by someone else. 
6.3.1.7 The marker loo in utterances that are to be conveyed to a fourth person 
So far we have seen that loo is used to mark utterances that a speaker A wishes the addressee B to 
convey to a third person, the recipient C. In this section I want to look at some examples that illustrate 
the use of loo in utterances that speaker A wishes to be passed on to a recipient D, a fourth person. The 
third person in this chain is addressee or conveyor C, not the recipient. The pattern of such an utterance 
is “A tells B, ‘Tell C to tell D that …’” as demonstrated in example (218). 
(218) asií man-á [S-í man-á=loo če [miiɡeé 
 3SG.PROX.DAT say-IMP.2SG name.F-DAT say-IMP.2SG=DUM COMP 1SG.DAT  
 
 ṣeé man-áthe búruš  dé=loo]]    
 such say-PRS.PFV brush give.IMP.2SG=DUM    
   ‘Tell her to tell S, “(A) has asked me to tell you ‘give us the brush’”’ (conversation 29.6.2012) 
This example contains two utterances that have to be conveyed. The first one starts with “tell S”; this is 
intended for recipient C and is marked by loo. The second utterance, to be passed on to recipient D is 
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“She has said, ‘give us the brush’”; this utterance, too, is followed by loo. The first utterance is a 
command to speak which is the reason why loo follows the complement-taking speech verb.  
The elicited example (219) below shows the same pattern. It assumes that I have brought some 
medicine for my language consultant’s sister-in-law who is living elsewhere. I give the medicine to my 
language consultant with the words: 
(219) tú T-i  man-á [U-i man-á=loo [če ṣṹ 
 2SG name.M-DAT say-IMP.2SG name.F-DAT say-IMP.2SG=DUM COMP 3SG.DEM  
 
 dawaí hár dìs ék  ṭiimb-á tal khá=loo]] 
 medicine every day one time-OBL on eat.IMP.2SG=DUM 
   ‘Tell T to tell U, “take this medicine once every day.”’ (elicited 4.5.2013) 
In both the above examples, the speaker wishes her utterance to be conveyed to a recipient D, with the 
help of addressee B and conveyor C. 
Example (220) is another instance of the pattern “tell C to tell D that …”, but here the actual 
speaker of the utterance is addressee B who passes on speaker A’s utterance to recipient C, and he in 
turn to D. 
(220) talá ɡàa khẽ man-á [če undá beaatèe man-áthe=loo 
 there go.PFV2.M.SG SUB say-IMP.2SG COMP here Beate.ERG say-PRS.PFV=DUM  
 
 [če  piirãã ́ mẽẽ̀ ék xàas bootál lukh-i-aáthe 
 COMP from.over.there 1SG.ERG one special bottle ask.for-CAUS-PRS.PFV  
 
 maṭõõ̀ kira=loo]]      
 boy.GEN.M for=DUM      
   ‘When you go there then say that Beate here has said (to tell you) “I have ordered a special 
baby bottle from abroad, for the baby-boy …”’ (conversation 18.5.2012) 
Again, there are two different utterances that the speaker wishes to be conveyed: the first one is “Beate 
here has said” which is speaker B’s own utterance to be passed on; the second one is Beate’s utterance 
“I have ordered a special baby bottle…” Both utterances have been marked by loo.  
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A further elicited example (221) shows the same pattern of “addressee B tells conveyer C to tell 
recipient D that speaker A has said …”. The context is the same as that of example (219). After I have 
given instructions to my language consultant as to what to tell conveyer C she passes them on to him. 
(221) ṣás  dawaí U-i dé     
 3SG.DEM.DOM medicine name.F-DAT give.IMP.2SG      
 
 tú  man-á [če beaatèe man-áthe=loo [ṣás dawaí 
 2SG say-IMP2SG COMP Beate.ERG say-PRS.PFV=DUM 3SG.DEM.DOM medicine  
 
 dís-ø man ék wàar kha-ṍ thú=loo]]  
 day.OBL in one time eat-INF be.PRS.M.SG=DUM  
   ‘Give this medicine to U. Tell her that Beate has said to take this medicine once a day’ (elicited 
4.5.2013) 
In all these examples, we find the pattern “speaker A tells addressee B to tell conveyor C to tell 
recipient D that …” What differs is who in the chain of communication is actually uttering the utterance 
to be passed on: in examples (218) and (219) it is speaker A, in examples (220) and (221) it is addressee 
B who speaks and passes on the utterance. 
In this section I have shown that loo is not only used to mark utterances that a speaker A wishes 
addressee B to pass on to recipient C. The communication chain may include one more conveyor or 
addressee C to reproduce the desirable utterance to a recipient D.  
So far, I have described and illustrated the use of loo in marking utterances that a speaker wishes 
her addressee to convey to a third or fourth recipient. In the next section I will discuss the use of loo as 
what seems to be a third person imperative marker. 
6.3.2 The marker loo as third person imperative marker 
In this section I briefly introduce the Indus Kohistani imperative verb forms and then proceed to 
show how loo is used to mark utterances that contain directives intended for a third person. 
Indus Kohistani has a morphologically marked imperative for second person singular and plural. 
For second person singular, a suffix –a is added to the verb root; the root accent will then shift to the 
suffix. The root of the verb ‘do’ is kar-, the singular imperative ‘do!’ is kar-á. The imperative form of 
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the verb paša- ‘show’ is paša-á ‘show!’. Other verbs ending in a vowel, such as kha- ‘eat’ have no 
suffix at all for second person singular imperative. The second person plural imperative of ‘do’ is kar-íi 
‘you (pl) do!’, that of ‘show’ is paša-ái ‘you (pl) show!’, that of ‘eat’ is kha-ái ‘you (pl) eat!’. Quite 
often, the second person singular imperative suffix -a is omitted, leaving the bare root, as in kár ‘do!’ 
To convey a third person imperative meaning, the marker loo follows the verb marked for second 
person imperative in a clause with a third person subject, for instance ṹ kar-á=loo ‘he/she do (2SG) 
loo’, and sã  ̃ ́kar-íi=loo ‘they do (2PL) loo’. In light of the use of loo seen so far this might be translated 
as “tell him, ‘Do!’” and “tell them, ‘Do!’”, but often a more appropriate translation is the following 
“He/she should do”, “let him/her do”, “he/she may do”, and “they should do; let them do; they may 
do” respectively. Note that although such a construction has a third person subject the verb is marked 
for second person imperative. In the following sections I will describe in more detail the differences as 
well as the similarities of both uses; here I just want to mention the two main points that distinguish the 
third person imperative use from the use seen above, (i) third person imperative clauses usually have a 
third person subject, the addressee C of the directive, and (ii) there is no mention of a specific person B 
that should convey the directive to addressee C. 
But first let me clarify some terms. Imperative is a collective term that may include several other 
terms such as jussive, hortative, permissive, or optative. Different authors use different terminology. 
Palmer uses the term “jussive” for first and third person imperatives and “imperative” for second 
person imperative (Palmer 2001:81). The term “hortative”, used by some authors, conveys the same 
notion as that of second person imperative, namely a speaker’s wish about a future state of affairs and 
her appeal to another person to bring the change about. It differs from second person imperative in that 
the person who is told to bring the change about is not the addressee but a third person as in “let him do 
the job”, or it includes the speaker besides the addressee as in “let us do the job” (van der Auwera, 
Dobrushina and Goussev 2013). Permissive signals the speaker’s permission for the actions of a third 
person; the term “optative” is used to express a speaker’s wishes or hopes for a second or third person 
(Loos et al. 2003). 
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  The term jussive has been defined as follows: “Jussive mood is a directive mood that signals a 
speaker’s command, permission or agreement that the proposition expressed by his or her utterance be 
brought about. Jussive mood is typically applicable in the first and third person” (2003). I prefer this 
term to the term hortative as its meaning seems to be broader, including agreement and permission 
besides command. Indus Kohistani imperative verb forms followed by the marker loo may express any 
of the three notions: the speaker’s command, permission or agreement. On the other hand, whereas 
jussive includes both third person and first person imperative, the marker loo marks only third person 
imperative clauses. In the following sections such clauses are referred to as containing a third person 
imperative which may express any of the three notions subsumed under the term jussive. As an aside, 
the marker loo cannot be used to indicate first person imperative. If Indus Kohistani speakers want to 
say, “should I/we do?” or “may I/we do?” then the subjunctive verb form is used, such as in má 
karàm=aa ‘I do.SBJV.1SG=Q’, ‘should/may I do?’; and in bé karíž=aa ‘we do.SBJV.1PL=Q’, 
‘should/may we do?’. 
6.3.2.1 The marker loo indicating third-person command, permission and agreement 
Most of the examples of the third person imperative use of loo are of the permissive kind, but there 
are some instances where imperative verb marking plus loo clearly has a commanding meaning. 
Example (222) is taken from a recorded text about tuberculosis, addressed to people waiting in a village 
clinic. The speaker exhorts his addressees as follows. 
(222) ɡí  wáxt khàaŋ iil-uú [só muúṭyõõ tãã̀ hàa 
 what time cough come.PFV-COND 3SG.DIST in.front REFL.POSS.M hand  
 
 tshá=loo yaá bíɡi zòṛ dhaý=loo] če só khàaŋ 
 place.IMP.2SG=DUM or some clothes hold.IMP.2SG=DUM COMP 3SG.DIST. cough  
 
 pií mút màaṣ-ãã kira nií ríŋɡ-ee   
 over.there other man-GEN.M to NEG attach-SBJV.3SG   
   ‘If he (the TB patient) has to cough then he should cover his mouth with his hand or with some 
piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) does not reach others.’ (TB text #32) 
173 
 
An equally adequate translation would be “Tell him (the TB patient), ‘If you have to cough then you 
should cover your mouth with your hand or with some piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) 
does not reach others’”, that is, loo in this utterance is used exactly as in the examples seen in 
section  6.3.1. Note however that although the verb carries second person imperative ending, the subject 
of this utterance is the explicitly mentioned third-person pronoun so ‘he’. This refers not to a specific 
individual, rather to a hypothetical person, anyone among the listeners or among their families or 
acquaintances who has contracted tuberculosis. Furthermore there is no mention of a specific addressee 
B that should pass on this utterance to the (unspecified) TB patient. 
Following are some more examples to illustrate this use. Example (223) is taken from the same talk 
about tuberculosis. 
(223) ɡhèn marìiz  ṭiib  ̃ĩ̀ dawaí istemàal kar-àant tás bãã̀ 
 who patient TB.GEN.F medicine use do-PRS.M 3SG.DIST.OBL house.GEN.M  
 
 mút xálk.õõ  kira húm ṣṹ  pakàar thí 
 other people.PL.GEN for also 3SG.DEM neccesary be.PRS.F  
 
 [če sã  ̃ ́ ḍaakṭár-ø ɡee baí=loo] [yaá marìiz ḍaakṭár-ø 
 COMP 3PL.DIST doctor-OBL to go.IMP.2PL=DUM or patient doctor-OBL  
 
 ɡee har-í=loo] [ao  tãã̀ ṭiibì-ãã muainá kar-í=loo] 
 to take-IMP.2PL=DUM and REFL.POSS.M TB-GEN.M examination.M do-IMP.2PL=DUM 
   ‘For a patient who is taking TB medicine it is necessary that the other people in his house 
should go to the doctor, or other ill persons in his house should be taken to the doctor and 
should be checked for TB’ (TB text #34) 
Again, an equally adequate way of translating the utterance would be “for a patient who is taking TB 
medicine it is necessary to tell the other people in his house, ‘Go to the doctor…’”. As already 
mentioned for example (222), the verbs go, take, and do are marked for second person plural 
imperative, the subject of these directives, on the other hand, is the third person plural pronoun sã  ̃ ́
‘they’, and no specific person is mentioned that should convey this utterance to recipient C. 
Next I will describe the use of the marker loo in clauses with third person imperative meaning 
where the notion conveyed is one of permission. Example (224) below is taken from a folk narrative. 
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The main character is a man considered stupid by the other villagers because he had burned their forest. 
One day they told him that they would kill his cow because she had eaten their crops. The man called 
by the others stupid said, “Go ahead and kill my cow, but give me the hide”. The villagers’ reaction 
was a follows: 
(224) xálkõõ man-áɡil ṭhiík thí ɡínče masùu béetus kha-ṣát-ø 
 people.PL.ERG say-PFV2 right be.PRS.F because meat 1PL.INCL eat-FUT.M-PL.M  
 
 ao tsàam-ø hin ṹ ɡí kar-àant [amã  ̃ ́ har-á=loo] 
 and skin-OBL with 3SG.PROX what do-PRS.M REFL take-IMP.2SG=DUM 
   ‘The people said, “That is alright, because we will eat the meat; what can he do with the hide! 
Let him take it.”’ (A Kohistani story #44) 
From the context it is clear that the villagers answer a request in the positive and give permission to 
take the hide. The use of the third person imperative construction suggests that this utterance was not 
addressed to the so-called stupid man himself but to one another, and its implication is that either one of 
the villagers will go to inform the stupid man of their decision or that they will just leave the hide for 
him to take, a kind of tacit permission. A translation of the clause marked by loo as “tell him ‘take the 
hide’” is still possible but, I think, less felicitous. The third-person subject in the clause marked by loo 
has been omitted because its referent has been mentioned explicitly in the preceding clause.  
Example (225) below is another illustration of this use, taken from a reported conversation. A told 
me that one of their neighbors had had to flee because another neighbor had threatened to kill him. 
Blood feuds are common in this area, but then usually both parties know for what reason they are 
enemies. This man, however, said that he had no idea why the other one wanted to kill him. He 
reasoned as reported by A: 
(225) só=lee m  ̃ĩ̀ tsút~tsut maasmá thé    
 3SG.DIST=REP 1SG.POSS small~REDUPL child.PL be.PRS.M.PL    
   ‘He said, “I have small children …’ 
 hãã mẽẽ̀ asií kar-áthe khẽ má as  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhariãã̀ 




 tsuúr thú khẽ [tãĩ̀ ɡhariũṹ maar-á=loo]   
 lover be.PRS.M.SG SUB REFL.POSS wife kill-IMP.2SG=DUM    
 
 [mii-  ̃ ́ maar-á=loo]      
 1SG.DOM-also kill-IMP.2SG=DUM      
   ‘And if I have done any such thing against him, such as being the lover of his wife then he 
should kill his wife; he may kill me too”’ [lit.: ‘And if I have done any such thing against 
him, such as being the lover of his wife, then (he) “kill your wife loo, kill me, too, loo”’] 
(conversation 18.5.2012) 
The speaker of this utterance cites legitimate reasons to kill someone and gives permission to his enemy 
to kill him if any such reason might be found. However, a translation of the clauses marked by loo as 
“tell him, ‘Kill your wife; kill me too’” does not sound right here. As in example (224), the third-person 
subject of the clauses marked by loo has been omitted; it refers to the same person, namely the enemy, 
as the object of the preceding clause “if I have done any such thing against him”.  
The next example, again conveying permission, contains an explicit third person subject. The 
utterance is taken from an explanatory text about how people handle enmities. The speaker had 
described to me that when something has happened that may cause an enmity, for instance person A has 
hurt another person B, then person A will move to a friend’s house and ask him for protection. The 
friend will offer protection for a limited period of time during which mediators will try to come to a 
peaceful settlement. The family of the hurt person will accept this limited period of negotiations and 
allow their enemy to move freely during this time by saying (226). 
(226) khẽ ṹ khulàa til-á=loo   
 DEVM 3SG.PROX open move-IMP.2SG=DUM   
   ‘Let him move freely/he may move freely’ (A way to end a feud #110) 
Here the third person subject is explicitly mentioned. As in all the examples seen so far, the imperative 
verb suffix indicates second person imperative. 
Of the three directive terms command, permission and agreement, the last one is the weakest. In 
the following examples, it is often not in the power of the agreeing one to change the state of affairs. An 
imperative verb form followed by loo is often used to indicate such an agreement to or acceptance of 
circumstances one cannot change. The first example is taken from a folk story about an evil fairy that 
has snatched away a princess’ husband. The princess goes on a long search for her husband and finally 
176 
 
manages to find the fairy, get her imprisoned and set her husband free. In example (227) the fairy 
resigns herself to the loss of the prince.  
(227) sẽẽ̀ man-áthe h  ̃ĩ̀ tsõṍ mií bánd kar-áɡil. xawàand 
 3SG.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV now 2PL.ERG 1SG.DOM closed do-PFV2 husband  
 
 mìn bazíɡaa. [waleé har-á=loo]. h  ̃ĩ̀ ɡí kar-àm  
 1SG.ABL go.PFV2.M.SG but take-IMP.2SG=DUM now what do-SBJV.1SG  
   ‘She said, “Now you have imprisoned me. The husband went away from me. But let (the 
princess) take (him). What can I do now”’ [lit.: ‘She said, “Now you have imprisoned me. 
The husband went away from me. But take him loo”’] (Prince and fairy #202-4)  
There is nothing left to command or permit for the speaker of this utterance, only to accept what has 
happened. Note that the verb of the clause marked by loo has second person imperative marking, the 
subject of this clause has been omitted. From the context we know that it must be the princess who was 
not present when this was uttered, that is, if the subject would be mentioned explicitly it would be a 
third person subject. A translation such as “Tell (the princess), ‘Take him’” sounds odd because the 
fairy is in no position to tell other people what to do. 
In the next example (228), the speaker of the utterance marked by loo is not quite as helpless as in 
(227). This conversation started when I brought some wool that the women of A’s household had asked 
me to buy for them. 
(228) C: ɡõõ̀ sáx suɡ-àa a-áthe    
  yarn.M very fine-M.SG bring-PRS.PFV    
   ‘(She) has brought very nice wool’ 
 A: má man-àynt heleék tìiz thú   
  1SG say-PRS.F a.bit bright be.PRS.M.SG   
   ‘I say, it (the color) is a bit bright’ 
 C: ɡõõ̀=aa       
  yarn=Q       
   ‘The yarn?’ (clicks with tongue, indicating that she does not agree) 
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 A: [hó=loo]=aa       
  become.IMP.2SG=DUM=Q       
   ‘Let it be then? [lit.: ‘You become loo’]’ or a more free translation, ‘Should we take/accept it 
then?’ 
 C: ɡõõ̀ sáx suɡàa thú    
  yarn.M very fine.M.SG be.PRS.M.SG    
    ‘The yarn is very nice’ (conversation 7.9.2012) 
A could have disagreed but was overruled by C. The phrase hó=loo  ‘let it be’ indicates her 
acceptance of A’s opinion that the wool is fine enough to keep it. A translation of the clause marked by 
loo as “tell (the yarn) ‘become’” does not make any sense; in such a context only the jussive meaning 
“let it be” is appropriate. 
In the next example, too, a “tell C, ‘[directive]’” translation fails. The utterances are from a 
conversation about blood transfusion. Some people are afraid that when they give blood to someone 
they themselves may die of weakness. The speaker explained this concept to me. 
(229) bé man-àant-ø raát nií dìi    
 1PL.EXCL say-PRS.M-PL.M blood NEG give.IMP.2PL    
   ‘We say “Do not give blood.”’ 
 [saatã  ̃ ́ ék màaṣ mar-á=loo]     
 in.the.end one man die-IMP.2SG=DUM     
   ‘In the end one person (the patient in need of blood) may die/let him die.’ [lit.: ‘In the end one 
person “you die” loo’] 
 mút màaṣ-ãã raát nheel-eé pií nií dìi  
 other man-GEN.M blood.M take.out-CVB over.there NEG give.IMP.2PL  
   ‘Do not take another man’s blood and give it (to the patient) over there’ 
 ɡínče tèe so-  ̃ ́ mar-áṣat     
 because then 3SG.DIST-also die-FUT.M     
    ‘Because then he too (the one who gave blood) will die’ (Conception, birth #485-8) 
Again, translating the second of these clauses as “in the end tell one person, ‘You die!’” does not at all 




The expression hó=loo ‘become.IMP.2SG=DUM’ or ‘let it be’ is frequently used to signal 
agreement to or acceptance of persons, matters or circumstances. Example (230) is an utterance of a 
mother whose daughter has been married off and has not been allowed to visit her parents so far. The 
mother worried about her daughter’s wellbeing, but once she heard from others that her daughter is 
doing fine she said the following utterance. 
(230) man-àynt m  ̃ĩ̀ dhií xušàal thí [hó=loo]  
 say-PRS.F 1SG.POSS daughter happy be.PRS.F become.IMP.2SG=DUM  
   ‘(She) says, “When my daughter is happy then let it be so (that she is not allowed to visit us)”’ 
(A mother’s advice #45) 
In other words: As long as the mother knows that her daughter is happy she accepts the situation as it is. 
Example (231) shows that the expression hó=loo ‘let it be’ may have an explicit third person 
subject. Context is a description of what people do during winter to keep themselves warm. The speaker 
tells that in the cold season, people build an open fire place inside the house, quoting them as “Let the 
(inside of) the house become blackened, but our children are kept warm”. 
(231) baá kiṣĩ  ̃ ́ hó=loo      
 house black.INCH become.IMP.2SG=DUM      
   ‘Let the house become black’ (Preparations for winter #111) 
Here baá ‘house’ is the third person subject; the verb is marked for second person imperative. Here, too, 
it would make no sense to translate “tell (the house) ‘You may become black’”. 
The last example in this section is taken from my language consultant’s narrative about an 
earthquake. Parts of her house had been damaged badly. The sons of the family were trying to get the 
pots and pans out of the house when their father said, “Never mind (the pots and pans)” and went on: 
(232) ũ baá sàar thú=aa [hói=loo]   
 3SG.PROX house intact be.PRS.M.SG=Q become.IMP.2PL=DUM   
   ‘Is the room intact? Let (the things) be (or: remain there)’ (The earthquake #118) 
Like in the preceding examples, the use of hó=loo or in this case hoí=loo signals agreement or 
acceptance to states of affairs or circumstances.  
In all examples seen so far, the verb preceding loo is marked for second person imperative whereas 
the subject of the clause is a third person subject when not omitted, as for instance in the hó=loo 
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clauses. For some of the examples seen in this section a translation of loo with “tell X ‘[directive]’” is 
possible; in some other cases a third person imperative/jussive meaning “let X do/X may do” is the only 
appropriate translation. What I wanted to show in this section is the fact that there is a distinct third 
person imperative use of loo, not just instances where both ways of interpretation are possible.  
6.3.2.2 What distinguishes third-person imperative use from other uses of loo? 
In this section I point out in more detail what distinguishes the third-person imperative use of loo 
from that as a marker of desirable utterances that the speaker wishes to be reproduced by someone else. 
The main difference, on a syntactic level, is the use of a third-person subject as the addressee of the 
directive in the third-person imperative use (remember that the verb ending is that of second person 
imperative). This third person subject may be explicitly mentioned, or there may be ellipsis. 
Furthermore, there is no explicit command to an addressee B to tell (reproduce) the speaker’s utterance 
to a third person, i.e. the third-person directive is not embedded in a speech clause. In this section I  
show examples of both, the “tell X ‘[utterance]’” and the jussive use to illustrate these points. 
First let me compare two examples containing a command, (222), repeated here, and (233). (222) is 
taken from a talk aimed at patients and attendants in a busy clinic. 
(222) ɡí  wáxt khàaŋ iil-uú [só muúṭyõõ tãã̀ hàa 
 what time cough come.PFV1-COND 3SG.DIST in.front REFL.POSS hand  
 
 tshá=loo] [yaá bíɡi zòṛ dhaý=loo] če só khàaŋ 
 place.IMP.2SG=DUM or some clothes hold.IMP.2SG=DUM COMP 3SG.DIST. cough  
 
 pií mút màaṣ-ãã kira nií ríŋɡ-ee   
 over.there other man-GEN.M to NEG attach-SBJV.3SG   
   ‘If he (the TB patient) has to cough then he should cover his mouth with his hand or with some 
piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) does not reach others’ or ‘Tell him (the TB 
patient), “If you have to cough then you should cover your mouth with your hand or with 
some piece of cloth so that the cough (the droplets) does not reach others”’(TB text #32) 
In (233), the speaker talks to her daughter-in-law who is washing clothes. 
(233) oó D zòṛ tú nií manḍ-á [hãã  




 E manḍ-á=loo] ... [só manḍ-á=loo]   
 name.F beat-IMP.2SG=DUM  3SG.DIST beat-IMP.2SG=DUM   
   ‘Oh D, you do not wash the clothes! Tell E, “wash the clothes…, wash the clothes”’ 
(conversation 4.5.2012) 
On first sight, these examples look very similar. Both contain a directive aimed at a third person. In 
both clauses containing the imperative, there is an explicit third-person subject: “he” in (222) and “E” 
in (233). But they differ in another aspect. In (233), there is the contextual implication that the speaker 
wishes her addressee D to tell E, “Wash the clothes”, E being nearby and both speaker and addressee 
being aware of it. In (222), on the other hand, there is no request to a specific addressee to convey the 
speaker’s utterance, neither is there a definite and specific recipient of the command. The addressees are 
a big group of people the speaker does not know, neither does he know who among them or their 
families has contracted tuberculosis and hence to whom his directive will be aimed at and relevant. So, 
in (222), I cannot translate “You, X, tell Y, ‘Cover your mouth when you cough …’” The only possible 
other way of translation would be “Whoever of you that has TB or knows someone who has TB, tell 
such a person, ‘If you have to cough then you should cover your mouth …’”. 
Now consider example (234), taken from a conversation about medicine. A asked me in the 
presence of her daughter-in-law who was ill, at what time she, the patient, should take a certain 
medicine.  
(234) [ṣás dawaí aáz bilàali khá=loo] ɡí [h  ̃ĩ̀ khá=loo] 
 3SG.DEM.DOM medicine today in.the.evening eat.IMP.2SG=DUM or now eat.IMP.2SG=DUM 
   ‘Should she take this medicine tonight or now?’ or ‘Should I tell her, “Take this medicine 
tonight” or “take it now”?’ (conversation 4.6.2012) 
Again, on first sight, this looks exactly like a third-person imperative. In this example, the subject of the 
clause containing the imperative has been omitted as is often the case in Indus Kohistani. However, 
there is no doubt about the identity of the subject – it can only be the daughter-in-law. On the other 
hand, there is also no doubt about how the expressed third-person command will be conveyed to its 
recipient as the second translation option above shows.  Like in all examples of section  6.3.1 the 
conveyor of the desirable utterance is a specific person, namely A.  
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Next, let me compare two examples that contain a permission directive. Example (224) from the 
previous section is repeated here. 
(224) xálkõõ man-áɡil ṭhiík thí ɡínče masùu béetus kha-ṣát-ø 
 people.PL.OBL say-PFV2 right be.PRS.F because meat 1PL.INCL eat-FUT.M-PL.M  
 
 ao tsàam-ø hin ṹ ɡí kar-àant [amã  ̃ ́ har-á=loo] 
 and skin-OBL with 3SG.PROX what do-PRS.M REFL take-IMP.2SG=DUM 
   ‘The people said, “That is fine, because we will eat the meat; what can he do with the hide! Let 
him take it.”’ (A Kohistani story #44) 
Example (235) below is taken from a conversation between my language consultant and me. I was 
expecting two guests, and one of them had asked if she might come with me to visit her. I passed on the 
request and she, my consultant, answered, 
(235) [é=loo] [é=loo] bhaizdá waal-á     
 come.IMP.2SG=DUM come.IMP.2SG=DUM both bring.down-IMP.2SG     
   ‘She may come, she may come. Bring both (of them) down (to us)’ or ‘Tell her, “Come”; tell 
her, “Come”; bring both (of them) down (to us)’  (conversation 10.9.2012) 
Comparing the two utterances, we note that in (224), the subject of the imperative clause is omitted in 
that clause but mentioned in the preceding clause. The utterance in (235) does not contain a subject. But 
from the context it is clear that the subject of the directive clause is that one of my guests who had 
asked to accompany me on my visit.  
What distinguishes the two utterances is again the absence of a specific conveyor of the directive in 
(224) and the presence of one, namely I myself, in (235). There is no other way for my guests to know 
if they are allowed to come other than by my conveying to them A’s permission. As I already noted 
above, a translation of example (224) as “tell the stupid man, ‘You may have the hide’” is slightly 
awkward because there is no specific addressee mentioned who is asked to do the conveying. There may 
or may not be someone who will tell him; it is simply left open. 
The last example (236) in this section is a further illustration of this point. The utterance is taken 
from a narrative about what happened to some relatives. The speaker reported that the second wife of a 




(236) sẽẽ̀ tãã̀ xawànd-i tapús kar-áthe če  ṹ man-àant 
 3SG.DIST.ERG REFL.POSS.M husband-DAT question do-PRS.PFV COMP 3SG.PROX say-PRS.M  
 
 ma-  ̃ ́ e-ént kar hãã [é=loo]=aa    
 1SG-also come-PRS.M MRM and come.IMP.2SG=DUM=Q     
 
 khẽ sẽẽ̀ man-áthe [é=loo]    
 DEVM 3SG.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV come.IMP.2SG=DUM    
   ‘She asked her husband, “He says that he too wants to come (with me); may he come?”. He 
said, “He may come (with you)”’ or ‘She asked her husband, “He says that he too wants to 
come (with me); do you wish me to tell him, ‘Come’?” Then he said, “Tell him, ‘Come’”’ 
(The torrent #30-1) 
Like (233), this utterance looks like the third-person imperative utterances described in this section but 
belongs into the category “speaker A wishes addressee B to reproduce her utterance to recipient C” 
because it is clear from the context that the addressee of the utterance is supposed to convey the 
permission.  
One other point of distinction between the uses seen in section  6.3.1 and what I call “third person 
imperative use” is the fact that in the latter use a translation as “Tell X, ‘[utterance]’” sometimes sounds 
awkward or inappropriate whereas a translation as “X should/may do…” captures the meaning of such 
utterances much better, see for instance examples (226) to (230) .  
In this section, I have compared third-person-imperative utterances with utterances where loo 
indicates the speaker’s wish to have her addressee convey her utterance to a third person. I have shown 
that what distinguishes the former ones from the uses described in section  6.3.1 is the absence of a 
specific conveyor (addressee B) of the command/permission/agreement. Furthermore, clauses belonging 
to the third-person imperative group have an explicit third-person subject (which may be omitted when 
occurring in a preceding clause) whereas utterances of other uses may but often do not have a third-
person subject. Lastly, a translation of loo as “Tell person X, ‘[utterance]’” works always for the uses 
described in section ( 6.3.1) but not always in the third person imperative use. It follows that although 
there are distinctions between the two uses they are not clear-cut. In the next section, I will briefly 
examine two possible analyses of the marker loo. 
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6.3.2.3 loo: Discourse marker? Third person imperative marker? 
So far, we have seen that the marker loo has two functions, (i) to mark utterances that a speaker A 
wants her addressee B to convey to a third person C. Such utterances may be statements, questions, 
directives or suggestions, among others; (ii) to mark utterances that contain a third-person imperative or 
jussive. In the first mentioned use, loo seems to be some kind of speech marker whereas the second use 
suggests that loo is a third-person imperative marker. In this section I want to look briefly at both of 
these possible interpretations. 
The marker loo may be analyzed as a speech marker of one special kind of speech, namely such a 
speech that the speaker wishes her addressee to convey to a third person. To my knowledge, there are 
no such markers in other languages. Furthermore, this analysis would leave out the use as third-person 
imperative marker, at least those instances where the translation of loo as “Tell (person X that …)” does 
not work. 
On the other hand, an analysis of loo as third-person imperative marker would not cover the speech 
marker use, or in other words, there would have to be two distinct markers loo. Even if that would be 
the case there are several objections to such an analysis which I will point out in this section.  
As a reminder see example (237), a typical instance of the use of loo discussed in the previous 
section. Previous to this utterance the speaker had mentioned that when her children are not obeying her 
she sometimes tells them that they will not get any food until they listen to her. But then she had second 
thoughts. 
(237) má man-àynt naíi m  ̃ĩ̀ kám  lak  oolàat thí 
 1SG say-PRS.F no 1SG.POSS few -ish offspring be.PRS.F  
 
 khẽ má ã  ̃ ́ xapàa neer-àm    
 DEVM 1SG 3PL.PROX annoyed not.do-SBJV.1SG     
 
 [ã  ̃ ́ amã  ̃ ́ ɡóli kha-ái=loo]     
 3PL.PROX REFL bread eat-IMP.2PL=DUM     
   ‘I say, “No, I have only a few children. I do not want to make them upset. Let them eat food.”’ 
(Children’s duties #80-1)  
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There is no doubt that the mother’s utterance “let them eat food” has an unambiguous jussive meaning. 
What I will question here is not whether such utterances have third-person imperative meaning, but 
rather whether loo is a genuine third-person imperative marker. There are several reasons for 
disfavoring such an interpretation:  
(i) Indus Kohistani has a morphologically marked imperative, as outlined in section 6.3.2. One 
might expect that in a language that has a morphologically marked second-person imperative, the 
jussive would be expressed by the same means, in our case by suffixing. However, the marker loo is a 
clitic that behaves quite differently from a suffix such as the second person imperative marker. 
(ii) In languages with a morphologically marked jussive, the suffixes for second-person and third-
person imperative will be distinct. In Indus Kohistani jussive examples, however, we find the regular 
second-person imperative suffix in addition to the marker loo. 
(iii) Although there are differences, there is no clear distinction between the two functions of loo, 
namely marking desirable utterances and marking third-person imperative. It seems that often the 
context determines in which way an utterance has to be interpreted, as has been illustrated in examples 
(224) and (234), repeated here. 
(224) xálkõõ man-áɡil ṭhiík thí ɡínče masùu béetus kha-ṣát-ø 
 people.PL.ERG say-PFV2 right be.PRS.F because meat 1PL.INCL eat-FUT.M-PL.M  
 
 ao tsàam-ø hin ṹ ɡí kar-àant [amã  ̃ ́ har-á=loo] 
 and skin-OBL with 3SG.PROX what do-PRS.M REFL take-IMP.2SG=DUM 
   ‘The people said, “That is alright, because we will eat the meat; what can he do with the hide! 
Let him take it.”’ (A Kohistani story #44) 
(234) sẽé tãã̀ xawánd-i tapús kar-áthe če  ṹ man-àant 
 3SG.DIST.ERG REFL.POSS.M husband-DAT question do-PRS.PFV COMP 3SG.PROX say-PRS.M  
 
 ma-  ̃ ́ e-ént kar hãã [é=loo]=aa    




 khẽ sẽẽ̀ man-áthe [é=loo]    
 when 3SG.DIST.ERG say-PRS.PFV come.IMP.2SG=DUM    
   ‘She asked her husband, “He says that he too wants to come (with me); may he come?”. He 
said, “He may come (with you)”’ or ‘She asked her husband, “He says that he too wants to 
come (with me); do you wish me to tell him, ‘Come’?” Then he said, “Tell him, ‘Come’”’ 
(The torrent #30-1) 
In both examples, we have a command/permission intended for a third-person subject which is omitted 
in the actual clause but which was mentioned in the preceding one. Although (224) and (234) are similar 
syntactically, in (224) the marked clause has been translated as “let him take it”, a jussive, whereas the 
meaning of the relevant clause in example (234) is “tell him, ‘Come’”. The reason has to be inferred 
from the context: In example (224) the speakers and addressees are a group of people, talking among 
themselves. The narrator left it open if the permission (“let him take it”) will actually be passed on to 
the recipient or if it remains tacit. In example (234) there is one speaker A, one addressee B and one 
recipient C. In short, it is the context that determines which way an utterance has to be interpreted. 
Looking at the syntax of both kinds of utterances, the differences between them tend to become blurred. 
In this section I have argued that an analysis of loo as a third-person imperative marker leaves 
several questions still to be answered. Besides, an analysis that cannot account for all uses of loo 
remains unsatisfactory. In the next section, I will analyze the marker loo within the framework of 
Relevance Theory as a marker of one kind of metarepresentations namely desirable utterances. I will 
further show that the analysis of loo as marker of desirable utterances also applies to the third person 
imperative use. 
6.4 loo: a metarepresentation marker of desirable utterances 
In this section, I suggest an analysis of loo within the framework of Relevance Theory that 
provides an explanation for the full range of the data so far presented. First I review the notion of 
metarepresentation, especially the concept of metarepresentation of desirable utterances. I then argue 




6.4.1 Metarepresentations in Relevance Theory 
In  Chapter 2 I already introduced the concept of metarepresentation as used within Relevance 
Theory. A metarepresentation “is a representation of a representation: a higher-order representation with 
a lower-order representation embedded within it” (Wilson 2012:230). The lower-order representation 
may be an attributed utterance (public representation) or an attributed thought (mental representation). 
Wilson also mentions non-attributive, more abstract representations such as in example (233) (her 
example (6a.) in 2012:232). 
(238) ‘Dragonflies are beautiful’ is a sentence in English   
Such abstract representations may be sentence types as in the above given example, names, words, 
propositions or concepts (2012:232).  
Other types of non-attributive metarepresentations are regular (that is, not attributed to someone 
else) interrogatives and exclamations: they represent desirable thoughts or desirable information. 
Regular negations and disjunctions are seen within Relevance Theory as metarepresentations of possible 
thoughts or possible information. And finally, utterances may be metarepresentations of desirable or 
possible utterances (2012:253-7). It is these last ones that I want to look at now. Wilson gives several 
examples of this type of metarepresentation; one of them I want to present here (example (37) in 
2012:255). 
(239) VICAR [to bride]: I, Amanda, take you, Bertrand, to be my lawful wedded husband. 
 BRIDE:  I, Amanda, take you, Bertrand, to be my lawful, wedded husband.  
In this example, the speaker’s (vicar’s) utterance is a metarepresentation of the utterance he wants the 
addressee (bride) to produce, in other words, of a desirable utterance. 
Example (240), taken from Noh (example (65) in Noh 1998b:273) illustrates another desirable 
utterance. 
(240) MARY [to Peter, as door bell rings]: If that’s John, I’m not here  
Here, Mary wants Peter to say, “Mary is not here” in case it is John that has rung the door bell; in her 
utterance, she is metarepresenting the desirable utterance “Mary is not here”. 
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I propose that Indus Kohistani utterances marked by loo are just that: instances of 
metarepresentations of desirable utterances. I further claim that loo is a procedural indicator that 
encodes constraints on higher-level explicatures (Wilson 2012:166).  
In this section I have reviewed the concept of metarepresentation and introduced different 
metarepresentation types, in particular metarepresentations of desirable utterances. In the next section, I 
will analyze loo as a device for marking metarepresentations of desirable utterances. 
6.4.2 The marker loo as metarepresentation marker of desirable utterances 
As already mentioned in section  2.3, Blakemore was the first to analyze certain discourse markers 
such as so, therefore, and after all as encoding procedural meaning and acting as constraints on the 
inferential phase of the comprehension process (Blakemore 1987). The purpose of such procedural 
indicators is to assist the hearer in his search for relevance by reducing processing effort. Constraints 
may be applied to different levels of the comprehension procedure: The above mentioned discourse 
connectors such as so, therefore, and after all  help a hearer to arrive at the intended implications of an 
utterance, in other words, they encode constraints on implicatures. In addition, there are procedural 
expressions that encode other kinds of constraints: pronouns can be analyzed as constraints on 
explicature; they guide the hearer’s search for the intended referent (Wilson 2012:166) when 
constructing the explicature of an utterance. “Hearsay” particles (Blass 1990) and illocutionary force 
indicators (Wilson 2012:166) encode constraints on the inferential construction of higher-level-
explicatures. So, procedural constraints are employed in each stage of the interpretation process: in 
recovering explicatures, in constructing higher-level explicatures, and in arriving at the intended 
implicatures.  
I propose that loo should be analyzed as a procedural indicator encoding procedural constraints on 
higher-level explicatures. When processing an utterance marked as “metarepresentation of a desirable 
utterance” the addressee in his comprehension process is guided towards the construction of a higher-
level explicature of the kind “speaker X wishes someone to say ‘…’”. Consider the following example 
(241). A told C who was sitting with us: 
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(241) [čèey kar-ìi=loo]       
 tea do-IMP.2PL=DUM       
   ‘Tell them to make tea’ (conversation 4.6.2012) 
The explicature of the utterance is a simple command, “make tea”. The marker loo does not encode a 
concept and does therefore not contribute to the explicature. But it indicates that the utterance “make 
tea” is the metarepresentation of a desirable utterance, or, in other words, it guides the addressee 
towards the construction of a higher-level explicature such as “A wishes someone to tell someone else 
‘make tea’”. A in this example does not make explicit whom to tell to make tea. The hearer follows the 
relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure (as outlined by Sperber, Cara and Girotto 1995:51) which 
goes as follows: 
(i) Follow a path of least effort in constructing an interpretation of the 
utterance (and in particular in resolving ambiguities and referential 
indeterminacies, in going beyond linguistic meaning, in supplying 
contextual assumptions, computing implicatures, etc.). 
(ii) Stop when your expectations of relevance are satisfied. 
That is, the hearer knows that the speaker wants her to say to someone else “make tea”. The 
indeterminacy of whom to tell is solved by accessing contextual information such as “tea is made in the 
kitchen” and “my sisters-in-law are already in the kitchen” and arriving at the conclusion  “A wishes 
me to tell my sisters-in-law to make tea”. Thus the referential indeterminacy is solved and the hearer’s 
expectations of relevance are satisfied.  
Or consider example (242); a toddler boy was greeting me by shaking my hand. His mother, 
watching us, then said to him (242a): 
(242a) [tú rùuɣ thí=aa =loo]     
 2SG well be.PRS.F=Q=DUM     
    ‘Say “Are you well?”’ 
Whereupon the boy said to me (242b): 
(242b) tú rùuɣ thí=aa      
 2SG well be.PRS.F=Q     
    ‘Are you well?’ (conversation 3.9.2012) 
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The explicature of (242a) is “are you well?”. Without loo this would be a simple question that the 
mother is asking her son; and the boy’s answer would most probably be “I am well”. The presence of 
loo in (242a), however, constrains the search for relevance towards the construction of a higher-level-
explicature of the kind “my mother wishes me to say, ‘Are you well?’”. Contextual information such as 
“I am shaking hands with Beate” and “when greeting another person we ask, ‘Are you well’” help the 
little boy to come to the conclusion “my mother wishes me to say, ‘Are you well?’” to Beate, while 
processing utterance (242a). And therefore the boy’s answer is his asking me, “Are you well?”. 
In this section I have analyzed loo as a marker of metarepresentations of desirable utterances and 
have shown that loo constrains the hearer of such an utterance towards the construction of a higher-level 
explicature of the kind “speaker wishes addressee to say, ‘…’”. It follows that loo is a procedural 
indicator encoding constraints on higher-level explicatures. In the next sections, I will apply this 
analysis to the data presented above and will show that it can account for all uses of loo. 
6.4.3 Desirable utterances embedded in “tell X …” clauses, and others that are marked 
with just loo 
In my data there are quite a number of instances of the use of loo where the speaker explicitly says 
“tell X, “… loo”  as shown in example (200), repeated here. The addressee of this utterance is a small 
girl that had been sent by her mother to find out if A is at home and available. 
(200) tú bá tãĩ̀ yàa-i man-á če [má baá-ø 
 2SG go.IMP.2SG REFL.POSS.F mother-DAT say-IMP.2SG COMP 1SG house-OBL  
 
 man thí=loo]       
 in be.PRS.F=DUM       
   ‘Go; tell your mother that I am at home’ (conversation 20.2.2012) 
A makes explicit (by saying, “Tell your mother”) that what follows is a desirable utterance, and at the 
same time uses the marker loo. So this is an instance of “double marking”. In such cases, the 
construction of the higher-level explicature does not require the same amount of pragmatic inference as 
was demonstrated for examples (241) and (242), but costs the hearer some additional linguistic 
processing effort by processing the phrase “tell your mother”. Considerations of relevance will 
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determine how much a speaker will make explicit and how much she will leave to the hearer to infer. In 
this particular case, the speaker may have thought that the explicit command “tell your mother” will 
help the addressee to achieve optimal relevance. Although the addressee had to take some additional 
effort to process this phrase, at the same time it saved efforts to figure out who the recipient of the 
desirable utterance would be. 
About half of such double-marked instances in my data are utterances addressed to children. One 
can easily imagine an adult talking to a child and embedding the desirable utterance in an explicit 
speech clause in order to make it easy for the addressee to recover the intended meaning. Consider, 
however, example (243), a short conversation between a toddler, his mother and me. 
Mother to toddler: 
(243) hàa milaá beaatàa-ø mil hàa milaá  
 hand join.IMP.2SG Beate-OBL with hand join.IMP.2SG  
    ‘Shake hands, shake hands with Beate’ 
Author to toddler: 
 assalaam alaikum t  ̃ĩ̀ ɡí hàal thí   
 assalam alaikum 2SG.POSS what condition be.PRS.F   
    ‘Assalaam alaikum. How are you?’ 
Mother to toddler: 
 [rùuɣ thú=loo] t  ̃ĩ̀ ɡí hàal thí   
 well be.PRS.M.SG=DUM 2SG.POSS what condition be.PRS.F   
    ‘Say, “I am fine. How are you?”’ (conversation 8.6.2012) 
Here the mother does not embed the desirable utterance “I am fine. How are you” within a speech 
clause in order to help her son. The reason for the omission is, I assume, that the addressee already 
knows whom to tell the desirable utterance. There are no ambiguities of reference to be solved; the 
addressee of the desirable utterance has already been established; there are no other potential addressees 
around. 
On another occasion, the same toddler, his parents and a number of other people were present. The 
father told his son (244): 
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(244) F-i man-á [miṭhèe dé=loo] bá  
 name.F-DAT say-IMP.2SG sweetmeat give.IMP.2SG=DUM go.IMP.2SG  
   ‘Tell F to give you sweets, go!’ (conversation 20.7.2012) 
Here the context is different: There are lots of people around; and without making explicit “tell F” the 
toddler would not be able to find the intended addressee of the desirable utterance. Trying to infer the 
meaning with the help of contextual information alone would be too costly in terms of processing effort, 
or might be impossible at all for the toddler. Knowing this, the speaker (the father) has made the 
addressee of the desirable utterance explicit. 
The next example (245), too, illustrates that considerations of relevance determine the use or 
omission of an explicit speech clause “tell X”. Again, several people were around when A told one of 
the boys the following utterance. 
(245) oó V pií E-i man-á [zãã̀ kira čèey 
 VOC name.M over.there name.F-DAT say-IMP.2SG 1PL.POSS.M for tea  
 
 aá=loo]       
 bring.IMP.2SG=DUM       
   ‘Oh V, tell E over there to bring tea for us’ (conversation 29.6.2012) 
In this instance, the speaker considered that her utterance would be more relevant (and less costly to 
recover its meaning) if she makes explicit who the addressee of the desirable utterance is.  
I conclude that it is not by chance whether a speaker uses just loo or an explicit complement-taking 
speech verb phrase in addition to loo to mark a desirable utterance. Rather, considerations of relevance 
determine how explicit an utterance is. A speaker, in order to make her utterance as relevant as possible 
for her audience, may make more information explicit (by embedding the desirable utterance in a 
speech clause) when it would be too difficult and costly to infer it from the context. Or the speaker 
makes her utterance less explicit (by using loo only) because the necessary information can easily be 




In any case, the marker loo reduces processing effort by making explicit or more explicit that the 
marked utterance is the metarepresentation of a desirable utterance, thereby helping the hearer to 
construct the appropriate higher-level explicature.  
In this section, I have shown that considerations of relevance determine whether a desirable 
utterance is marked by loo only, or whether it is embedded in a speech clause.  
6.4.4 Third person imperative utterances marked by loo 
In this section I argue that the analysis of loo as a marker of metarepresentations of desirable 
utterances also applies to its use in instances of what seems to be jussive utterances described in 
section  6.3.2. But first I need to make clear the difference between what is termed “desirable 
utterances” in Relevance Theory and utterances containing regular imperatives. Within Relevance 
Theory, imperatives are seen as representing a desirable state of affairs. To cite Wilson, “Someone who 
utters an imperative indicates that she is thinking about a state of affairs which she regards as desirable 
from someone’s point of view” (Wilson 2012:254). In short: imperatives are representations of desirable 
states of affairs. Desirable utterances, on the other hand, are metarepresentations of another 
representation, for instance if a desirable utterance contains an imperative then the speaker of this 
utterance is (meta-)representating a representation of a desirable state of affairs; there is an additional 
level of representation involved. 
So far, we have seen that loo is used to mark a speaker’s own desirable utterances that she wishes 
to be produced by her addressee; or to mark desirable utterances that the speaker was asked by a third 
person to pass on to her addressee. On first sight, the function of loo in what I have called so far third 
person imperatives seems to be distinct from the examples analyzed in the previous section. In fact, as 
long as I relied on recorded texts (monologues) in my analysis of Indus Kohistani, I assumed that loo is 
a third person imperative marker because instances of this use were the only examples I had in my data. 
It was only after I had started to pay more attention to mother tongue speakers’ discourse that I became 
aware of the second and more common use as a marker of desirable utterances.  
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Let me recapitulate here the main differences and similarities between the third person imperative 
use of loo and that of marking desirable utterances (see section  6.3.2.2): (i) clauses containing third 
person imperatives always have a third person subject whereas desirable utterances usually do not. (ii) 
Clauses containing third person imperatives are not embedded in a matrix clause with a complement-
taking speech verb such as “tell C that …”. There may be, but there is often not, an obvious addressee 
that is supposed to forward the utterance to the recipient of the directive. Desirable utterances, in 
comparison, are often but not necessarily, embedded in such a speech clause. Nevertheless, in some of 
the examples seen so far, there is no difference in the syntax of the two kinds of utterances; what guides 
the addressee to interpret such utterances as desirable utterance that he is asked to reproduce, or as a 
third person imperative that does not necessarily imply him, is the context. It seems to me that there is 
no clear dividing line between the two uses, rather a gradual transition from “speaker A wishes 
addressee B to reproduce her utterance to recipient C” to “speaker A wishes her command or 
permission or agreement to be made known to recipient C”, in which case a conveyor B may or may 
not be specified or even existent. What is common to both is that speaker A wishes her utterance to be 
communicated to a third person via someone else, in other words: that her utterance marked by loo is a 
desirable utterance. 
In light of this I propose that the third person imperative function of the marker loo is just a special 
case of the basic function as a marker of desirable utterances. Indus Kohistani does not have a 
morphological and genuine third person imperative marker. Instead, the concept of “metarepresentation 
of a desirable utterance” is used to express this notion. In the following section, I will further lay out 
my claim. 
6.4.5 Indus Kohistani third person imperative: a special case of desirable utterances 
In section  6.4.2 I defined loo as a procedural marker of metarepresentations of desirable utterances 
that constrains the addressee towards the construction of a higher-level explicature of the kind “speaker 
A wishes me to produce her utterance to addressee C”. In this section I want to argue that Indus 
Kohistani third person imperative utterances are really second person imperatives that are also instances 
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of  metarepresentations of desirable utterances and thus the addressee of such an utterance will arrive at 
a similar higher-level explicature such as “speaker A wishes someone (specified or unspecified) to tell 
recipient C, ‘You … (command/permission/agreement)’”.  
As we have seen in section  6.3.1, the metarepresentation of a desirable utterance is an utterance 
that a speaker A wants her addressee to produce to a recipient C. Such an utterance may be a 
description of a state of affairs, a question, a wish, or a command. Speaker A may explicitly ask her 
addressee to produce her metarepresentation of the desirable utterance to person C. In another scenario, 
the request to produce the desirable utterance is not made explicit linguistically other than by using loo, 
which constrains addressee B to construct a higher-level explicature while processing speaker A’s 
utterance. The fact that addressee B is the one that should do the telling has often to be inferred as for 
instance in example (241). In yet another case, there is no appeal, neither explicit nor implicit, to 
addressee B to be the one to produce the desirable utterance. Nevertheless, the speaker’s utterance 
containing a third person imperative metarepresents an utterance that she, the speaker, wishes or would 
wish to be addressed to person C. There is no basic difference between metarepresentations of desirable 
utterances as described in subsection  6.3.1 and third person imperatives discussed in subsection  6.3.2. 
Rather, there is a continuum, starting with utterances where speaker A explicitly asks an addressee B to 
produce her metarepresentation of the desirable utterance, and ending with third person imperative 
utterances where the person supposed to convey the desirable utterance remains unspecified or 
unmentioned. But in both cases, what speaker A utters is a metarepresentation of a desirable utterance 
that she wishes to be conveyed to recipient C. The next examples will illustrate this continuum, (243) 
representing its “explicit” end. 
(246) tú sayõṍ kira man-á če [kùl-õõ kàam 
 2SG 3PL.DIST.GEN to say-IMP.2SG COMP bead-GEN.PL work  
 
 mutsa-ái=loo]      
 finish-IMP.2PL=DUM      
    ‘You tell them, “Finish the bead work”’ (conversation 3.10.2011) 
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Here, the speaker explicitly tells her addressee to reproduce her utterance containing a command to a 
group of people known to both of them. Such an instance represents the explicit end of the continuum.  
Further along are utterances such as example (247) below. I had talked to my language consultant 
about one of my colleagues who wanted to start a biogas project so that people who own cattle would 
be able to produce their own gas for cooking. My language consultant then said: 
(247) [awál m  ̃ĩ̀ kira sand-á=loo]   
 first 1SG.POSS for make-IMP.2SG=DUM   
   ‘First (he) should make one (biogas installation) for me’ or: ‘tell him, “First make one for 
me”’(conversation 27.4.2012) 
In (247), my language consultant did not make explicit her wish that I tell my colleague “First make 
one for me” by saying “you tell him …”. Nevertheless there was no doubt that I was expected to pass 
on her utterance.  
In this example, the imperative clause has no subject. The most obvious interpretation would be a 
second-person subject that has been omitted as is often the case in imperative clauses. But according to 
my language consultant, one could as well say awál ũ m  ̃ĩ̀ kira sanda=loo  ‘First he make (IMP.2SG) one 
for me’, using an explicit third person subject in the imperative phrase. 
At the far end of the explicit – implicit continuum are utterances such as examples (225) and (230), 
repeated here. 
(225) só=lee m  ̃ĩ̀ tsút~tsut maasmá thé    
 3SG.DIST=REP 1SG.POSS small~REDUPL child.PL be.PRS.M.PL    
   ‘He said, “I have small children …”’ 
 hãã mẽẽ̀ asií kar-áthe khẽ má as  ̃ĩ̀ ɡhari-ãã̀ 
 and 1SG.ERG 3SG.PROX.DAT do-PRS.PRF SUB 1SG 3SG.PROX.POSS wife-GEN.M  
 
 tsuúr thú khẽ [tãĩ̀ ɡhariũṹ maar-á=loo]   
 lover be.PRS.M.SG SUB REFL.POSS.F wife kill-IMP.2SG=DUM    
 
 [mii-  ̃ ́ maar-á=loo]      
 1SG.DOM-also kill-IMP.2SG=DUM      
   ‘and if I have done any such thing against him, such as being the lover of his wife then he 
should kill his wife; he may kill me too”’ (conversation 18.5.2012) 
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The speaker of this utterance is talking about someone who wants to kill him and from whom he is 
hiding. Neither does he explicitly ask a person to tell his enemy “Kill your wife, kill me if I have done 
anything wrong” nor can such a person be inferred from the context. He wishes to say this to his 
opponent but cannot in the circumstances. And the best and most economical way to express his wish is 
by using a second person imperative phrase and the marker loo, thus making the utterance the 
metarepresentation of a desirable utterance that he wishes someone would tell his enemy. It is not 
necessary that his wish come true. 
In example (230), repeated here, a mother accepts a situation where her newly married daughter is 
not allowed to visit her parents about hearing that she is happy in her in-laws’ house. 
(230) man-àynt m  ̃ĩ̀ dhií xušàal thí [hó=loo]  
 say-PRS.F 1SG.POSS daughter happy be.PRS.F become.IMP.2SG=DUM  
   ‘(She) says, “When my daughter is happy then let it be so (that she is not allowed to visit us)”’ 
(A mother’s advice #45) 
The imperative phrase hó=loo is ambiguous in that it is not clear if it refers to her daughter (“you 
daughter be (there)”), or to the in-laws (“you in-laws be (as you are)”), or to the situation (“you 
situation be (as it is)”). But in either case, the mother’s utterance is the metarepresentation of a desirable 
second person imperative utterance that she would wish someone to say.  
At the end of this section let me return to my claim that Indus Kohistani has no genuine third 
person imperative and therefore the “desirable utterance” concept has to be used to express third-person 
imperative meaning. There are other ways for a speaker to convey to her addressee that she wants a 
third person to do something. The speakers of example (224) might have said (245) instead of (249). 
(248) bé ižaazá de-ént-ø če ṹ tsàam hár-ee 
 1PL.EXCL permission give-PRS.M-PL.M COMP 3SG.PROX skin take-SBJV.3SG 
    ‘We give permission that he take the hide’ 
However, (249) is much more economical than version (248). 
(249) [amã  ̃ ́ har-á=loo]     
 REFL take-IMP.2SG=DUM     
    ‘He may take the hide’ or literally ‘we wish to convey to him (by someone) “take the hide”’ 
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The addressee of (249) requires less processing effort because there is less linguistic material to decode, 
less ambiguities and reference indeterminacies to resolve and because the use of loo constrains the 
interpretation of the utterance towards the desired interpretation, thus saving the addressee’s time and 
effort. My data confirm that the marking of a second person imperative phrase with loo is the standard 
way of expressing third person directives. 
6.5 Summary: the marker loo 
To summarize this chapter, I have introduced and described the marker loo in section  6.1 and  6.2 
and illustrated its uses as a marker of desirable utterances in section  6.3.1. In the following section I 
have presented examples of third person imperative utterances that are marked by loo and have 
highlighted the similarities and differences between the two kinds of utterances. In section  6.3.2.3 I have 
shown that the analysis of loo as a speech marker of a special kind of utterances on the one hand and as 
a third person imperative marker on the other hand would require assuming that there are two different 
markers loo. Section  6.4 offers an analysis of loo. Within the framework of Relevance Theory, loo may 
be analyzed as a marker of one particular kind of metarepresentations i.e. of metarepresentations of 
desirable utterances. Furthermore, I have argued that the so-called third person imperative use of the 
marker loo is just another instance of its use as metarepresentation marker of desirable utterances. As 
Indus Kohistani grammar has no genuine third person imperative marker, the use of loo is the standard 
way of expressing third person imperative meanings. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
7.1 Summary 
Four markers of Indus Kohistani: the evidential marker lee, the marker karee, an instance of so-
called quotatives, the complementizer če, and the desirable-utterance marker loo have for the first time 
been described in detail in this thesis.  
The marker lee is a “reported” evidential, marking the contents of a clause as second- or thirdhand 
knowledge. It occurs in complements of utterance predicates but may also be the only indicator of the 
proposition marked by it being a reported speech. Only reported speech of persons other than the actual 
reporter are marked by it. The position of lee within a complement construction indicates whether the 
marked clause contains secondhand or thirdhand report: in case of a secondhand report lee follows the 
complement; a thirdhand report is indicated by lee following the complement-taking predicate. The 
exact source of the quoted speech marked by lee may or may not be known. Not every reported speech 
has to be marked by lee. 
The marker karee is the grammaticalized converb of the verb kar- ‘do’, in its uses comparable with 
grammaticalized forms of SAY verbs. It indicates reported and self-reported speech but also reported 
and self-reported thoughts. Furthermore karee is a marker of purpose and reason clauses and occurs in 
naming and in similarity constructions. The position of karee is clause-final; clauses marked by it may 
be preposed, embedded within the main clause, or postposed. 
The uses of the complementizer če, borrowed most probably from Pashto, considerably overlap 
with those of karee. It is a clause-initial marker; subordinate clauses introduced by če are always 
following the main clause. Besides introducing complements of utterance-perception-cognition 
predicates and other complement-taking predicates, it marks such clauses that have no complement-
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taking predicate as complements of speech and thought. It also occurs as clause linker in purpose and 
reason clauses. Unlike the marker karee, če also functions as relativizer in relative clauses, occurs in 
conditional clauses, in subordinate clauses that describe a quality mentioned in the main clause, in 
answers to questions raised in the main clause, and as introducer of independent clauses. In this study, I 
have looked in detail only at those uses of če that both markers share. I have further commented on the 
distribution of the older karee and the more recent če marker; the latter seems to be in the process of 
replacing karee as marker of reported speech. 
The marker loo has two main uses: it marks utterances that a speaker wants her addressee to say to 
a third person, and it is used to indicate third person imperative. Clauses marked by loo may be 
complements of speech predicates or may be independent. In both uses the marker is positioned clause-
finally.  
Central to my analysis of these markers is the notion of metarepresentation within Relevance 
Theory. Some utterances contain the description of a state of affairs; they are a representation of this 
state of affairs. Others contain not the description of a state of affairs but the description of another 
utterance or thought: they metarepresent or interpret that utterance or thought or, in other words, a 
public representation (utterance) and a mental representation (thought) respectively. In both cases what 
is metarepresentated is an attributed representation. Besides such attributed metarepresentations, non-
attributive representations such as possible thoughts (negations), desirable thoughts (questions), and 
desirable utterances and thoughts may be metarepresented.  
In this thesis I have proposed that what all four markers indicate is metarepresentation: a clause 
marked by any one of them does not contain the description of a state of affairs, that is, a representation, 
but the representation of a representation or, in other words, a metarepresentation. The “reported” 
evidential lee marks metarepresentations of speech other than of the speaker herself and at the same 
time activates the hearer’s argumentation module in order to get past his epistemic vigilance. Both karee 
and če, in the uses they share, indicate that the clause contains the metarepresentation of the speaker’s 
own or someone else’s speech or thought. Finally, the marker loo indicates the metarepresentation of a 
desirable utterance. In this case what the speaker utters and what is marked by loo is the 
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metarepresentation of what she wishes her addressee to say. So what unites all four markers is their 
meaning “procedural indicator of metarepresentation”. What distinguishes them is the kind of 
metarepresentation they indicate: lee marks metarepresentations of attributed public representations, 
karee and če both indicate metarepresentations of attributed and self-attributed public and mental 
representations, and loo marks metarepresentations of non-attributive public representations. Each of 
these markers may be used in two different settings: in utterances where the “saying”, “thinking”, or 
“wishing to say” is part of the explicature, and in utterances where the marker is the only indicator of it 
being a metarepresentation and so constrains the hearer towards the construction of a higher-level 
explicature such as “X says/thinks/wishes to say…”. 
Languages differ widely in whether and how they mark metarepresentations. These may not be 
marked at all; the hearer has to infer whether an utterance is the representation of a state of affairs or of 
another representation. Its explicit marking helps the addressee of such an utterance to save processing 
effort in the search for relevance. Evidentials, occurring in many languages, are one means to indicate 
attributed metarepresentations. Quotatives and complementizers are often used to mark both public and 
mental attributed metarepresentations. Indus Kohistani loo marks metarepresentations of desirable 
utterances; to my knowledge, this is the first instance of such a marker being recognized.  
My analysis of the four markers not only confirms the proposed distinction in Relevance Theory 
between representations of states of affairs (utterances that are used descriptively) and 
metarepresentations of states of affairs (utterances that are used interpretively), as Blass’s analysis of the 
Sissala marker rɛ ́does (Blass 1990:123). The existence of a marker such as Indus Kohistani loo 
supports and confirms the theoretical distinctions between several types of non-attributive linguistic 
metarepresentations (see  6.4.1), namely that there is a marker to specifically indicate 
metarepresentations of desirable utterances. 
7.2 Further research 
The Indus Kohistani markers lee, karee, če, and loo have been described in detail for the first time 
in this study. The data used here are from one particular extended family (mostly female members) and 
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village, representing one of the two main dialects of Indus Kohistani. More data from more diverse 
sources will be necessary to confirm or question my findings.  
Concerning the “reported” marker lee, more folk stories will be needed to study and analyze its 
particular functions in such narratives. 
In  Chapter 4 I have suggested that underlying the particular grammaticalization path of karee  may 
be an extension of its function as metarepresentation marker: from marking metarepresentations of 
attributed public repesentations only to metarepresentations of attributed and self-attributed public as 
well as mental representations. It would be interesting to look at other grammaticalized markers 
developed from SAY verbs or other such sources whether this explanation would apply to them as well.  
The complementizer če merits much more attention than I have given it in this thesis. Again, an in-
depth study of all uses of če, of the similar marker in Pashto, and of Persian ki within the framework of 
relevance theory might show if there is one unifying meaning after all. In particular, where Indus 
Kohistani has two different complement options for complement-taking predicates, one a sentential 
complement introduced by če and one a reduced complement (as for instance in examples (154) and 
(155)), a comparison of the two types might confirm or disprove my assumption, namely that če-marked 
complements contain information presented from an “insider” perspective whereas in reduced 
complements, the same information is presented as viewed from outside. Similarly, a comparison of 
purpose and reason clauses marked by karee and če with purpose and reason clauses without these 









Typological features of Indus Kohistani Grammar 
Here I give a brief overview of the grammatical features of Indus Kohistani as seen from a 
typological perspective. 
1. Morphology 
 On the morphological level, languages are classified with the help of the indexes of synthesis and 
of fusion. The index of synthesis indicates whether and to which degree a language consists of isolated 
morphemes or of words composed of several morphemes, i.e. root and affixes. In Indus Kohistani, we 
find words built up of a root and one or several affixes, as examples (1) to (3) show. 
(1) kutsùr-a       
 dog-PL       
   ‘dogs’ 
(2) kar-h-aánt-e       
 do-POT-PRS.M-PL.M       
   ‘are able to do’ 
(3) kam-zùur       
 little-strength       
   ‘weak’ 
There are, however, many words consisting of just one morpheme so that Indus Kohistani is not a 
purely synthetic language but rather somewhere in between isolating and synthetic.  
The index of fusion distinguishes between languages where the morphemes of a word can easily be 
separated (agglutinative languages) and languages where morphemes have merged together to such a 
degree that they are no longer separable (fusional languages). Indus Kohistani is partly agglutinative; the 
most common plural suffix can easily be separated from the noun as can suffixes indicating gender, 
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most of the case markers and verb suffixes. This is demonstrated in examples (4), (5), and example (2) 
above. 
(4) baal-i-a       
 word-F-PL       
   ‘words’ 
(5) màaṣ-i       
 man-DAT       
   ‘to the man’ 
In (4) both gender and plural marker are distinct morphemes; in (5) it is the case marker morpheme that 
can easily be separated from the noun stem. 
On the other hand, there are words where root and gender- or plural-indicating morpheme have 
merged and are no longer separable, as is illustrated in examples (6) and (7). 
(6) atshàk       
 bad.M        
 
(7) atshìk       
 bad.F       
   ‘bad’ 
In example (8), too, it is not possible to separate a plural morpheme from the noun stem. 
(8) khàan  khàn     
 mountain.SG  mountains.PL     
   ‘mountain’ vs. ‘mountains’ 
Plural in this case is indicated by a shortening of the noun stem vowel. 
So while many suffixes in Indus Kohistani can easily be separated from the stem and from one 
another, there are also instances of fusion and therefore, Indus Kohistani is, to some extent, a fusional 
language. 
2. Basic constituent order 
The basic constituent order in Indus Kohistani is subject - object - verb (SOV). Almost all clauses 
are verb-final; in pragmatically unmarked clauses, the subject, and where present, the object precede the 
verb, as shown in examples (9) and (10). 
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(9) ék dís màaṣ=uk i-íɡaa    
 one day man=INDEF come-PFV2.M.SG    
   ‘One day a certain man came’ (More about sin #5) 
(10) tèe meešwaal-á só makày manḍ-áṣat-e   
 then menfolk-PL 3SG.DIST corn thresh-FUT.M-PL.M   
   ‘Then the menfolk will thresh the corn’ (About deqani #66) 
In both examples, the verb is clause-final; in (10) the subject meešwaalá ‘menfolk’ and the object 
makày ‘corn’ precede the verb. 
The verb of a main clause may be followed by a complement clause as in example (11). The 
complement clause is indicated by square brackets. 
(11) h  ̃ĩ̀ mút-õõ man-áthe [ràal kar-iž]   
 now other-PL.ERG say-PRS.PFV night do-SBJV.1PL   
   ‘Now the others said, “Let’s spend the night (here)”’ (Prince and fairy #64) 
The order of constituents may be changed because of pragmatic factors. 
In the Indus Kohistani noun phrase, the head noun is usually the right-most element. Adjectives, 
numerals, demonstrative adjectives, the indefinite marker ek ‘one’ and possessors precede the noun. 
Example (12) shows a typical noun phrase. 
(12) m  ̃ĩ̀ ṣã  ̃ ́ dùu lák ẓhaa-ṭoó   
 1SG.POSS 3PL.DEM two small brother-DIM.PL   
   ‘my two younger brothers’ 
The demonstrative adjective and the numeral may precede or follow each other. The possessive pronoun 
always precedes other elements of the noun phrase, the exception being a pragmatically marked clause 
where the possessive pronoun may follow the head noun. Another exception is the Indefinite Specific 
marker =uk, an enclitic that follows the head noun. Example (9) above shows an instance of this 
marker. 
Relative clauses, too, are modifiers of noun phrases. In Indus Kohistani we find both, prenominal 
relative clauses where the relative clause precedes the head noun, and left-dislocated postnominal 
relative clauses. For examples and discussion of relative clauses I refer the reader to chapter 5, 
section  5.2.3.  
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Consistent with the SOV order of constituents, adpositions in Indus Kohistan always follow the 
noun as can be seen in (13) and (14). 
(13) khàn tal      
 mountain.OBL on      
   ‘on the mountain’ 
(14) màaṣ-ãã kira      
 man-GEN.M for      
   ‘for the man’ 
As for the order in verb phrases, when Indus Kohistani uses constructions consisting of two verbs, 
then the first verb is the main verb expressing the meaning whereas the second verb is semantically 
empty and carries the markers for tense, aspect, gender and number, an example of which is given in 
(15). 
(15) má tií dáz- de-ént naíi   
 1SG 2SG.DOM burn give-PRS.M. NEG   
   ‘I don’t let you burn’ (Miscellaneous #46) 
The first verb used in this construction, daz- ‘burn’, carries the meaning and consists of the root only 
whereas the second verb deént  ‘give’ is marked for tense/aspect and gender. The construction as a 
whole conveys the meaning “let someone do something”. 
Another, very frequently used complex verb construction consists of a semantically bleached verb 
such as do, give, or become plus a noun or noun-like word. Here again, the verb is always in second 
position, as shown in (16). 
(16) sã  ̃ ́ čáɣ de-ént-e     
 3PL.DIST wail give-PRS.M-PL.M     
   ‘They are wailing’ 
In Indus Kohistani negated clauses, the negation particle is usually placed directly preceding the 
finite verb, as example (17) illustrates. 
(17) sã  ̃ ́ čáɣ nií de-ént-e    
 3PL.DIST wail NEG give-PRS.M-PL.M    
   ‘They do not wail’ 
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When special emphasis is put on the negation (pragmatically marked) then the negation particle naíi  
‘no’ follows the finite verb; example (15) above being such an instance. 
In Indus Kohistani yes - no questions, the question particle =aa follows the finite verb (18). 
(18) tú oktá uk-áṣit=aa     
 2SG tomorrow come.up-FUT.F=Q     
   ‘Will you come up tomorrow?’ 
The question word of a content question is usually positioned directly before the verb phrase, but 
again this word order is not rigid and can be different in a pragmatically marked clause.  
3. Encoding of grammatical relations 
In Indus Kohistani noun and postpositional phrases, grammatical relations are marked on the 
dependent or modifying constituent. One such group of modifiers is adjectives. Indus Kohistani 
adjectives may be of the invariable kind that cannot be inflected and therefore do not display agreement, 
or they are variable adjectives that show agreement with the head noun for gender, a subgroup of these 
also for number. Examples (19) to (21) show one adjective of the last mentioned group. 
(19) kiṣõ̀õ kutsùr      
 black.M.SG dog.M      
   ‘black dog’ 
(20) kiṣ  ̃ĩ̀ kutsùr-i      
 black.F dog-F      
   ‘black bitch’ 
(21) kiṣẽẽ̀ kutsùr-a      
 black.M.PL dog-M.PL      
   ‘black dogs’ 
The adjective ‘black’ in (19) - (21) above agrees in gender, and in number  if the head noun has 
masculine gender.  
In possessive constructions, too, the possessor, the dependent constituent, will be marked. When 
the slot of the possessor is filled by a noun this will have genitive case marking and will agree with the 
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gender of the head noun. Examples (22) to (24) show such instances of both agreement and case 
marking on the dependent constituent. 
(22) màaṣ-ãã puúc ̣      
 man-GEN.M son      
   ‘the man’s son’ 
Here, the possessor noun is marked with a fused genitive case and gender agreement marker: the 
masculine gender marker agrees with the head noun puúc ̣‘son’, whereas in the following example (23), 
the fused genitive/gender marker is feminine, agreeing with the head noun dhií  ‘daughter’. 
(23) màaṣ-ãĩ dhií      
 man-GEN.F daughter      
   ‘the man’s daughter’ 
(24) màaṣ-õõ maasmá      
 man-PL.GEN child.PL      
   ‘the men’s children’ 
If the possessor is plural-marked as in (24) then there is no gender distinction like in (22) and (23); the 
suffix -õõ is used for both masculine and feminine possesses. 
In postpositional phrases, too, the dependent element, the noun, is marked as illustrated in (25). 
(25) ɡharimaaṣ-á mil      
 woman-OBL with      
   ‘with the woman’ 
Here, the dependent element ɡharimaáṣ ‘woman’ is marked by oblique case. 
At the clausal level, there are grammatical relations between the verb as head and its arguments; 
case marking shows one such syntactic dependency. Indus Kohistani uses several case systems to mark 
grammatical relations in a clause: a nominative case marking system for intransitive clauses and 
transitive clauses with imperfective aspect, ergative case marking for transitive clauses with perfective 
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aspect, differential object marking21, and dative, genitive or oblique case marking for experiencer 
clauses. In the following paragraphs I give examples of each of these strategies.  
In all intransitive and in transitive clauses with imperfective aspect, S22 and A23 respectively are 
similarly treated in that they have no marking at all. This is demonstrated in the following two examples 
(26) and (27). 
(26) ṹ ɡatá baazaar-ií bazíthu    
 3SG.PROX again market-DAT go.PRS.PFV.M.SG    
   ‘Again he went to the market’ (A.’s story #21) 
In this intransitive clause, the subject is unmarked, as it is in example (27), a transitive clause with 
imperfective aspect. 
(27) phày màazãã zòṛ manḍ-ãĩ̀s    
 old.woman of.other clothes beat-PST.IPFV.F    
   ‘The old woman used to wash other people’s clothes’ (A.’s story #5) 
The second argument in a transitive clause, the direct object (DO), may or may not be marked . 
Masica states that Indo-Aryan languages (among them Indus Kohistani) do not have accusative case. 
However, the DO may still be marked, depending on its position in the Animacy/Definiteness hierarchy: 
a DO high on this scale is more likely to be marked. For instance in Urdu, it is obligatory for a human 
DO to be marked by dative case whereas other DOs are unmarked. In Indus Kohistani, only 1st, 2nd, and 
3rd person singular, and 1st and 2nd person plural  pronouns in DO position are marked, this being the 
very top of the Animacy/Definiteness Hierarchy scale. Example (28) shows DOM marking of a 3rd 
person singular pronoun; example (29) shows that there is no DOM marking on a 3rd person plural 
pronoun. 
(28) só tás paš-àant    
 3SG.DIST 3SG.DIST.DOM see-PRS.M    
   ‘He is seeing him’ 
                                              
21 In languages with differential object marking (DOM), the case marking of a direct object is dependent on its 
position on the scale of the Animacy/Definiteness hierarchy. DO high on the scale are marked, DO low on the scale 
are unmarked (Aissen 2003). 
22 S = subject; it is used as term for the sole argument of an intransitive clause. 
23 A =  the most actor-like argument in a transitive clause. 
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(29) bé sã  ̃ ́ paš-àant-e    
 1PL.EXCL 3PL.DIST see-PRS.M-PL.M    
   ‘We are seeing them’ 
To mark the DO, the oblique form is used with the exception of 3rd person singular (as in example (28)) 
which has a distinct DO pronoun form.  
The third argument in a transitive clause is marked with dative case; other cases are oblique, 
genitive, ablative, and ergative which I will treat next.  
In transitive clauses with perfective aspect, the case marking for A switches to an ergative system, 
where the agent or actor is marked for ergative case. This is split ergativity as it applies only to 
transitive clauses with perfective aspect. One would expect that now the subject of an intransitive clause 
and the second argument O24 would be grouped together and both have zero marking (A vs. S & O). 
This is not so in Indus Kohistani: S has zero (nominative case) marking, A has ergative case marking, 
and O shows the same differential object marking as in imperfective transitive clauses. Another aspect 
of the difference between S in intransitive clauses and O in transitive perfective-aspect clauses is that 
the verb does not agree with O in the latter kind of clause. Examples (30), (31), and (32) show the 
ergative case marking of the agent and differential object marking on O. 
(30) màaṣ-ee ás paš-áthe     
 man-ERG 3SG.PROX.DOM see-PRS.PFV     
   ‘The man saw her’ 
(31) ɡharimaaṣ-eé ás paš-áthe     
 woman-ERG 3SG.PROX.DOM see-PRS.PFV     
   ‘The woman saw her’ 
(32) màaṣ-õõ ás paš-áthe     
 man-ERG.PL 3SG.PROX.DOM see-PRS.PFV     
   ‘The men saw her’ 
                                              
24 O stands for the not most actor-like second argument of a transitive clause. 
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All three examples also demonstrate that there is no agreement marking between O and verb. Ergative 
case marking occurs with all transitive verb forms marked for perfective aspect, this includes the 
conditional verb form. 
Experiencer or dative-subject constructions are found in many Indo-Aryan languages (Masica 
1991:346). In such clauses the most likely candidate for subject position is marked with dative case 
(some languages also use genitive case). Semantically, this “subject” is not an agent but an experiencer; 
such constructions are used to express “physical sensations and conditions, mental states, wanting or 
needing, and obligations” (1991:347-9). The less subject-like argument in such clauses will be marked 
with nominative case (zero marking) and will agree with the verb in gender and number. A more 
detailed discussion will have to be the topic of future studies; suffice to say that Indus Kohistani makes 
extensive use of this construction. Not only dative case but also genitive and oblique case (plus locative 
postposition) may mark the experiencer subject. Examples (33) and (34) below are given to illustrate 
such constructions. 
(33) màaṣ-i nìiẓ i-ínt     
 man-DAT sleep.F come-PRS.F     
   ‘The man is sleepy’ [lit.: ‘Sleep comes to the man’] 
(34) màaṣ-ãĩ laáz di-ínt     
 man-GEN.F embarrassment.F give-PRS.F     
   ‘The man is embarrassed’ [lit.: ‘The man’s embarrassment gives’] 
Example (33) contains a dative experiencer subject; in (34) the experiencer subject has genitive case 
marking. Note that in both examples, the verb agrees in gender and number with the unmarked, less 
subject-like second argument. 
In the examples presented so far we have already seen that in Indus Kohistani, in intransitive 
clauses and in transitive clauses with imperfective aspect the verb agrees with the subject in gender and 
number (examples (26) to (28)). This is a case of head marking as the verb is the head of the clause.  
Exceptions are the just mentioned experiencer clauses ( examples (33), (34)) where the less subject-
like argument agrees with the verb, clauses with verbs other than finite, clauses with verbs in irrealis 
mood, and clauses where A is marked with ergative case (examples (30) to (32)). In these latter 
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constructions, the verb does not agree with either of the arguments; a gender- and number-neutral form 
is used.  
In clauses with irrealis verb forms such as imperative and subjunctive, the agreement between 
subject and verb is not in gender and number but in person and number. 
4. Tense, aspect and mood 
Indus Kohistani verbs are marked for both tense and aspect. Masica notes about verbs in Indo-
Aryan languages that “… paradigms are made up of various combinations of inherited-synthetic, neo-
synthetic/agglutinative, and so-called analytic (discrete) elements” (1991:257). The basic elements are 
often participles and auxiliaries. This seems to be true also for Indus Kohistani verbs. The observations 
in this subsection as well as those above are work in progress; a comprehensive description of the Indus 
Kohistani verb system still waits to be written. 
The finite verb pattern can be described as follows in (35), taken from Masica (1991:258): 
(35) VERB STEM+ASPECT MARKER+AGREEMENT+TENSE OR MOOD MARKER+AGREEMENT  
The aspect marker is the innermost suffix, followed by an agreement marker (not always) and tense 
marker (again not always). Mood and tense marker exclude each other. Tense and agreement markers 
may have fused to one suffix.  
Indus Kohistani has morphological Present, Past, and Future tense marking. The following example 
(36) shows the pattern of the Present tense verb form. 
(36) kará- a- nt- e   
 do.IPFV.PTCP- M- PRS- PL.M   
   ‘are doing’ 
The stem of this construction is the imperfective participle kará ‘doing’; its aspect is, as the term says, 
imperfective. This is followed by the agreement marker -a- (M) and the tense marker -nt- (PRS); the 
fused agreement marker -e (PL.M) is the outermost suffix. The following Table 1 and  
Table 2 show the Indus Kohistani past tense forms of the transitive verb kar- ‘do’ and of the intransitive 
verb til- ‘move’. 
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Table 1. Past tense forms of kar- ‘do’ 
kar-áthe ‘did, has done’ PRESENT PERFECTIVE 
kar-álaas ‘had done’ PAST PERFECTIVE 
karíl ‘did’ PERFECTIVE 1 
kar-áɡil ‘did, would do’ PERFECTIVE 2 
kar-ãã̀s ‘was doing, used to do’ PAST IMPERFECTIVE, SG, M  
 
Table 2. Past tense forms of til- ‘move’ 
til-íthu ‘moved, has moved’ PRESENT PERFECTIVE, SG, M 
til-ílaas ‘had been moving’ PAST PERFECTIVE, SG, M 
til-íl ‘moved’ PERFECTIVE 1 
til-íɡaa ‘moved’ PERFECTIVE 2, SG, M 
til-ãã̀s ‘was moving, used to move’ PAST IMPERFECTIVE, SG, M  
The terms “Present Perfective” and “Past Perfective”(“Perfect” and “Pluperfect/Past Perfect” in 
Hallberg 1999) are a working reference term for the time being; I am aware of the fact that especially 
“Present Perfective” is somewhat misleading. It is not a typical Perfect; in the Pattan variety of Indus 
Kohistani it is the default Past tense verb form used in narratives. A more appropriate term for it might 
be “Near Past”, and “Remote Past” instead of Past Perfective. 
Perfective 1 is a simple Perfective, not marked for tense. An event described using this verb form 
is seen as complete but not necessarily as having occurred in the past. 
The Perfective 2 is a marked Perfective which for instance is being used when describing events 
that are hypothetical, happening in a possible world. The study of this verb form is still ongoing.  
Both Present and Past Imperfective are used to convey habitual as well as continual aspect. The 
Past Imperfective form is also used to describe actions that were intended but never achieved. 
Indus Kohistani has three verb forms expressing morphological mood: imperative, subjunctive, and 
conditional. Imperative and subjunctive verb forms differ from indicative verb forms in that they are not 
marked for tense, aspect or gender-number agreement. Instead, the verb stem is followed by a person-
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number agreement suffix. For instance, the 2nd person singular imperative verb form consists of the root 
and the suffix -á; for 2nd person plural mperative the suffix -ìi follows the root. 
The subjunctive paradigm for the verb man- ‘say’ is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Subjunctive paradigm 
person and number root - suffix translation 
1st person sg man-àm ‘I may say’ 
2nd and 3rd person sg màn-ee ‘you/he/she may say’ 
1st person pl man-ìž ‘we may say’ 
2nd and 3rd person pl màn-ãã ‘you/they may say’  
The conditional verb forms of intransitive, transitive and causative verbs are shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Conditional verb form 
intransitive tilil-uú ‘if move/s’ 
transitive karil-uú ‘if do/es’ 
causative pašaal-uú ‘if show/s’ 
The conditional verb form has perfective aspect marking; transitive conditional verb forms induce 
ergative case marking of the agent. 
5. Summary: Indus Kohistani typology 
From a typological viewpoint, Indus Kohistani is a fairly consistent OV language. Table 5 shows 
the following correlations found in pragmatically neutral Indus Kohistani clauses as compared with 




Table 5. Indus Kohistani constituent order correlation 
Indus Kohistani word order correlation Lehmann’s OV languages word order correlation 
noun - postposition noun - postposition 
genitive - head noun genitive - noun 
adjective - head noun adjective - noun 
relative clause - head noun and head noun - relative clause relative clause - noun 
question words: non-initial non-initial question word 
morphology: suffixes suffixes 
main verb - auxiliary verb main verb - auxiliary verb 
comparison: standard - quality standard - comparative adjective 
adverb - verb adverb - verb 
negative marker - verb  verb - negative 
subordinator - clause and clause - subordinator clause - subordinator 
Or, in terms of Dryer’s Branching Direction Theory (Dryer 1992), Indus Kohistani is a left-
branching language: phrasal (branching) categories precede non-phrasal (non-branching) categories, as 
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